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ABSTRACT
Cognitive processing performance in complex 
situations - the dynamics of information flow.
Ph.D. thesis by Robert B, Lee,
Department of Psychology, University of St. Andrews,
The thesis describes and develops a new theoretical approach 
to the study of human cognitive processing performance in complex 
situations. This approach utilises and integrates existing 
theoretical and empirical data from a number of traditionally 
separate areas of information processing psychology, such as 
cognition, perception, memory, imagery, skill and vigilance.
Contemporary cognitive psychology considers perception, 
memory and imagery as functionally inter-related and inter-dependent 
processes characterised by active, constructive, conscious information 
processing* In the present thesis the implications of this view are 
extended, in that this processing is considered to occupy the 
cognitive processing capacity of the subject in qualitatively the 
same way as does normal decision-making, problem-solving, or 
conscious internalised thought processing of any kind. Existing 
research evidence accumulated over the past 20 years suggests that 
this conscious information processing capacity is limited.
In dual-task situations inter-task interference resulting 
from attention alternating between the information processing 
requirements of the two tasks, has been demonstrated in numerous 
experiments. If the above cognitive view of perception, memory and 
imagery is correct, such inter-task interference should take place 
between * externalised* and ’internalised* tasks, - i.e. thought 
processes should interfere with visual perception. There exists
4
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some experimental evidence that this is the case in certain 
situations. However, unlike the inter-task interference observed 
in typical dual-task situations, our ongoing conscious stream of 
perceptual awareness does not appear to be continually intermittently 
interrupted as information processing referent to some other 
cognitive task * captures' the single channel.
There is evidence from one area of research that memory 
information concerning expected, over-learned familiar visual 
patterns may be incorporated into the perception of such patterns. 
Conversely, the recent increase in research investigation into the 
phenomena of mental imagery has demonstrated that real sensory 
information may be incorporated into internally synthesised images. 
Perceptual information emanating from real sensory information input 
and perceptual information emanating from memory, in the form of 
images, may be phenomenally indistinguishable at the level of :1
conscious perceptual experience.
The present thesis re-appraises the possible function of the 
mechanisms of the imagery system. It is suggested that the role 
of imagery in human performance in familiar perceptual environments 
is to reduce the cognitive processing requirements referent to the 
analysis of real sensory information from these environments, 
thereby making available additional capacity for thinking, while 
moving about in these environments. The imagery system may be 
utilised in these situations to augment or enhance partially 
processed real sensory information. In this way, conscious 
perceptual experience is not interrupted, but the total amount of 
information forming this experience may consist, at any instant, 
of a composite of information from memory and from the real 
environment. The relative amounts of real and memory-derived 
Information may vary continuously according to such factors as the -1
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subjective focussing of attention of the perceiver, or the degree :;T
of over-learning or expectation of the patterns involved* A 
number of eminent investigators in somewhat different areas of 
psychology (e.g. Bartlett, Welford, Bruner, Piaget, Neisser) have 4
4
put forward the idea that much of what is perceived is, in fact, '4
inferred. It is suggested that there exists a system by means 
of which this may occur, and this is the imagery system.
The theoretical approach of the thesis stresses and accepts 
the functional inter-relationship and inter-dependence of the 
various higher mental processes, and is primarily concerned with 
the sustained dynamic performance properties of the total system.
The nature of the research emphasis and direction of the
thesis originates from the author’s direct concern with applied -f|
problems resulting from the increasing cognitive load imposed upon
human operators in present complex man-machine systems, such as
jet aircraft, for example. Performance failure of the human 
operator in these systems often has very serious consequences.
There is a critical lack of knowledge regarding the fundamental
nature and limitations of human information processing in such
situations. The basic motivation behind the v/ork repc-it‘=*d in
the thesis was that, in order to study meaningfully the relevant
aspects of the applied situation, further pure research, both
theoretical and empirical, had to be undertaken to clarify
particular issues. Much applied research has been restricted to
a particular kind of psychological approach. It is felt that
the scope of this approach may be too restricted. Many other
areas of psychological research have been ignored by most applied
psychologists (e.g. imagery), yet the cognisance of research
information from these areas may well offer a fresh approach to
applied problems and perhaps offer some new.solutions, or, at least,
allow the asking of new questions.
(iv)
An experiment is described which utilises the known 
indicative relationship of eye movement activity to the amount of 
processing of visual sensory information. This experiment 
confirmed the theoretical prediction that such processing will 
be considerably reduced when subjects are engaged in thinking, 
and will be increased when they are not performing any stimulus- 
independent cognitive activity.
As a result of the factors outlined in the foregoing 
discussion, some of the experiments reported in the thesis are 
concerned with the recognition of expected, over-learned, complex 
visual patterns under conditions in which only partial attention 
may be dedicated to this task. The remaining processing capacity 
is utilised in the simultaneous performance of an internalised 
cognitive task, which involves no associated visual sensory input.
The complex visual patterns used in these experiments are not the 
usual dot matrices or line drawings, but photographs of real, 
familiar perceptual environments. The experiments make use of 
the considerable power of picture memory, which enables pictures 
to be rapidly and effectively over-learned. The photographs are 
divided into heterogeneous categories, each category being 
represented by a set of homogeneous pictures. Subjects* memory 
performance was evaluated in terms of two error indices, one 
referent to the picture category, and one to the specific picture. 
Recognition was tested by exposing the pictures for short intervals 
while subjects were attempting to solve difficult mental problems. 
Some new and powerful effects have been demonstrated and replicated 
in these experiments which confirm, at a highly significant level, 
the particular empirical predictions derived from the theory.
There was nc performance difference in relation to the identification 
of the heterogeneous picture categories between the subjects tested
;
:
i
4
."•I
■4
(v)
in the above situation, and a control group v/ho did not have to 
perform the mental task during recognition. However, there was 
a highly significant difference between the groups in relation to 
the identification of specific pictures.
Individual performance characteristics and error patterns 
in the experiments were related to a questionnaire index of 
vividness of visual imagery. On the basis of the theoretical 
ideas developed, it was predicted that in situations where all 
conscious attention is dedicated to performance of the memory task, 
*high* imagers would perform better than ’low* imagers. In 
contrast, in the divided attention case, the prediction was that 
’high’ imagers would perform worse than ’low’ imagers. Both 
these separate theoretical predictions were empirically supported.
. A new conceptual approach to vigilance-type situations is 
suggested by the theory developed in the thesis. A task was 
devised in which the signals to be detected were clearly visible, 
but embedded at random in complex visual patterns (photographs). 
These patterns were presented on a television screen at regular 
intervals, over 600 times to subjects during a single tes king 
session. At each of these presentations subjects had to respond 
with respect to the identification of the picture shown, and to 
the presence or absence of a signal within it. Prom the theory 
it was predicted that where the complex pattern remained the same 
throughout the testing session, signal detection performance would 
show a typical vigilance decrement. However, when the set of 
possible pictures in which the signal may or may not be embedded 
is vastly increased, and the subject has to respond at each event 
in the manner described, it was predicted that signal detection 
performance would be significantly improved in relation to the 
single picture condition. These predictions were empirically
I
a
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confirmed at a highly significant level, (On the basis of visual 
signal - to - noise ratios only, a signal detection analysis of the |
experimental situation would predict a result opposite to that 
actually obtained in the experiment).
A computer simulation program based on fundamental 
theoretical ideas outlined in the thesis was developed. The 
program was used to simulate the vigilance experiment reported in 
the dissertation. The purpose and implications of the use of 
this technique as an applied research tool are discussed.
The final chapter discusses the results achieved, and 
outlines the proposed application of the theoretical ideas, and 
empirical results of the research to the cognitive load problems 
of human operators in real man-machine systems, in particular 
aircrew flying advanced jet aircraft.
1
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CHAPTER I
Background, Introduction, and development 
of the theoretical approach.
1.1 The late Sir Frederick Bartlett stated as long ago as 
1932 that psychologists have persistently treated "every mental 
process as presenting problems the answer to which can be found %
without searching beyond the limits of the specific process 
itself." (Bartlett, 1932, p.187). He pointed out that "it is
impossible to understand any high level mental process if it is 
simply studied by and for itself" (ibid., p,186). It would 
seem plausible to argue that the reason for the continued (and 
continuing) persistence of "faculty psychology" is directly 
related to the unwillingness or inability of many investigators 
to come to terms with the manifold complexities of these inter- 1.;
acting processes. Reitman (1970) has strongly argued that, if 
it is acknowledged that all behaviour is a function of a wholly 
integrated system, the various processes (e.g. perception, 
memory etc.) may be too interrelated to separate, and the 
investigation of such processes in isolation may involve no more 
than arbitrary and artificial problems.
The rapid and continuing technological advances of the 
last three decades have provided psychologists with powerful new 
tools with which to study the complexities of human behaviour. 
Fundamentally, many conceptual areas of research interest have 1
'Înot changed, however much the relevant descriptive terminology 4
-Îmay have altered. In spite of this basic adherence to the 
investigation of the same underlying phenomena, it has become to
.f
%some extent possible, by means of new analogies and languages 
associated with technological change, "to cope now with problems 
which psychology had put aside as too difficult a decade and more 
ago," (BroadbenT, 1971, p«2). That psychologists can now cope 
with such problems illustrates clearly the way in which increases 
in knowledge about a phenomenon "are inextricably a function of 
technical and methodological advances, as well as theoretical 
advances," (Yates, 1972, p,2)<>
Primarily, the greatest significance of these changes is 
that experimental psychologists can now acknowledge and investigate 
complexity. The most important single aspect of this new 
technology for the study of human behaviour has been the advent 
of the readily available general purpose digital computer, and the 
continuing research and development leading to its increasing 
adaptability and refinement. Theories and models of complex 
behaviour patterns which are not necessarily simplistic can be 
developed and tested, often by computer simulation techniques.
This has led to the claims of psychologists such as Ap'ter, for 
example, that the computer modelling of psychological processes 
may eventually provide the most important contribution tc man's 
knowledge of himself, (Apter, 1970, p.l), In addition to 
simulation of human behaviour, computers may also be used to 
generate complex visual displays for use in psychological 
experiments.
The specialised scientific and technical knowledge and 
expertise necessary to the realistic investigation of complex 
phenomena increasingly involves several of the traditional 
academic disciplines (Uhr, 1966), Investigators in different 
disciplines have not taken cognisance of the work of others in 
other disciplines, and are often totally unaware of it.
VI
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Fortunately, however, many psychologists are recognising this 
problem, and interdisciplinary research programs are now common#
To keep the evaluation of these advances in some 
perspective, it should be pointed out that the relative ease 
with which the predictions of complex theories can be calculated 
on a computer has been called "a retrograde step" by Broadbent 
(1971, p.6)* He argues that psychology has, in general, come 
to concentrate on specialised theorising of particular cognitive 
and behavioural phenomena, in contrast to the all-embracing 
theoretical approach of Hull (1952), for example# Particular 
theories, however, are now able to become so elaborate that they 
"outrun" the possibility of unambiguous experimental validation# I
(Uhr, 1966, p.6).
A further valid criticism of the current state of much 
psychological theorising is that the formulation of theories may 
tend to become governed by the technological hardware they employ 
in their modelling# Some current extremes in the fashionable 
human brain - computer comparison which overlook the obvious 
differences between them are cases in point (Apter, 1970, p.19).
The once great enthusiasm for "machines which think like men" 
dissipated as the consequences of the differences between 
biological systems and digital computers became clear# (von 
Neumann, 1958),
Although such criticisms as those described above may well 
be warranted in some instances, they do not discredit the serious ^
and considered analytical approach which utilises these new 
facilities#
1.2 A new conceptual approach to psychological research, which, 
by its terminology and analogies clearly shows the direct 
influence of other disciplines - notably mathematics and
'hcommunications engineering, is generally termed the "Information 
Processing approach." (e.g. Broadbent, 1971; Reitman, 1965),
This approach stresses the value of "analysing human function in 
terms of the flow of information within the organism," (Broadbent, 4
1971, p.7).
The basic notions of this approach can be traced back to 
the publication of two papers by Craik (1947, 1948) and the 
appearance of three important books at the end of the 1940*s.
These were "Cybernetics" by Weiner (1948); "The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication" by Shannon and Weaver (1949); and 
"Statistical Decision Functions" by Wald (1950). Weiner's book 
utilised mathematics to propose ideas for regarding man as a 
self-regulating mechanism and presented the basic conceptsof 
Information Theory. The notions of Information Theory were 
expanded and put forward as a set of theorems in Shannon's and 
Weaver's work. Wald's book laid the foundations for the 
application of statistical decision theory to human performance. V
The growth of research interest in what has been termed 
Behavioural Cybernetics (Smith, 1966), where the basic assumption 
is that the organisation of motor performance and the pattern of 
learning are connected with the characteristics of closed-loop 
feedback control which an individual maintains over his own 
behaviour, and the rapid growth of Cognitive Psychology (Bower,
1970) can be attributed largely to the information processing 
approach to psychological problems.
1.3 Possibly the most potentially important and one of the 
most recent areas of research generated by information- 
processing psychology is that of pattern recognition. Uhr 
(1966, p.l) notes that philosophers and psychologists have been 
"strangely silent" about patterns, (although Bartlett was using
the concept of pattern in the contemporary sense many decades 
ago, and the Gestalt psychologists were very much concerned with
the specific area of perception of geometric patterns). However,
ristates Uhr, an increasing number of investigators are coming to V
recognise that many of the central cognitive characteristics of 
the human organism - intelligence, thinking, remembering, ^
perceiving, learning - are characteristics that involve patterns. |
In perception, for example, one of the critical problems 
has been to explain "why things look the way they do." (Vickers,
1971, p.l). Gestalt theory has been largely concerned with the 
ability of the human perceptual system to organise information V
from unfamiliar, ambiguous or meaningless stimulus arrays "into 
perceptions that amount to clear and simple descriptions of what 
we see." (ibid.).
Virtually since the adoption of information concepts by 
psychologists (see Attneave, 1959) attempts have been made to
relate them to problems of pattern perception, but with limited '4
success (Garner, 1962). Garner states that the attraction of %
the concepts of information theory in the study of patterns is
that they are potentially capable of dealing with organisation 
and structure in a quantitative manner - "the very things which 
have seemed to be the essence of the nature of pattern 
perception" (ibid., p.175). However, as Garner points out, 
the application of these concepts has not met with great success V
to date. There has been no satisfactory evolution of a 
psychophysics of form. In particular, the informational v
quantification of the intuitively appealing pattern perception 
notions of Gestalt psychology, such as "goodness of figure", 
"configuration", and so on, has proven extremely difficult.
However, in recent years, claims Vickers (1971), the
I.1
interpretation, interrelations and applications of some of these
ÏGestalt principles have become sufficiently clarified and precise f
• Îto enable them to be evaluated experimentally* ^
1In the related field of intelligence, after the pioneering 
computer simulation of human problem solving by Newell, Shaw and I
tSimon (1958 onwards - reviewed in Newell & Simon, 1972), a very
large literature developed. Hunt (1971) refers to "over a i
thousand papers" on the computer simulation of aspects of human #
Iintelligence. Importantly, he also notes that, although there i
have been numerous reviews and collections of papers, with the 
exception of Reitman (1965) there has been little effort directed V
towards theoretical integration. In a major attempt to achieve 
such a state. Hunt (1971) presents a model of man's cognitive 
processes based on an analogy between a human being and a 
computing system; i.e. the analogy is to the organisation of 
the computing system and not to its components. Hunt puts 
forward his "Distributed Memory" model as a framework to guide 
research, but admits, in doing so, that his theoretical basis 
is incomplete. He acknowledges also that it would be difficult 
and potentially vastly expensive to test.
1.4 The investigation of the nature and properties of 
human information processing has become an increasingly 
important applied problem, Man has become a component of 
complex man-machine systems, such as modern jet aircraft, for 
example. The continued retention of the control functions of 
the human operator in such systems is almost entirely attributable 
to man's cognitive flexibility and decision-making capabilities 
(Pogel, (1964) - in Singleton, Easterby and Whitfield (1967% 
p.xii.). The primary load modern systems place upon the human -V
operator is a mental load. The human operator’s once previously
-I.
: , ■ 1
j;essential function as a source of mechanical power is now largely 
redundant (Chapanis, 1965, p.11).
The relative lack of knowledge concerning the basic 
information-processing properties, capabilities and limitations 4
of the human operator in relation to other machine components of 
a system, and the consequent inability to make reliable 
predictions concerning operator performance constitutes the 
weakest link in the design of such systems, (de Sola Pool,
1964 - in Siegel and Wolf, 1969, p.vii). Because the con­
sequences of the failure of these complex systems can be 
catastrophic, resulting in the loss of hundreds of human lives, 
it is obviously essential that the fundamental limiting 
characteristics of human information-processing performance be 
defined as far as possible. It is necessary to avoid, both at 
the design and operational level, instances of human operators 
being placed in systems in which they cannot either perform at 
their maximum efficiency when the system is fully serviceable, 5
or compensate for potential failures of other components of the 
system - even though in the latter case they may function 
completely adequately when the system is fully serviceable.
There are a number of common characteristics in relation 
to the information-processing requirements of the human operator 
in a wide range of typical complex systems. This is so, even 
though the specific operator work environments may be quite 
different superficially, (e.g., an aircraft cockpit vs an 
electric power station control room). The primary shared 
characteristics of these situations are as follows :-
1) The human operator must continuously divide his visual 
attention between a number of different external (i.e. to 
the operator) sources of information input in the integrated
8performance of a number of separate sub-tasks. His 
perception of this visual information must be accurate.
2) Coincident with the requirements of 1), there is also a
i
I
considerable and continuously variable internalised cognitive î;
load imposed on the operator by the necessity for correct 
recognition, analysis and integration of the visual sensory 
information patterns according to predetermined criteria and 
procedures contained in memory.
3) The correct visual pattern and cognitive processing 
strategies in relation to 2) which are appropriate to the 
possible set of definitive internal states and global 
physical configurations of the particular system are 
thoroughly over learned by the qualified operator, i.e. they 
are able to be completely specified from memory information |
acquired during extensive training and practice.
In more general terms, the human operator is expecting 
the occurrence of sets of familiar, highly overlearned visual 
patterns according to the overall state of the system. For 
example, in the case of an aircraft, the pilot expects to 
see instrument patterns which indicate satisfactory states 
of internalised system components (e.g. the engines, 
hydraulic systems) together with instrument patterns indi­
cating the satisfactory physical state of the aircraft 
(e.g. airspeed, rate of climb). The correct instrument 
pattern depends on the particular global state of the system 
(e.g. take-off, landing), and varies according to changes in 
that state. Thus, the instrument and control displays have 
different but consistent patterns appropriate to different 
global states.
4) For the entire period during which he is a component of 
the functioning system, the human operator must hold 
accurately in memory a large repertoire of specialised 
control procedures which he may be required to rapidly and 
accurately implement in order to compensate either for 
possible failures in other system components, or for unusual 
external physical forces acting on the whole system. The 
most appropriate of these procedures to implement is 
dependent on the operator's evaluation of the particular 
global state of the system at the time of the crisis situation. 
Further, the most appropriate procedure to select and 
implement in an emergency situation may not be immediately 
obvious. In such situations a considerable additional 
cognitive loading relating specifically to the optimal 
selection of the most suitable compensatory procedure is »
imposed on the operator, while, at the same time, the re­
quirement for accurate visual perception of the instrument 
and control displays is even more important than when the 
system is functioning normally,
1.5 The theoretical, experimental and simulation research to 
be reported in the present study is addressed primarily to the 
investigation of some of the fundamental aspects of human 
information-processing in complex situations characterised by 
the properties described in the previous section, A long term 
aim of the work is to utilise the theoretical and empirical 
findings in real applied man-machine situations.
The theory is concerned with the dynamics of the flow of 
Information within the organism, and it involves a reappraisal 
of some of the traditional psychological concepts involved.
The theory is derived from several diverse areas in information-
I
I
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4processing psychology - areas which are still rapidly changing.
As Reitman (1965) states, information processing theories 
"examine the representations and processes involved in cognitive 
activity. They emphasise the functional properties of thought 
and the things it achieves." (ibid., p.l).
The present work firstly develops a theoretical model 
emphasising particular functional characteristics of the 
cognitive system which is intended to provide an organising 
framework for systematic thinking about certain theoretical and 
applied psychological problems. Secondly, new experimental 
procedures which test the predictions of the theory will be 
described, and the results reported and interpreted. However, 
as Reitman observes, (ibid., p.38), in theories which attempt 
to deal with the complexity of human cognitive processes it is 
unwise to make prediction the "sole touchstone." theory as
yet has had much predictive significance in this area. Hence, 
part of the overall purpose of the work is that of exploratory 
information gathering. The evolution of the present conceptual 
approach will be illustrated in its description and, wherever 
possible, existing experimental and theoretical data from 
diverse areas of cognitive psychology, information theory, 
human performance, pattern recognition, perception, memory, 
etc.#. will be evaluated in terms of its degree of support for 
the present approach.
This overall approach is congruent with the "philosophy 
of information processing" outlined by Hunt (1971), which is 
epitomised by the consideration of perception and memory as i
constructive processes (Neisser, 1967) - i.e. "activity in view 
of ends" (Mackay, 1969). The present approach is also in 
accordance with Mackay*s mentalistic philosophical position in i
11
that it considers that subjective conscious experience is a 
legitimate basis from which to derive and on which to test a 
psychological theory. The usefulness of such theories must 
ultimately be evaluated in these terms.
The following theoretical model deals with principles of 
organisation of the system, references being made to hypo- 
thesised system components without presenting detailed 
descriptions of the physiological mechanisms underlying their %
operation. (see also Hunt, 1971). Piaget (1969) has strongly
■;*justified such abstract theoretical models on the grounds that, 
if such models lead to a system of well formulated laws, they 
constitute the "best preparation for a complete physiology whose 
elaboration has scarcely begun." (ibid., p.xxiii).
Kaneff (1972) states that the usual approach of information 
processing psychologists to the complex problems of human 
behaviour has been to postulate block or flow diagrams in terms 
of selected functional processes, and then to investigate in 
detail only one, or very few, of these processes. However, like 
Reitman (1970), he argues that this method is subject to great 
difficulties stemming from the fact that perceptual and 
cognitive systems are integral entities with highly interactive 
and interdependent parts and "therefore need to be studied as 
such" (ibid., p.28). While still employing the useful 
conceptual utilisation of flow diagrams, the present approach 
attempts to relate to the overall performance characteristics of
the total dynamic system in the particular type of situation |
1described previously (p. 7 ).
1.6 Returning specifically to the field of pattern recognition,
(or "pattern cognition" (Kaneff, 1972)), much of the research iij
reported in the literature to date has involved attempts to
I
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construct theoretical or actual machines which recognise patterns 
that resemble those recognised by humans - for example, the 
recognition of letters and numerals, recognition of shapes etc.... 
The great proportion of the literature in this area is concerned 
with aspects of pattern recognition in the visual sense modality. 
Vickers (1972), Uhr (1966), Watanabe (1969) and Garner (1962) 
provide useful and comprehensive reviews of this work.
Information from the environment impinges directly upon 
human sensory receptors and is first transduced into an 
electrical signal. Hunt (1971) states that, when this has been 
done, it is found that the environment consists mainly of highly 
redundant information which, if responded to in detail, ’’would 
(Quickly swamp our minds” (ibid., p.60). The visual system alone 
is capable of transmitting information to the brain at the rate of 
4.3 X 10^ bits/second. In contrast, it has been estimated that 
silent reading, intuitively one of man’s most rapid means of under­
standing the environment, proceeds at about 45 bits/second. If it 
is assumed that the reader comprehends and recalls every word read, 
one must still account for the fact that only one out of every 
100,000 bits input to the brain remains there.
Data such as these well illustrate why one of the most 
important problems in the field of pattern recognition is the,, 
problem of feature extraction. Attneave (in Garner, 1962, p.200) 
thus claims that the “major function of the perceptual process ... 
is to describe or encode any stimulus in as economical form as poss­
ible and that, basically, the problem of describing a figure is 
determining the minimum number of parameters needed to ispecify the figure, ” Selfridge (1955) has defined pattern 
recognition as “the extraction of the â
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significant features from a background of irrelevant detail." 
Numerous attempts have been made to model this process, (which 
is clearly a fundamental aspect of selective attention (e.g. 
Broadbent (1958, 1971)), as it relates to visual perception* 
Most of this literature has considered *ad hoc* properties of 
2-dimensional patterns, such as cusps, vees, straight lines, 
arcs, bays, etc... (Parker and Moore (1972)).
However, Parker and Moore (1972) have proposed a new
1
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fundamental approach to the derivation of features in a pattern. i5It is claimed that "a feature can be simply defined as a 
particular sort of non-random distribution of the points 
defining the pattern. Thus structure in the pattern is a non- 
random statistical distribution of some kind" (ibid., p.59).
Parker and Moore consider some limited examples of both global 
and local analyses of shape, showing how features can be 
detected and extracted mathematically from patterns and how 
these features may then be enhanced in the patterns. Two 
global structure measures which can be used in the character­
isation of simple shapes are defined, these characterisations 
being invariant to translations, rotations and dilations of the v|
patterns. The precise details of the mathematical analyses 
involved are not of immediate concern to the present study.
Those areas of Parker's and Moore's research which are of 
importance to this thesis are the functional aspects and the 
psychological implications of the processes described.
In particular, the notion that the analysis of a pattern 
may lead to the * enhancement *, or subjective perceptual 
exaggeration, of those points within the pattern which contri­
bute most to its total overall structure is of much relevance 
to the psychology of human pattern recognition performance.
:
Three pictorial examples of the process are shown in Fig. 1.
From this conceptual approach to the structural analysis 
of patterns, Moore and Seidl (1972) have further extended the 
possibilities in a paper entitled "A Gestalt Theory of Machine 
Perception". Once again, although primarily a mathematical 
model, the psychological implications are extremely important, 
especially as the research is claimed to be inspired by Gestalt 
principles. Wertheimer (1938) considered the perceptual process 
as the basic organisation of sensory data. This organisation 
was described in terms of a mapping from the unorganised sensory 
input of the geographical environment to a "configuration."
The concept of "configuration" was, in effect, an abstract 
representation of the coding and organisation of the sensory 
information.
Moore and Seidl examine the nature of this Gestalt concept 
from a new mathematically based standpoint, and proceed to define 
two types of automaton, named a perception automaton and an 
association automaton. The function of the perceiving automaton 
Is-to organise the sensory data input into e configuration and 
to indicate what parts of this data contribute to that con­
figuration, in the manner proposed by Parker and Moore.
The association automaton is defined as a higher order 
processer which assesses these two basic functions of the 
perception automaton to provide more sophisticated processing of 
the sensory data input. It incorporates the perception 
automaton, but, in addition, has a memory and a facility with 
which to compare the content of its memory with the processed 
input pattern from the perception automaton. The nature of 
the pattern data in the memory store of the association 
automaton is in the form of stored configurations of sets of
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sensory patterns previously processed by the perception automaton.
In other words, the information regarding particular patterns '$
which is stored in memory is not stored in the form of a 
representation of all the first-order physical characteristics «
of the pattern, but in the form of a set of higher order 
characteristics of the statistical structure of the patterns.
Thus, the comparative analysis of input data in terms of the 
information held in memory takes the form of the determination 
of those characteristics of the configuration of the processed 
pattern obtained by the perception automaton which are maximally 
shared with the various similarly derived pattern configurations ^
held in the memory store.
Although these notions are primarily concerned with 
machine perception, it is considered by the present writer that 
they are clearly relevant to human information processing, 
particularly in the class of situations under consideration 
(p. 7 ). Any perception-memory system which operates not on
the extracted higher-order complexity characteristics of patterns, 
but on a simple template matching of the direct physical 
characteristics of perceived patterns with similar "unprocessed" |
patterns held in memory, is inconceivable. For example, in 
order to recognise a square in any orientation, the memory store 
of such a system would have to contain images of every possible 
transformation of such a figure for every possible size of that 
figure. The number of such transformations and dimensions is, 
of course, infinite. These suggestions are congruent with what 
Welford (1968, p.162), for example, has termed "economy of 
perception", this requiring the "abstraction of constants" from 
the total input of sensory data encountered in space and over 
time in conjunction with the allocation of retention priorities
■
17
II
to these constants. Moore et. al. appear to have, at least, 
provided a potentially viable paradigm for the extraction of 
such constants (e.g. "squareness") from visual patterns, and a 
methodology for the pro-active feedback of such data from memory 
to perception, 1;
Thus, for their model Moore and Seidl describe examples 
of how information held in memory is able to influence the 
extraction and enhancement of particular features of a perceived 
pattern. If a particular pattern is held in memory it Will a
Jenhance the perception of a similar pattern if that pattern is %Icontained in a given stimulus field, even though that field may 
contain other patterns - i.e. the model is ’seeing* what it is 
•looking for*, or what it is * expecting* to see. In particular, 
this aspect of the model provides a plausible basis for the j
consideration of individual (and cultural) differences in pattern 
learning and pattern recognition, the characteristics of each 
being largely dependent upon existing information in the memory 
store relating both to processing strategies and the patterns 
themselves* In terms of Moore and Seidl* s notions, one can 
readily conceptualise * individual differences* in pattern 
recognition performance between different association automatons, 
with different memory stores, in relation to their perception of 
the same visual information arrays.
An illustrative example of this process is shown in Pig. 2, 
According to Moore and Seidl, this nev/ type of automaton 
illustrates the power of "a quite general conceptual framework 
for a theory of perception" (ibid., p,117). Although such 
statements must necessarily be treated with caution, the present 
writer considers that they are sufficiently worthy and 
provocative to extend their most significant implications I
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further in conjunction with concepts from other areas of 
cognitive psychology.
In the present context, the most significant implication 
concerns the reciprocal interaction of sensory perceptual 
information with perceptual information held in memory,
Piaget (1969), in his elaborate discussion of what he calls 
•perceptual anticipations* states that if the characteristics 
of an •object• - for which may obviously be substituted the 
word »pattern* - are taken to be a, b, and c, then c will be 
"anticipated" if a and b are perceived. In recognising 
familiar objects, writes Piaget, that is, objects (patterns) 
about which information is stored in memory, the perceiver will 
bring pre-implications and anticipations into play: "For
instance, it would be very difficult to know if a subject had 
distinctly perceived the equality of the angles of a square or 
if the equality had been perceived only by implication from the 
global form ... above all, his explanations and transports will 
be guided by these implications when the perception is equivocal, 
for example, when the squareness of a figure is found to be in 
conflict with other factors." (ibid., p.l91).
The conceptual parallels between these notions of 
Piaget*s and the role of the association automaton of Moore and 
Seidl are clearly apparent. The present writer considers that 
further propositions may be derived from ideas such as these, 
which implicitly (Piaget) and explicitly (Moore and Seidl), 
highlight the possible role of the memory function in the 
operation of the perceptual system. This point is made most 
succinctly by Welford (1968, p.174). He observes that a 
result which occurs throughout Bartlett*s work and a 
substantial amount of proceeding and subsequent work is that;
a
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"Much of the detail which is apparently perceived is in fact 
inferred* It seems as if a schema which is imposed on incoming 
data brings a considerable amount of detail with it and this is 
incorporated into the resulting perception,"
1.7 These notions are conceptually congruent with those of 
what is generally termed the "New Look" in perception, beginning 
after World War II and inspired primarily by the theoretical and 
experimental work of Jerome S. Bruner (1957a, 1957b), Bruner* s 
(1957b) important and influential paper titled "On perceptual 
readiness" stressed the effect on perception of "readiness", 5
**expectancy", or "set", on the part of the perceiver. The 
basic effect of set on perception is said to be as follows 
In a situation in which a perceiver is given specific instructions 4
to attend to only one of several attributes of a stimulus display, l|
or in which he subjectively expects to perceive a particular 
attribute of a stimulus display (e.g. through previous experience), 
he is able to report his perception of that attribute more 
accurately than he would be able to do otherwise.
The basic proposition of tne New Look perceptionists is ^
that tne perceiver*s cognitive processes greatly influence the 
manner in which he perceives the world. According to Bruner 
(1957b, p.148), the "likelihood of occurrence of events learned 
by the person in the course of dealing with the real world of 
objects and events and the redundant sequences in which these 
are embedded" results in the person building a "model of the 
likelihood of events" (ibid), an activity seen as "achieving a 
minimization of surprise for the organism"(ibid.). Clearly,
Bruner is placing great emphasis upon the existence and the 
role of a cognitive, constructive component in perceptual 
experience. Neisser (1967, p.15) employs the term "visual
21
cognition" in this context.
The more detailed aspects of Bruner*s ideas have been 
widely debated. For example, Neisser (1967, p.49) argues that 
"Bruner's claim that * all perception is necessarily the end 
product of a categorisation process* must be rejected" because ÿ
many cognitive processes, such as iconic storage, do not involve «
categorizing "to any serious extent" (ibid.). |
Haber (1966) provides a comprehensive discussion of the
historical development of the theoretical and empirical research I
into the nature of the effect of set on perception. However, «
•:lthe primary purpose of Haber's paper is an examination of what 
he argues are the two basic and dissimilar hypotheses that have 
been used to interpret the effect of set on perception.
The older of these two hypotheses, and the one most 
favoured by the *New Look* perceptionists, (e.g. Dember, I960; i
. . ' 'SPostman, 1963), employs the concept of "perceptual enhancement" û
or "tuning." Thus, attending to a particular stimulus I
iattribute "results in a clearer and more vivid perception of ^
5that attribute - it stands out more" (Haber, 1966, p.335).
The feature enhancement process of Moore and Seidl* s associ­
ation automaton described previously (p.14 ) well illustrates %
this notion.
The second hypothesis is that set "has no effect on 
perception itself but only on some aspects of the memory trace ^
or on response to that perceptual experience" (ibid.). Accord-
I
I
'aing to Haber, there are three forms of this "response" hypothesis, #'éviz; "(a) the set facilitates relevant responses by S, #
increasing the probability that S can identify the stimulus in -i
his report; (b) the set causes S to report the emphasised 
attributes first, before memory of the stimulus fades, thus
22
allowing those attributes to be reported more accurately;
(c) the set modifies the organisation of the memory trace, so t 
that the important attributes are remembered more accurately," 
(ibid,), Haber points out that these two basic hypotheses 
have wider application in perception and memory in addition to ; 
specific problems of set.
Relevant to this latter point, Gromulicki (1956),. for 
example, considered remembering as an active, abstractive process « 
and in a series of experiments on the immediate oral recall of 
verbal passages of varying lengths found that, in recall, a 
high degree of selectivity was shown in relation to omissions 
from the material originally presented. "Items omitted were 
regularly those which contributed least to the general meaning 
of the passage" (ibid., p.92). Gomulicki related subsequent 
recall of items to the distribution of attention during hearing i;- 
of the original passage, stating that the items of content 
most attended to were those most clearly remembered.
Haber argues that the two iiypotheses reflect "one of 
the most difficult distinctions in any-analysis of perceptual 
behaviour." (ibid., p,^36). The usual procedure of 
experimenters has been to assume that simply because the subject 
was reporting immediately what he had perceived, he was therefore , 
performing a "perceptual" task. According to Haber, "there is ] 
a crucial difference between reporting one*s experience and 
reporting the attributes of stimuli that one remembers seeing.
One task is perceptual' and the other deals with a memorial 
process" (ibid.). Haber emphasises that these must be concept-  ^
ually differentiated and states that innumerable experimenters 
have failed to make this distinction. Consequently, much of the 
theoretical controversy in this area is a direct result of this 
confusion.
However, after evaluating the available evidence Haber’s 
final conclusion is that these two hypotheses, which can both 
be supported by appropriate experimental evidence, are not 
incompatible but only alternative and often complementary,
"There is no reason to doubt that both may be correct and 
occurring together," (ibid).
Such a conclusion would seem to support strongly
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Reitman*8 (1970) arguments that perceptual and memory processes 
are too interrelated to separate and that the "conceptual 
differentiation" espoused by Haber is arbitrary and contrary to 
the functional nature of human information-processing performance 
Certainly Haber’s very strong emphasis on the primary role of 
verbal encoding strategies would be challenged by the more 
recent work of Paivio and his collaborators (e.g. see Paivio, 
1971), together with current work on the power of picture memory 
(fStanding, 1972).
Some of Haber’s statements are questionable. For example: 
"Introspectively, it might be very difficult for an S to diff­
erentiate a rapidly, fading memory from an image that was 
perceptually less clear." (Haber, 1966, p.551). If, as recent 
research suggests (Sheehan, 1972), the "memory" itself at a 
subjectively experiential level may well be an image, then there 
is no necessity to distinguish these notions. Further, Haber’s 
claim that there is a "crucial difference between reporting one’s 
experience and reporting the attributes of stimuli that one 
remembers seeing" is disputable for the reason that in order to 
report one’s perceptual experience, or even to relate any 
stimulus to an experiential category there must be a dynamic 
memory component operating all the time.
Although the effects of set are well established, then, 
considerable theoretical controversy exists. However, on the ' 
basis of all the available evidence, it can be stated that, in 
information-processing terms, there is at least a two-way 
continuous flow of information involving the integration of 
information input from the visual sensory system and information 
held in memory. Obviously, the specific dynamics of this 
information flow may be dependent on a wide range of search, 
retrieval, encoding and decoding strategies, for example, and 
these may differ between subjects. s
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In a number of experiments (see Haber, 1966) there is
clear evidence that, at the level of subjective conscious t.1experience, information concerning the anticipated character- ^;Sistics of a stimulus may be fused with partially processed 
sensory information from a stimulus display which does not 
physically contain some of these expected attributes. A good 
example of such a phenomenon is the experiment of Bruner and 
Postman (1949) on the perception of incongruity. In this 
experiment subjects expecting the tachistoscopic, presentation 
of normal playing cards were actually presented on occasion 
with cards In which the colours of the suits were changed.
Most subjects reported perceiving the incongruous cards 
normally, and, very significantly, some reported a "fusion" of 
the expected (e.g. black) and actual (e.g. red) colours for the 
particular card, seeing the card as "purple". Clearly, the 
visual characteristics of the expected playing cards can be 
completely specified from memory, having been overlearned 
through extensive previous experience.
Similar effects were shown in an important early 
experiment by Pillsbury (1897). In an extensive investi­
gation of word reading, Pillsbury found that under certain 
conditions of expectation and context, subjects would report 
accurate letter-by-letter perception of words which were 
actually either misspelt, or which contained a "shapeless 
blur" in place of an original letter. The blurring effect 
was obtained by typing an »X* over the original (ibid., p.342). «
For subjects in these, and in similar types of 
experiments, to be able to consciously experience such 
composite perceptions there must be some kind of integration 
of information from the external, or 'real', stimulus display
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(otherwise subjects would not be able to identify correctly the 
pattern shown) and information about that pattern held in 
memory (e.g. with regard to the appropriate colour of a playing 
card).
1.8 If information from internal and external sources is 
integrated in this way, then it is a logical step to consider 
in detail a system by means of which this might happen, rather 
than simply to postulate that it does. The subjective 
phenomena of dreaming and hallucination provides irrefutable X
evidence that 'normal' perceptual experiences may emanate 
directly from the memory store. That is, subjects can experience 
clear, complete and dynamic 'pictorial* perceptions of their 
external environment v/ithout any external input through the i
visual sensory channels. Neisser (1967, p.120) states: "Even
without any stimuli at all, dreams and hallucinations result in 
experiences which are phenomenally just like other perceptions,"
The functional similarity of dream imagery and normal 
perception strongly suggests that, at the level of conscious 
experience, the two represent extreme ends of a continuum of 
the same basic process. Dependent upon a wide range of factors, %
such as time-sharing of attention, subjective probabilities of 
expected patterns, and stimulus clarity, the total information 
content of perceptual experience may, at any instant, be made 
up of both 'real* information from the external world and 
information from the memory store, with the contributions of 
each information source to the total perceptual experience 
being phenomenally indistinguishable from each other.
... . i / ;  . .  ' , . A ,  i  V . Ï . - ; '. . f r o ,
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Direct support for this argument is provided by Dixon
(1971)0 In discussing the common occurrence of phenomenal 
representation without the concurrent input of any external 
sensory information (e.g. as in dreams, imagery and 
hallucination), he states: "That recently blinded individuals
continue to experience visual dreams, whereas these are not 
reported (Berger, 1967) by the congenitally blind, or those 
v/ho lost their sight many years ago, seems to show very clearly 
that the system subserving phenomenal representation is one jl;Iwhich is just as ready to accept information from memory as 
it is from current sensory inflov/" (p.309),
This general notion is also indirectly supported by 
Antrobus (1968; Antrobus, Singer and Greenberg, 1966) who 
describes an information theory model relating to some of the 
operations involved in the unsolicited generation of "fantasy, 
imagery and other sequences of mentation which are not strongly 
'directed'." In this model, both sensory-perceptual and non- 
perceptual events are assumed to be outputs of a "common limited- 
capacity cognitive operator" (p.423).
Thus, the phenomena of mental imagery appear potentially 
able to meet the requirements of the system under consideration.
I
'
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1.9 Since the mid-1960's there has been a resurgence of 
psychological research interest in the field of mental imagery, 
and a number of investigators (e.g. Sheehan, 1972; Segal, 1972;
Neisser, 1967) have argued in favour of a "functional similarity 
between imagery and perceiving" (Kessel, 1972, p.155). In the #
pre-Watsonian early years of psychology the primarily intro- 
spectionist study of the mind was a central field of study and 
"mental imagery was one of the most important concepts for the 
understanding of human behaviour"(Sheehan, 1972, p.xiii).
Watsonian behaviourism, and the later neobehaviourism typified 
by the Hull and Spence schools from the 1930s to the 1950s 
dominated mainstream psychology, and mentalistic terms such as 4
•cognition* and 'imagery* "were still relegated comfortably to 
the world of the poet" (ibid.). Watson claimed that such 
concepts would "never reappear" in psychology (V/atson, 1920, 
p..94).
As an integral part of the renaissance of cognitive 
psychology of the mid-1960's (Bower, 1970) a new style of 
thinking about imagery has emerged, dating from an important 
paper by Holt (1964) who wrote about imagery as "a long 
neglected topic just emerging from ostracism" (Holt, 1972, 
p.3). Kessel (1972, p.155) in a review of recent imagery
research refers to imagery as "a dimension of mind rediscovered", 
and he examines the major methodological and theoretical issues 
emerging from this rediscovery.
A fundamental aim of this revival of interest in imagery 
and the field of cognitive psychology in general is to restore 
conscious experience to the status of legitimate data in 
psychological research. (Burt, 1962; Zener, 1958; Zener and 
Gaffron, 1962). Kessel (1972, pl55) points out that, ironically,
,
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the best support for this general position is provided by 
Carnap, "a founding logical positivist and ••• the father of 
operationisra, viz: * a person's awareness of his own state of
imagining, feeling, etc... must be recognised as a kind of 
observation in principle not different from external observation, 
and, therefore, as a legitimate source of knowledge(Carnap, 
1956).
Neisser (1967) stresses the notion that, like other 
cognitive processes, imagery is active, constructive and an 
integral functional component of the cognitive system as a 
whole. Kessel (1972), Sheehan (1972), Richardson (1969), 
Horowitz (1970) and Segal (1971) provide comprehensive reviews 
of the entire field of contemporary imagery research and theory.
1.10 Some particular experiments are of prime relevance to 
the development of the present proposition that conscious 
perceptual experience may be a combination of external sensory 
information and internal memory information. As described 
previously (p. 24) some studies have clearly demonstrated the 
fusion of some memory information with an appropriate primary 
visual sensory input. The converse, i.e. the assimilation of 
real sensory input into the construction of images has been 
recently demonstrated in a series of experiments by Segal
(1972).
Segal's experiments were based on much earlier work by 
Kulpe (1902) and Perky (1910) which was specifically concerned 
with the question of whether imagery could be dependent not 
only on information stored in memory, but also upon external 
sensory stimuli which happen to be present at the same time and 
which may be processed as part of the image. In Kulpe's 
experiment subjects were asked to report on any "objective" or
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"subjective" events that they consciously experienced while they 
were relaxing in a darkened room. At intermittent intervals a 
square which varied in location, size and brightness was pro- f
jected onto one of the walls of the room. Kulpe observed a 
fusion or integration of this physical stimulus with the 
subject's imagery. He noted that "the final product was 
experienced as a complete and integrated event and often 
classified as subjective, but the observer could not analyse 
it back into its objective and subjective sources." (Segal,
1972, p.205).
Perky (1910) followed up Kulpe's findings with a now 
classic experiment. Her subjects were simply instructed to 
"imagine a banana", (or a leaf, or a book) and to describe 
their resulting images. A yellow banana-shaped form was 
allowed to oscillate briefly in the subject's field of vision 
while he described his image. All the subjects "noted that 
the imaged banana was on end and not as they had been supposing 
they thought of it" (ibid., p.432). The results, argued Perky, 
show that the stimulus form was registered at a sensory level 
as it significantly affected the final appearance of the 
consciously experienced image even though the subjects were not 
aware at any stage that a supraliminal stimulus had actually 
been present. Perky concluded that such undetected but 
supraliminal physical stimuli may be "mistaken for and incor­
porated into an image of imagination, v/ithout the least 
suspicion on the observer's part that any external stimulus 
is present to the eye" (ibid., p.450).
Segal (1972) contends that if these findings of Perky 
can be replicated, then "it follows that stimuli may be 
determining, influencing, and altering images all the time and
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the image cannot be defined simply as an experience which occurs 
in the absence of a stimulus" (ibid*, p.205). In 1964 Segal and 
Hathan reported a partial replication and extension of the Perky 
effect. However, although Segal and her collaborators ultimately 
failed in a series of eight separate experiments (in Segal, 1972) 
to achieve the dramatic effects reported by Perky, they consistentlyï 
observed far more subtle_ effects on the image- which led Segal to 
conclude that the "stimulus was at least partially processed, and 
was assimilated into the generated image according to specifiable 
principles." (ibid., p.207).
In this series of experiments the basic methodology was the 
same throughout. The subject was seated and his head covered with 
a vinyl hood onto which, unknown to the subjects, slides could be 
projected at varying brightness levels. Material either congruent 
or incongruent with the instructed image was projected onto the 
hood. Subjects* verbal descriptions of their images were tape 
recorded, and later transcriptions of these tapes were rated 
independently for stimulus assimilation content by five judges.
For the purposes of the present study, the. important general 
result of Segal’s experiments was that at a statistically signi­
ficant level, visual sensory information input from a real 
physical source could be assimilated into a subjectively 
synthesised image, and that, in many cases, subjects could not 
distinguish the "subjective" and "objective" information components 
in the image, even in situations where they knew a physical 
stimulus might be present.
Further strong evidence that supraliminal stimulus information 
can be processed by subjects without their being aware of it is 
provided by the work of Corteen and Wood (1972). In this experiment 
certain nouns (city names) were first associated with the occurrence 
of an electric shock. These nouns were then embedded in material 
presented to the nonattended channel in a dichotic listening task. 
Using GSR measures, it was found that "shock associated city names 
gave rise to a significant number of autonomic responses even 
though Ss were not aware of them." (my italics) (ibid. p.508).
1.11 In summarising the previous discussion several main points 
emerge, and these are as follows:-
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It has been clearly demonstrated that ;-
(a) memory information may be incorporated into phenomenal 
perceptual experiences emanating primarily from real physical 
stimulus inputs; and
(b) physical stimulus information may be incorporated into 
phenomenal perceptual experiences emanating primarily from 
subjective imagery.
It should be emphasised that it is not being claimed 
that (a) and (b) always occur, but that there is evidence that 
they consistently can and do in certain situations. Evidence 
of this kind strongly supports the argument for a functional 
similarity, or continuity, between the mechanisms of visual 
imagery and visual perception (Neisser, 1967, p.95). It is 
also evidence for a two-way flow of sensory-memory information 
in perceptual experience, the direction of flow of the major 
component of this phenomenal information being dependent 
upon the global characteristics of the organism-environment 
situation.
As an example, it should be noted that in the global 
situation in which the organism is sleeping normally, there 
is no doubt that concurrent auditory, tactile and even 
olfactory external sensory stimuli are often directly 
incorporated into dreams, i.e. with little evidence of any 
symbolic cognitive transformation of this sensory information 
input. (Neisser, 1967; Dixon, 1971). However, although 
Dement and Wolpert (1958) have shown tha.t level of 
illumination 'per se* may have some limited effect on the 
content of dreams, in the case of the normally sleeping
.
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subject, experiments have failed to demonstrate that 
articulated visual patterns presented during sleep are 
incorporated either directly or symbolically into dream imagery, 4%
For example, Rechtstaffen and Foulkes (1965) presented such 
stimuli (e,g, real objects, printed messages) to subjects who 
were sleeping with their eyes taped open, and their pupils 
chemically dilated. The results of this experiment produced 
no unambiguous instances of any representation of the external 
stimulus in the reports of subjects woken shortly after 
presentation of the stimulus. Rechtstaffen and Foulkes refer 
to the "relative functional blindness of the sleeping state" |
(ibid. p.1157).
This terra ."functional blindness" is also used, in a 
quite different context, by Kahneman, Beatty and Pollack (1967) 
in connection with the observation of perceptual deficit in 
subjects during performance of a demanding mental task. (see 
later, p.40). It is conceivable that these two identically 
named effects may be found to be qualitatively the same. For 
example, Antrobus (1968; Antrobus, Singer and Greenberg (1966)) 
has shown that increases in unsolicited stimulus-independent 
thought processing (e.g. fantasising, daydreaming, imagining) 
may also decrease the concurrent rate of gain of sensory 
information emanating from environmental stimuli. Dependent 
upon the amount of such wholly internally generated cognitive 
processing which may be occurring during the state of sleep, 
concurrent real, * normal *, visual sensory information input may 
be effectively almost completely suppressed.
i
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However, as Dixon (1971) has discussed in detail, 
there are paradoxes involved in consideration of the global 
state of sleeping (e.g. the brain may show increased evoked 
potentials in response to certain types of external stimuli).
Although consideration of the particular state of sleep is 
outside the scope of the present work, there may well prove 
to be common factors linking the various phenomena under 
consideration in this thesis with those of sleep.
Because of the years of neglect of imagery and because |
most important contemporary imagery research has been carried 1
out only in the last few years, the possible role of imagery 
in.other areas of human information processing has been 
completely ignored. If the role of imagery in normal 
visual perceptual information processing is as functionally 
important as is being suggested here, then any theoretical 
viewpoint in this area which does not consider imagery at 
all is inadequate. The consideration of a possible role for 
the imagery system suggests a new approach to more 
'traditional* phenomena, such as vigilance, for example, 
and experimental work to be reported in this thesis 
illustrates the potential value of a cognitive approach.
1
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1#12 The next stage of the development of the present 
theoretical position is concerned with the proposition that 
perception and memory are active, constructive and conscious 
processes. What is important at this stage of the discussion 
is not the precise nature of the constructive cognitive activity 
involved in perception, about which there is considerable 
theoretical controversy (e.g. Neisser's ’analysis by synthesis’;
Bruner’s ’perceptual categorisation’; various forms of feature 4
analysis), but the implications of the concept of constructive 
cognitive activity itself. In spite of the continuing 
unresolved debate over specific points, there is at least full 
agreement among cognitive psychologists that perceptual-memory 
processes do involve active, constructive information 
processing, i.e. the subjective thought processes of the human 
perceiver impose some kind of structural organisation upon his 
incoming sensory input. The perceiver acts upon his sensory 
input, a process which involves thought processes, and is not 
a passive respondent to this input.
A further basic notion common to all cognitive 
theoretical positions is the idea of selectivity of attention 
to parts of the visual field. In Neisser’s words; ’’Attention 
may be flexibly redistributed to parts of the visual field.
To focus attention on a figure is to devote the lion’s share 
of processing capacity to it.” (Neisser, 19&7, p.123). The 
significant concept here is the proposition that the construct­
ive activity of perceptual information-processing may involve the 
utilisation of a high proportion of the total conscious inform­
ation processing capacity of the cognitive system.
1.13 There is a very substantial body of research which has 
addressed itself specifically to the investigation of the
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fundamental nature, capabilities and limitations of human 
information processing performance* This particular area of 
research had as its origin the pioneering wartime investigations 
of human sensory-motor performance in tracking situations 
carried out by K.J.W. Craik. (see p*4 ). The publication in
1947 and 1948 of two now classic papers by Craik, in which he 
reported the results of this wartime work and outlined his own 
theoretical ideas on the human operator in control systems, 
inspired a great deal of subsequent research into 'intermittency* 
in human sensory-motor activity.
The intermittency hypothesis had a long history in 
psychology, dating from a paper by Pillsbury in 1913. Craik’s 
basic argument was that "the human operator behaves basically as 
an intermittent correction servo" (Craik, 1947, p.56), and the 
evidence for this was the periodic or "wavy" characteristics of 
the time record of errors made by human operators on tracking 
tasks which showed "a spectrum with a predominant frequency of 
about 0*5 sec., with a smaller cluster of frequencies from 
0*25 to 2 sec." (ibid.) This error pattern was most clearly 
evident on the performance records of unpractised subjects, 
the overtly ’jerky* performance smoothing out with increased 
task practice.
The greater part of the research work directly concerned 
with Craik's theory of intermittency, (as against that concerned 
with more general areas of human information processing), has 
been carried out in the U.K. Kelley (1968, p.191) observes 
that, although considerable interest in central intermittency 
was aroused in the U.S.A. by the work of Pitts and his 
colleagues (e.g. Noble, Pitts and Warren, 1955), workers in 
that country have been cautious in adopting the intermittency 
hypothesis.
I
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Detailed reviews of the theoretical and empirical 
developments in this field are provided in two books, by 
Welford (1968) and Broadbent (1971). Although many specific 
issues remain unresolved or inadequately investigated (Welford,
1967, p.19 - in Sanders, 1967), and the overall picture is a 
complex one, a number of firm general conclusions can be drawn 
on the basis of the results of over twenty years of intensive 
theoretical and empirical work.
In his 1971 book, Broadbent, after evaluating all the 
relevant data, affirms that the basic theoretical notions of 
what has come to be termed the "single channel hypothesis" are 
most strongly supported of any model of conscious decision­
making in human sensory-motor performance. For the purposes 
of the present discussion, two broad propositions of this 
hypothesis suffice.
Firstly, it is hypothesised that the times taken, to 
process data and monitor response action set an upper limit on 
the amount of information that can be processed in a given 
time. Secondly, the proposition that all conscious decision 
making is central and sequential is important to the present 
argument. The possibility of the human operator being able 
to process independently two separate simultaneous streams of 
information in parallel is "still an open question", states 
Broadbent, but he concludes that "one cannot feel that there 
is any evidence for independent processing at present."
(Broadbent, 1971, p.314).
Dual task research has shov/n that inter-task interference 
occurs when two tasks are performed simultaneously, particularly 
at the subject’s maximum level of performance in the particular 
dual-task situation. (Welford, 1968, p.132). Further, all conscious
. -- ■- ... -v'. t . ■■■■ik.e.- ..-V .. ........ ;
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control decisions concerning both task performances are made 
one at a time, and are made sequentially, the decision 
processes for each task capturing the single channel to the 
exclusion of all other information-processing for the entire 
time interval required for that decision. Thus, although 
ballistic motor movements involved in the simultaneous perform­
ance of separate tasks obviously may take place in parallel, 
the separate information streams involved in the control of each 
task are not processed in parallel, conscious attention alternating 
between them.
In addition to the processing of information predominantly 
derived from external sensory sources (e.g. as in the performance 
of a tracking task), the human cognitive system is capable of 
the autonomous generation of conscious thought processes in the 
absence of any relevant external sensory input. If all 
conscious information processing is centralised,as the evidence 
suggests, then decisions involving internalised cognitive 
processing should capture the single channel in exactly the 
same way as information processing relevant to the performance 
of external tasks. Therefore, irrespective of the nature of 
the task, i.e. internal or external, intertask interference 
should take place between any set of information-processing 
tasks which the subject is attempting to perform simultaneously 
at a high level of performance. Under these conditions. 
Interference should take place between two external tasks or 
two internal tasks.or, most significantly, between an external 
and an internal task. Thus, a subject performing a complex 
sensory-motor task, such as driving a motor car, for example, and 
simultaneously attempting to perform a mental task should 
experience interference. Experiments on subject performance 
in this particular situation show that this theoretically
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predicted inter-task interference does indeed occur (Brown and 
Boulton, 1961; Brown, 1962, 1965a, 1965b),
Kahneman argues that all information-processing 
activities "apparently draw upon a common pool and performance 
of multiple tasks therefore requires proper allocation of 
limited resources" (1970, p.121). Clearly, any kind of 
cognitive processing under conscious control, e.g. thinking, 
imagery, involves the capturing of the hypothetical single 
channel.
1.14 If the cognitive component of perception is the conscious, 
constructive decision-making process claimed by Neisser and 
others (see p. 34), then the specific task of visual pattern 
perception should be susceptible to interference from other 
cognitive information-processing tasks performed at the same 
time. However, our ongoing conscious stream of perceptual 
experience is not continually subjected to intermittent 
interruptions as a component of the system dedicated to some 
other simultaneous purpose captures the single channel. 
Subjectively at least, we do not appear to stop perceiving 
our environment while engaged in thought.
For this reason, the theoretical propositions developed 
in proceeding sections concerning the role of the imagery 
system become even more important. The suggestion is that 
during learning of novel perceptual layouts, the organism 
normally devotes all processing capacity to this function. 
However, once the relevant patterns have become overlearned, 
i.e. able to be completely specified or synthesised from 
information held in the memory store, the information- 
processing capacity devoted to the function of perception in 
situations involving these familiar patterns may be
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significantly reduced# The conscious analysis of real sensory 
input need only proceed as far as is necessary to confirm the 
presence of an expected pattern, the remaining information 
necessary to complete the particular perceptual experience 
coming from the memory store# In this way, in familiar 
environments, the cognitive information-processing load 
involved in the analysis of sensory input may be minimised, 
thereby freeing spare capacity for the performance of other 
tasks, as for example in the case of thinking while moving about 
in a familiar environment.
It would obviously seem logically and adaptively appro­
priate that the visual perceptual system should not be entirely 
and continuously devoted to the analysis of sensory input, and 
that the various time sharing parameters of this limited 
information-processing capacity should be variable according to 
the transitory requirements of particular situations. If 
’attention* at any instant in time be defined in terms of the 
information actually being processed in the single channel at 
that instant, then attention becomes a cumulative measure, and 
the ’amount of attention' allocated to one task is measured in 
terms of the proportion of the total amount of information 
processed over a given period of time which is devoted to that 
task. In the terms of the present discussion, where there is 
a specific requirement for accurate perception of what may be 
a familiar environmental pattern, then the proportions of total 
processing capacity will be reallocated according to that 
requirement.
This kind of attentional control is very commonly applied 
in everyday life (Kahneman, 1970). "Thus, the experienced 
driver will normally interrupt his conversation while making a
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turn into the traffic, but may continue it while making a less 
dangerous turn. The transition is smooth, effortless and very 
rarely involves a conscious decision. As far as I know, even 
speculative efforts have not been directed to the question of 
how the system works" (ibid., p.121). The theoretical and 
experimental research reported in this thesis is concerned with 
some detailed aspects of this system,
1.15 According to the present arguments, the deficit in the 
processing capacity available for pattern perception of 
familiar patterns caused by the concurrent performance of a 
mental task will be compensated for by the utilisation of the 
imagery system. The resultant perceptual experience should be 
normal and complete. However, in a multiple-task situation in 
which v/hat is being experienced perceptually is primarily 
composed of memory-derived information, with a minimum of 
processing of sensory information, the subject should fail to 
perceive transitory visual events or incongruities occurring 
within that part of the real visual information array which is 
not being processed at the times
Clear evidence that this is indeed the case is provided 
by Kahneman, Beatty and Pollack (1967) in an experiment 
investigating perceptual deficit during a demanding mental task. 
Subjects in this experiment performed two tasks simultaneously, 
these being a digit transformation task and a detection task.
A string of four digits (e.g. 8340) was presented auditorily 
and the subject responded verbally with another string (9451), 
adding 1 to each digit he had heard. These digits were 
presented at the rate of one per second and the subject had to 
respond at the same rate. At the same time, the subject 
monitored a visual display which flashed letters at a rate of
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five per second. The subject had to report after each trial 
whether or not the letter K had been among those presented. 
Performance in the dual task situation was compared with 
performance on both tasks performed separately.
Subjects were significantly more successful in the 
detection task when the transformation task was not required, 
and false positives were significantly more frequent in the 
detection task alone* An important finding was that the 
subjects* ability to detect signals varied continuously over 
the 8 seconds of the task in parallel with an independent 
physiological indicator of processing load (viz: pupillary 
dilation). Analysis of the patterns of error data led 
Kahneman to conclude that the effect was "not a failure of 
memory, but of perception" (Kahneman, 1970, p.121) - i.e. it 
was unlikely that subjects clearly recognised the target when 
it was actually presented and then forgot all about it,
Kahneman, Beatty and Pollack state that the subjects in 
this experiment "v/ere to some degree functionally blind when 
they were engaged in thought" (Kahneman et, al., 1967, p=219). 
Such a statement is of extreme importance to the consideration 
of the applied situations to which this thesis is addressed, 
and the relevant implications will be discussed at a later point.
The theoretical ideas outlined and developed in the 
proceeding discussion both predict and explain the results of 
Kahneman, Beatty and Pollack. These investigators do not 
discuss the question of what the subjects are actually 
experiencing perceptually at the times when they miss the 
target.
1.16 In developing a theoretical approach involving pattern 
perception, the problem of the definition of a ’pattern* must
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be resolved. The problem central to any theory primarily 
concerned with cognitive aspects of pattern recognition, that 
is the problem of feature analysis and feature extraction 
(Parker & Moore, 1972, p.59) remains unsolved at the present 
time. The notion that there are within visual patterns sets 
of "objective features" which will be extracted by all human 
perceivers may not hold at the cognitive level. There are 
various clear physiologically defined specialised feature 
detectors in the visual system, involved in stereopsis, move­
ment, contour, line, depth etc... In a recent review article, 
Gross (1973) notes that the visual areas in the monkey brain 
have now been mapped in some detail, but above a particular 
level the perceptual process becomes primarily a complex 
cognitive one, which cannot be ’mapped* physiologically.
It appears to be the case that the specialised sensory 
receptors of the visual system do provide a primary set of 
fundamental data forms on the basis of which the organism can 
analyse visual information input at a higher level, and that this 
primary sensory organisation is the same for all humans.
However, what differs between subjects is what the individual 
cognitive system elects to do with the information potentially 
available from these peripheral feature detectors. Whatever 
the particular ’significant* features of a visual information 
array which are selected and used in perception might be, they 
may ultimately be a function of a particular individual form, 
or style, of cognitive processing strategy. The possibility 
must be acknowledged theoretically that these strategies may 
vary considerably between subjects, and within subjects.
A further difficulty is whether or not a visual 
information pattern may be arbitrarily defined, at some level, 
as a set of discrete "features", whatever these might be.
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Visual information might well be encoded and stored in some 
analogue rather than digital form and, in spite of the existence 
of much computer-based research favouring digital processing, 
the possibility of full or partial analogue processing must at 
least be regarded as feasible until there is definitive research 
evidence either way*
These considerations raise critical problems for any 
theoretical model of perception and memory. The effectiveness 
and generality of the model at a cognitive level, must not be 
limited by, and dependent upon, the correctness or otherwise of 
certain assumptions concerning as yet unresolved questions 
about the nature of pattern recognition. If we cannot state 
unequivocally which 'features* of visual information input 
different subjects select as * significant *, nor whether these 
sets of features are continuous or discrete, nor what are the 
precise encoding, processing, storage and retrieval strategies 
involved, what can be truthfully and usefully said theoretically 
about this problem?
There is a solution to this theoretical dilemma.
Consider a complex visual pattern which a subject first 
memorises and unfailingly recognises on subsequent encounters. 
The picture or pattern can be defined simply as a quantity of 
information of some kind. Clearly it is at least this.
If we limit our definition to this very basic, but true 
statement, the theoretical difficulties raised by still 
unresolved problems such as feature detection and analysis, 
the precise nature of the optic array, and the possibility of 
vast individual differences in processing, may be bypassed.
It becomes possible to discuss patterns with some degree of 
generality.
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In order to recognise reliably the same visual array at 
any subsequent time, a subject must have processed and stored 
at least some proportion of this visual information, whatever 
that particular subject’s individual processing strategies 
might be, and however much it may be different from other 
subjects’ strategies*
It is emphasised that the concept of a ’quantity of 
information', as it is used in the present: context, does not 
refer to 'information* in the formal mathematical communication 
theory sense (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). As noted earlier (p.5), 
the application of these formal concepts to the complex cognitive 
problems of pattern perception and recognition has met with only 
limited success, and the ’irrational* way in which mathematical 
communication theory has been applied by many psychologists in 
the investigation of human performance has been strongly 
criticised by Laming (1968, Ch. 1), for example. Garner (1962) 
points out that attempts to utilise formal information theory 
to determine an unequivocal constant maximum information- 
processing capacity for the human subject, in terms of ’bits’ 
of information, ha.ve not been successful. A large number of 
factors, such as instructional ’set’, overlearning of verbal 
material and of ballistic movement patterns, 'grouping* of 
responses, stiraulus-response compatability, and semantic 
properties of messages, are not amenable to arbitary quanti­
fication in terms of 'bits’ of information,
Broadbent (1971) states that the emphasis in this area 
of research has shifted from the deterministic approach of 
the investigators of the 1950's to the present probabalistic 
approach. The inapplicability of the formal mathematics of 
information theory to anything but the simplest situations has
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resulted in the terra now being generally used in a manner closer 
to its intuitive or everyday sense. Moray (1967), Welford 
(1968) and Broadbent (1971) use the term 'information' more in 
a conceptual, non-specific sense than purely as a term of 
measurement. The present use is close to the term 'information' 
as it refers to computer programming, (i.e. the general processes 
of manipulation, rather than measurement of information).
Although the broad concepts of the "information sciences" 
(Neisser, 1967, p.7), which include formal communication theory, 
systems analysis and computer programming, have been of the 
utmost significance and usefulness to modern cognitive psychology, 
Neisser argues that "the upshot of more than a decade of research 
is that information measures have little or no direct relevance 
to performance in most cases" (ibid. p.112).
In the present thesis, then, in the absence of any 
suitable objective metric to quantify precisely complex 
perceptual information, the concept of a pattern as a 'quantity 
of information* is employed without reference to systems of 
units. As stated earlier, because it is a fact that patterns 
may be remembered (i.e. that information from the pattern is 
processed), we may speak meaningfully about the'total information 
content of a pattern' as a hypothetical quantity which may 
include semantic aspects, and, although we cannot as yet 
'measure' this in terms of some arbitary scaling system, we may 
clearly speak about proportions of this total quantity of 
information.
It may be that different patterns represent different 
absolute quantities of some form of total pattern information, 
and that the same pattern may represent different quantities of 
information to different subjects. However, because the
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present concern is only with proportions of total information, 
which does not involve units of measurement, it becomes possible 
to consider information processing performance referent to 
different complex patterns, and to different subjects, in a 
manner which facilitates direct comparisons on the basis of 
this common factor.
Consequently, when patterns are defined in this way it 
is proposed that the common factor linking similar subject 
performances may be considered purely in terms of proportions 
of pattern information utilised in various similar circumstances. 
In the following discussion, the notion of a 'pattern* is 
conceptualised in this manner.
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CHAPTER II
The following chapter summarises and extends the basic 
theoretical ideas outlined and developed in Chapter I.
2.1 In familiar environmental contexts where the probability 
of occurrence of perceptual patterns already stored in memory 
is extremely high, it is postulated that the analytical 
requirements of the perceptual system with regard to the 
sensory input from such contexts are greatly reduced. To 
illustrate this notion at an elementary level: If the
information content of a sensory pattern Pg is some quantity 
Qs, then, if the subjective probability of occurrence of Pg is 
high, confirmatory feedback as to the presence of the expected 
pattern Ps need only involve the processing of a relatively 
small proportion of the total relevant sensory pattern inform­
ation Qs. In contrast if Ps were a novel pattern (which might 
or might not become familiar), the perceptual system would have 
to process and possibly transfer to the memory store the total 
amount of sensory information Qg. Thus, under the two 
conditions the information-processing requirements, or loading, 
of the perceptual system are quite different. A third 
possibility must also be acknowledged. That is, where the 
probability of occurrence of Pg is high and it is familiar, 
the subject may still, however, direct his perceptual system to 
the detailed analysis of Pg.
It should be emphasised here that the concept of *a 
proportion of the total quantity of information* is not 
logically linked to any specific proportion for a given pattern.
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Rather, the idea is that on repeated encounters, or prolonged 
exposure, to the same expected sensory pattern in the same 
context, the subject may, in each case, or time period, 
process the same proportion of the total available sensory 
information, but this proportion may well be referent to 
different aspects of the same real sensory pattern. In this 
way, over a series of continuing re-encounters with the same 
perceptual layout the accuracy or veridicity of all the 
memory information concerning that pattern may be continually 
checked and progressively updated if necessary, even though at 
each encounter only part of the real sensory information is 
being processed. This proposition has obvious implications 
for the concept of "rehearsal" of information in the memory 
store, (e.g. Welford, 1968), a process which is hypothesised 
as increasing the resistance to decay of the memory trace of 
these items. These implications will be further discussed at 
a later point.
2.2. In part, these ideas are conceptually similar to 
Vicker's (1970; 1972) suggestions regarding the mechanisms 
underlying the emergence of a perceptual organisation. Vickers 
proposes that the process is mediated by an "optional stopping" 
mechanism, and that this mechanism is of the accumulator type. 
Vicker's notions are concerned with responses to particular 
figures or patterns, the idea being that the observer operates 
on a distribution of signal differences relating to the pattern 
elements. The observer steadily inspects these positive and 
negative differences one at a time until some criterion, k, is 
satisfied. Vickers suggests that this criterion k actually 
used is an accumulated magnitude of positive or negative signal 
difference. The present ideas are related except that the
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primary concern is with the encoded Information content of 
familiar patterns. The notion of a criterion is relevant in 
the sense that, for decisions to be taken concerning the 
presence or absence of such a pattern, a criterion relating to 
the amount of information in the sensory pattern which must be' 
processed in the given context to confirm the presence of the 
expected familiar pattern must be met. Once this criterion is 
reached, analysis of the sensory information need not continue.
To summarise, if tbere is no requirement that the 
perceptual system completely analyse a given sensory pattern, 
then it need not do so. It may perform only a rudimentary and 
partial analysis of the external sensory input, processing only 
that proportion of the total definitive information about that 
pattern subjectively considered necessary to infer the 
remainder. In such cases, the total information flow within 
the organism concerning a familiar pattern may be the resultant 
of a small amount of information coming directly from the 
external environment and the bulk of the information coming from 
the memory store. The critical notion being put forward here 
is that there is firm empirical evidence for the existence of 
a system by means of which information in memory may be 
experienced perceptually, and this is the imagery system.
Rather than lying dormant for much of the time and only being 
utilised in specialised, purely imagery, functions such as 
dreaming or thought, it is proposed that the imagery system is 
a 'live' system which is constantly active. Through the 
functional integration of memory and sensory perceptual 
information, it makes available information processing capacity 
which enables the human organism to move about in familiar 
perceptual environments without having continuously to devote
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its entire information processing capacity to the analysis and 
recognition of sensory patterns. Bartlett stated in 1932 that 
"it is clear that images have fundamentally important parts to 
play in mental life" (Bartlett, 1932, p.215), an opinion that 
was "hardly popular" (ibid.) at the time. Current imagery 
research Indicates the correctness of Bartlett’s view.
Thus, an important concept proposed here is that for 
given patterns and situations the nature of much information 
flow within the human perceiver may be largely in the form of 
a closed loop in which, according to particular contexts, 
information in memory concerning particular patterns is 
recirculated, via the imagery system. This information from 
the memory store is utilised to enhance or augment the input 
from the perceptual system in a manner conceptually similar to 
that described by Moore and Seidl.
2.3 The question may be raised as to why, given the ideas 
outlined in the foregoing discussion, it is necessary to 
postulate that information in the memory store is integrated 
with partially processed real information. Aside from its 
potential importance for the concept of rehearsal of information 
in memory, the proposition would appear intuitively sound on 
the basis of introspective evidence that there are no 
consciously apparent ’gaps' in our continuing visual perception 
of patterns, which would necessarily be the case if the sensory 
input of familiar patterns were only partially analysed and 
relevant memory information concerning these patterns were not 
utilised to enhance or complete what is consciously 'seen'.
If, as Neisser (1967) suggests, perception and memory are 
constructive processes, then conscious thought is clearly 
involved in the perception of patterns. It is proposed that
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"kh® part of this process involving the accessing and recircu­
lation of stored memory information involved in the image 
enhancement of expected familiar patterns is overlearned, and, 
therefore, largely automatic, requiring little or no conscious 
direction, as in the case of ballistic motor movements in 
particular skills. Bartlett (1958) has considered high level 
cognitive processing as a skill in this sense.
In his 1963 paper on "the multiplicity of thought", in 
which he presented theoretical concepts later updated and 
refined in his definitive book "Cognitive Psychology", (1967), 
Neisser proposed that people "commonly or constantly think 
about several things at once" (p.12). This notion apparently 
contradicts the "widespread conviction" of both laymen and 
psychologists that "it is impossible, or at least unusual, to 
(|o even two things at once" (ibid.). Neisser resolves this 
apparent contradiction by proposing that, although this belief 
is valid, it shows "only that we cannot be conscious of two 
complex processes together." It is postulated that certain 
kinds of thought processes may occur concurrently with a 
conscious main stream of thought outside of consciousness. 
According to Neisser, if a process is "automatic" enough to be 
outside of consciousness, it may occur in parallel with 
conscious thought processing. In the context of the present 
thesis this idea supports the notion put forward here that the 
thought processes involved in the integration of memory and 
sensory perceptual information may be largely automatic, and 
consequently take place outside of conscious awareness.
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It is postulated that the information-processing load 
involved in the constructive analysis of sensory information 
is greater than that involved in the generation of images of 
existing stored patterns, even though the patterns involved 
and the resulting perceptual experiences may be the same.
The basis for this assumption is that the information stored 
in memory is already processed according to the subject’s 
various strategies and does not involve the utilisation of the 
usual sensory receptors at any point. In contrast, the analysis 
of real sensory information requires at least the necessary 
additional stage of transducing and processing the real 
sensory input into whatever ultimate form in which it is 
utilised and stored.
It follows from this argument that, in the case of the 
generation or synthesis of novel images, the processing load 
is greater than that involved in the synthesis of over-learned 
patterns, but it is still less than the perceptual processing 
load involving the analysis of real sensory input, because 
the synthesis of even novel images is based on internalised 
information content which does not require the additional 
stage of sensory information processing.
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2.4 From the theory outlined above it follows that the 
informational loading of that part of the human cognitive 
system involved in visual pattern perception is variable 
according to either, or both, of (a) the information processing 
requirements dictated by the degree of familiarity of the 
pattern, and, (b) the subjebtive direction or conscious focussing 
of the sensory analysis facilities of the perceptual system by 
the perceiver. Thus, if it is accepted that the various cog­
nitive processes are interdependent, interrelated, and inter­
active, (e.g. Bartlett, Reitman, Hunt, Piaget etc.,.), and that 
there is strong experimental evidence to suggest that the 
conscious information processing capabilities of the cognitive 
system as a whole are limited, (e.g. Welford (1968); Broadbent 
(1971)), then reduction in the information processing require­
ments of the system component concerned with conscious analysis 
of direct sensory input data will provide additonal information 
processing capacity capable of utilisation by other components 
of the system.
This point may be more clearly illustrated by reference 
to a computing system - provided, of course, one accepts Hunt's
(1971) claim as to the validity of an analogy between a human 
being and a computing system, (a claim disputed by Neisser,
(1972)). Consider the now typical situation of a large central 
digital computer simultaneously accessed by a number of remote 
terminals through which information may be read in and out.
The greater the number and utilisation of these remote terminals, 
(i.e. the larger the amount of information flow connected with 
their operation), the greater is the proportion of the information 
processing capacity of the large central computer utilised in 
simply organising and structuring the information flow of these
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terminals. This means that the remaining processing capacities 
of the central computer available for the analyses and mani­
pulation of the information content of the terminal inputs is 
greatly reduced. Reduce the loading from the peripheral 
terminals, and the "thinking ability" of the computer is 
increased. One way of reducing this loading from the terminals
is to decrease the analytical requirements of the flow of
information from the terminals by either reducing the actual 
input and/or pre-processing this input so that the information 
is partially organised to begin with.
This latter point may be further illustrated by reference 
to the work of Posner (1962; 1965), Posner notes that most
tasks, such as reading a book, listening to a lecture, forming
a concept, or solving a problem, require the subject to "take in 
information, to transform it in various ways by means of 
selection, classification and combination, and to store the 
product of these operations" (p.197). Such serial tasks, in 
which emphasis is placed upon the storage of transformed 
information appear to be "most representative of intellectual 
performance" 0.bid.)«
In the following discussion it should be noted that 
Posner is using the term 'information* in the formal, communi­
cations theory sense. (see footnote, p. 55 )•
Posner describes three types of transformations 
according to their informational properties, based upon the 
relation between input and output information required for 
perfect task performance. The first type of transformation 
is termed 'information conservation', in which the subject must 
preserve all of the information input in his response (e.g. as 
in reaction time and memory span tasks). Secondly, 'information
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creation* tasks are those in which the information output must 
exceed the input if the subject is to carry out the task (e.g. 
as in word-association-tasks). Thirdly, 'information reduction' 
tasks are all those in which "the subject is required to map more 
than one stimulus point into a single response" (ibid.). For 
example, addition, classification and selection are information 
reduction tasks. It is this third category of transformation 
with which Posner*s experiments have been primarily concerned.
Posner's hypothesis is that "the difficulty or amount of 
mental processing required in an information reduction task is 
directly related to the amount of information reduced" (p.199). |
He tested this hypothesis in the following way (Posner, 1962):
In a series of experiments, constant sets of 8 numbers, comprised 
of digits randomly selected from the range 1 to 64, and therefore 
representing 48 bits of information, were presented auditorily 
to subjects, at interstimulus intervals of between 1 and 4 seconds.
Six different information-reducing transforms were investigated, 
varying from 0 to 40.3 bits. These tasks ranged from simple 
recording of the number presented (an information conservation 
task) to various combinations of addition, and classification into S4such categories as 'high and odd' or 'low and even'. Posner 
found that "the results of several different experiments showed I
that the greater the information reduced between input and output, 
the more performance declined with increasing speed. The relation 
between rate of decline in performance and information reduction 
was roughly linear" (p.199),
In general terms, Posner's argument is that the amount of
information to be reduced between input and output is representative
of the amount of mental processing required by the task. Thus, it 
follows that, if a given task input may be partially pre-processed,
so that a smaller amount of'information must be reduced in the
j
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transformation to output, then less processing capacity must be 
utilised in performance of the task. Therefore, by reducing the 
amount of information reduction required by the task in this way, the 
thinking capacity available for concurrent performance of other cog­
nitive processing tasks, (e.g. problem solving, rehearsal in short­
term memory tasks), is increased. Posner*s work provides a useful 
experimental illustration of the computer system analogy discussed 
above.*
This point is emphasised to illustrate the ability of the 
present theory, as it has been developed so far, to describe a 
perceptual system in which information in a memory store may be 
dynamically and continuously utilised to reduce the analytical 
information processing requirements of perception, thereby providing 
additional capacity for potential utilisation, (e.g. for thinking), 
by other components of the system. By considering aspects of 
total system performance in controlled situations it is possible to 
test these propositions experimentally. This methodology will be
described later.
In outlining the information processing organisation of the
visual system Hunt (1971) states: "It does not defy intuition
to say that man sees much and thinks little." This is too 
dogmatic a statement, particularly in the light of the present 
approach. It fails to acknowledge a most important possibility 
raised by the present argument, and it is felt that Hunt's state­
ment, as it stands, misses the point. In terms of the present 
model, such a statement should read: "(i) When man is
seeing much he is thinking little, and (ii) When man is 
thinking much he is seeing little." Here, of course, the verb
* Note that, although Posner is using 'information* in the communi­cation theory sense, and measuring this quantity in 'bits’, a pro­cedure susceptible to the considerable limitations outlined earlier (p. 44), he is restricting this quantification to simple classifi­cations and clearly definable sets of operations. He acknowledges the extreme difficulty of applying such measurements to the study of complex intellectual tasks, in which the sequence and complexity of the steps through which the subject must pass to perform the task cannot be precisely specified.
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’see* is referring to the perceptual analysis of sensory 
information from the immediate environment. We may, in thought, 
*see* images without actual reference to the sensory signals 
from the external environment in which it is highly probable 
that such images are contained.
2.5 The present theory thus considers the human being in a way
rather different from traditional information processing 
approaches. In a manner analogous to the development of what
has been termed the "social psychology of the laboratory"
(Bickman and Henchy, 1972; McGuire, 1967; Ring, 1967), it is 
worth considering the possibility that such a development may 
have taken place in other "hard" fields of psychology. It is 
possible that removing the study of perceptual behaviour from 
natural contexts changes its very character, and thus the 
elements studied may be very different from their counterparts 
in the field situation. Reitman (1970), in his discussion of 
the laboratory investigation of memory by artificial and con­
trived tasks, and the role of subjects* strategies in the 
performance of such tasks, would certainly appear to support 
this argument. The simplification of memory models and the 
impossibility of decoupling the memory process from the 
cognitive system as a whole, together with the nature of the 
laboratory tasks typically used "eliminate the everyday context 
of memory", argues Reitman (ibid., p.473). Welford (1968) also 
lends strong support to this view, stating that: "Perception
in everyday life is ... much more complex than it is with the 
single objects or groups of objects used in laboratory 
experiments." (p.178)
.ri
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The present theoretical position suggests a conceptual 
framev/ork for the consideration of the human being in his normal 
environment. Where the environment is familiar he may, for 
much of the time, exist in a state where the sensory analysis 
facilities of his perceptual system are simply * idling’ within 
some range of minimum activity level necessary to maintain them 
in a viable state of readiness. Such a state of readiness 
involves periodic or partial confirmatory sampling of sensory 
data from the 'external* world. The information components 
involved in augmenting this partial or periodic analysis are 
continuously ’recirculating* via the imagery system. Thus, 
the human can easily move about in this environment ’thinking 
about something else.* In new environments, or where the 
human elects to analyse familiar patterns in detail, the 
situation is, of course, different. It is hypothesised that, 
in familiar environments, the organism is, in effect, for much 
of the time ’inward looking* and 'seeing* what is in memory.
If the proposition concerning a minimum level of activity 
holds, it follows that when activity falls below this minimum, 
the perceptual systems may be automatically activated and 
analysis of the sensory environment commences, whether or not 
the environmental sensory pattern at that time is familiar.
This analysis ceases again when the required level of activity 
is reached. In general terms, a basic idea of the model is 
that if we stop thinking we tend to inspect our sensory 
environment, and, intuitively this would seem a reasonable 
statement. Conversely, if v/e are engaged in internalised 
thought, we tend to analyse less sensory data from our 
environment. This proposition has been tested and verified 
experimentally. (see Chap. III).
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2.6 It is emphasised that, from the conceptual approach of 
the present theory, it follows that pattern-recognition is 
context-dependent. If the functional role of pattern inform­
ation held in memory is as it is proposed here, then because 
the probability of occurrence of familiar patterns is inseparably 
related to the organism-environment contexts in which they 
normally occur, the nature of the process is determined by this 
fact. Thus, even in the case of novel or unfamiliar patterns, 
the nature of the perceptual analysis imposed by the subject 
upon sensory data input from his environment is determined by 
information held in memory.
In the transference of sensory pattern information to 
memory, or in the initial interpretation of novel sensory 
patterns, it is proposed that the basic control function of the 
cognitive system is to maximise the sharing of higher order 
pattern information characteristics derived from the sensory 
data with appropriate sets of similar characteristics already 
in memory. In other words, according to his cognitive 
presuppositions and expectations in relation to any given 
situation, what is in memory largely determines which attributes 
of sensory patterns are sought out by the perceiver - i.e. in 
order to make sense of any sensory information input, he must 
have in memory a set of internalised referents by means of which 
this input might be evaluated. Conversely, failure to utilise 
the appropriate sets of internalised referents may lead to 
failure to perceive organisation of any kind in the stimulus 
array.
keeper's (1935) classic experiments illustrate the 
essence of the present argument. Subjects were asked to 
identify figures such as those in Fig. 3 . When told what to
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Figures used
by beeper (1935)
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expect (e.g. "it is a musical instrument") subjects were more 
often able to structure the pattern and recognise the 
particular item. We are here, of course, again considering 
the phenomena of perceptual sets, and, as Neisser (1967, p.61) 
points out any theory of pattern recognition must reckon
with them."
Further empirical support for the theory may come from 
clinical evidence. Subjects who have suffered injury leading 
to sudden partial or complete loss of sensitivity in areas of 
the'visual field may not be consciously aware of this condition, 
at least in normal familiar visual environments. (Gedye, 
personal communication,1973) Under such conditions, provided 
the appropriate memory systems are unaffected, information held 
in the memory store, previously obtained and stored via the 
intact visual system, is constantly utilised to present normal 
and complete perceptual experience.
This area appears worthy of investigation as, if memory 
information were not being utilised in the manner proposed by 
the present theory, such subjects should be aware of decay in 
parts of the visual field wnen fixating a visual array with 
little eye movement. It would be predicted by the theory 
that in certain kinds of novel pattern recognition situations 
comprising patterns and pattern characteristics not in memory, 
conscious awareness of some visual damage might become 
subjectively apparent.
2,7 There follow some preliminary comments on the experimental 
investigation of the model.
In addition to the substantial direct and inferential 
support for the present approach provided by the existing 
literature, it is possible to test directly some specific aspects
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of the model# The problems connected with artificiality of 
the laboratory situation can be minimised by utilising an 
experimental configuration employing materials and cognitive 
functions relevant outside the laboratory. For example, visual 
stimulus material can be in the form of well overlearned complex 
patterns such as photographs of highly familiar objects and 
scenes.
The initial and most important stage of the investigation 
is to test the notion that much information is recirculated 
from the memory store utilising the imagery system when there 
is no requirement for comprehensive analysis of the direct 
sensory perceptual input and, consequently, the capacities of 
the central mechanisms are freed for other cognitive purposes.
It is considered that this aim can be achieved by a controlled 
investigation of subjects* performance in a task situation 
incorporating the simultaneous recognition of complex visual 
patterns and the performance of an internalised cognitive task 
involving considerable utilisation of the subjects* conscious 
thought capacities.
In this way, by forcing the subject to attempt to perform 
the two tasks simultaneously, he is prevented from devoting his 
entire processing capacity fco one task, or to the other.
V/elford (1968, p.132) points out that it has long been 
known that, where subjects are required to perform two tasks 
simultaneously, "the speed or accuracy of one or of. the other or 
of both is likely to be lower than when the tasks are carried 
out separately." In some contrast, from the premises of the 
present theory it can be hypothesised that this need not 
necessarily be the case where one of the two tasks is concerned 
with the cognition of highly familiar patterns in contexts where
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there is a high subjective expectancy that they will occur. It 
is further predicted that particular kinds of alteration or 
breakdown of these familiar patterns in situations where their 
subjective probabilities of occurrence are close to unity should 
not affect the ability of subjects to recognise them on many 
, occasions provided that the necessary proportions of critical 
identifying information may be derived from the display.
Where the subject happens to process a portion of a 
pattern information content which does contain an incongruity 
in relation to an expected pattern, he will perceive it as such, 
and exhibit a discrimination reaction to the altered pattern.
It is important to consider this general point in some 
detail. A question raised here is: Is it important to the
experiment that the subject actually sees the display (i.e. in 
the sense that some analytical processing of the sensory data 
is involved), or that the subject thinks he sees the visual 
pattern? (i.e. he consciously experiences complete perception 
of the visual pattern). For the present discussion it is 
clearly necessary only thai the subject is convinced he 
experiences perception of a particular pattern, whether it 
involves any analysis, however limited, of the real sensory 
pattern or not. However, it is clearly crucial to the 
validity of the proposed investigation that the subject should 
not simply guess the occurrence of given patterns, there being 
no overt or covert perception involved. There are a number 
of methods of controlling for this kind of contamination, such 
as, for example, the use of a two-stage pattern identification 
requirement, the use of catch trials, the use of particular 
verbal instructions, and the use of large sets of possible 
response alternatives. These methods will be outlined in the
&3
reports of the particular experiments.
2.8 An important notion emerging from the theoretical 
argument is as follows:-
Let the information content of a pattern be conceptually 
represented by a Venn diagram, the area of the circle represent­
ing the total information content of the pattern. Let be 
an overlearned pattern, and Pg be a-similar pattern such that P^ 
and Pp share a high proportion of common information content, as 
represented by Pig. 4 I -
B'sJl
If the subject in a recognition situation processes only 
a proportion of the sensory pattern information coming from the 
shared portion, then he will not exhibit any discrimination 
response between the two patterns. Further he will consciously 
experience complete perception of the pattern expected (P^, say), 
as memory information complements the partially processed sensory 
information. This memory information contains that portion 
which is unique to the particular expected pattern.
2,9 A schematic flow chart showing the information flow 
dynamics of the pattern recognition component of the cognitive 
system according to the present model is given in Appendix I .
An important part of the research to be reported in the 
following chapters is the use of computer simulation techniques,
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incorporating the theoretical ideas outlined previously, to 
replicate the experimental work.
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CHAPTER III
3.1 The previous chapters have described the background and 
development of the theoretical approach of the present research. 
This chapter describes an experiment which directly tests a 
fundamental hypothesis derived from the theory.
3.2 Prom the theoretical arguments of the present approach, 
the following specific hypothesis can be formulated (see p. 57):-
When the cognitive system of a human subject is not 
involved in any internalised cognitive information processing, 
in order to maintain the activity level of the system the 
available capacity of the system will be primarily dedicated to 
the analysis and processing of a greater proportion of real 
visual sensory input, whether or not it emanates from familiar 
patterns, than when the subject is engaged in internalised 
thought processes.
Conversely, when the subject is primarily engaged in 
internalised cognitive processing, less capacity is avail,able 
for the analysis of real visual sensory input, and the amount 
of this analysis should be reduced accordingly.
In more general terms, if the present theoretical 
notions are correct, it should be the case that, when a subject 
is engaged in thought, he will elect to allocate less of his 
cognitive processing capacity to the analysis of available real 
visual sensory input from his environment than when he is not 
engaged in thought.
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3«3 Experiments by Gould and his co-workers (Gould and 
Schaffer, 1965, 1967; Gould, 1967; Gould and Dill, 1969;
Gould and Peeples, 1970) consider patterns of eye fixations as 
a "direct reflection of cognitive processing." (Loftus, 1972, 
p.527). For example, Gould and Peeples assume that refixation 
of a particular visual pattern indicates the "need to obtain 
more information about it" (1970, p.51), Loftus states that 
this research, together with analogous reaction-time research 
(e.g. Smith and Nielson, 1970; Tversky, 1969) "suggests that 
eye fixation patterns may be profitably regarded as an 
observable basis for inferring internal processing of visual 
information." (Loftus, 1972, p.528).
Therefore, from the premises of the present theory, 
subjects instructed verbally to "try not to think about anything" 
for a prescribed time period should exhibit significantly more 
gross eye movement activity than in an otherwise identical 
condition in which they are instructed to carry out an inter­
nalised mental task, even though this mental task should not 
nominally interfere with normal perception, as it involves no 
reference to, or utilisation of, real visual sensory input.
3.4 Method
i) Apparatus: The apparatus consisted of a Kipp
and Zonen, Model BD8, flat bed recorder. Eye movement 
activity was recorded by placement of two electrodes 
adjacent to the left eye, one electrode at the left hand 
corner of the eye, and one just above the pupil at the 
mid point of the eye. These electrodes recorded the 
ocular muscular activity associated with eye movement.
The experimental room was large with sizeable windows 
through which the subject could view the external scenery.
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ii) Subjects; The subjects were eight undergraduate 
or postgraduate university students with normal corrected 
vision and no optical defects. Pour subjects were male and 
four female. All subjects were unpaid volunteers, and had 
no prior knowledge as to the purpose of the experiment.
iii) Procedure ; Subjects were seated comfortably in 
a chair in the experimental room, facing in the general 
direction of the windows. They were then wired up for 
recording of eye movements, their overall head movements not 
being restricted in any way. Subjects were told that the 
testing session was part of some work preliminary to a main 
study, and that their eye movements were being recorded 
simply as an operational reliability test of the recording 
apparatus, which was to be used extensively in a later 
experiment.
The purpose of this was to structure the demand 
characteristics of the experimental situation (Neisser, 1967) 
in such a way as to minimise emphasis on the real experi­
mental interest in the amount of eye movement activity.
The aim was to convince the subjects that they were not even 
participating in an actual experiment in the usual sense, 
their role being purely the preliminary one of operationally 
testing the apparatus.
Subjects were then asked to relax, the apparatus was 
switched on and the recording equipment checked. During 
this period subjects were instructed to blink and to move 
their eyes in various directions so that artifacts could be 
extracted from the later analysis of the data.
Standardised instructions to the subjects were as 
follows:-
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Condition A; ’Although this might seem unusual, I want you, 
when I give the word, to try as hard as you possibly can not 
to think about anything for a short time, until I tell you 
to stop. The time period for this task will be two minutes.* 
Condition B : *I am going to tell you a three figure number,
selected at random. When you hear this number, I want you 
to start counting silently to yourself, and as quickly as you 
can, backwards by threes. That is, subtract three from the 
number I give you, then three from that total and so on.
You will continue to do this task until I tell you to stop - 
this period will be two minutes. I want you then to tell me 
the number you have arrived at. I have a fairly accurate 
estimate of where you should have got to, so try and concen­
trate hard on correctly keeping track of the numbers.*
Half the subjects were tested with condition A first, 
and half with condition B. The experiment was repeated for 
each subject, with the initial orders of the testing conditions 
reversed. On completion of the testing session, subjects 
.were interviewed in order to check on any demand character­
istics which may have enhanced or confounded the predicted 
results.
iv) Results; The paper tape pen record of eye movements 
under conditions A and B were compared for the two experi­
mental treatments for each subject. Because of the 
relatively basic nature of the apparatus and the record, 
differences between amounts of eye movement in the two 
conditions were estimated by gross visual comparison of 
the adjacent raw data recordings for conditions A and B.
The differences obtained were quite clear. However, a 
second independent observer, who had no knowledge of the aims
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of the experiment nor of any previous ratings of the data, 
also similarly rated the eye movement activity records for 
differences between the two conditions. Both observers* 
ratings correlated perfectly.
The results are shown in table I.
The results very strongly support the experimental
hypothesis, only one result being contrary to that predicted, 
and three showing no obvious■detectable difference. If the 
tied instances (i.e. no difference in eye movement activity
between conditions A and B), are ignored, then the experimental
hypothesis is supported in 12 out of 13 cases, i.e. 92% of 
occasions. No subject exhibited results contrary to those 
predicted on both test and re-test, all subjects producing at 
least one clear response pattern in the predicted direction.
The post experimental interviews indicated that no 
subjects ascertained the true purpose of the experiment, and 
none consciously attempted to generate particular eye move­
ment patterns according to any subjective assessment of the 
demand characteristics of the testing situation.
3.5. Discussion.
Although methodologically and technically straight 
forward, the experiment produced empirical data which confirm 
the basic predictions derived from the theoretical model. The 
consistency of the gross effect across subjects shows that, 
whatever the individual differences in information processing 
strategies, the broad notions of the model concerning the 
allocation of total processing capacity appear to be supported.
The results of the present experiment are further 
supported by data obtained in another experimental context 
using far more sophisticated eye-movement recording apparatus.
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TABLE I
order of testing
Subject No. Sex A — B B A
1 M + 2 + 1
2 M + d + 2
3 M * 1 + 2
4 M + 1 + 2
5 P + 1 * 2
6 F + 1 - 2
7 F * 2 + 1
8 F + 2 + 1
Key; + indicates significant difference in thepredicted direction (i.e. more eye.movement in condition A than B).
indicates significant difference in direction opposite to that predicted*
* indicates no observable difference between conditions A and B*
The numerals 1 or 2 in the * order of testing* columns indicate the condition testing order for the experiment and its replication for each subject. e.g. subject no. 1 was first tested in the condition order B *->■ A and the experiment was replicated using the testing order A B.
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In a series of experiments, Loftus (1972) investigated the 
extent to which recognition memory for pictures may be predicted 
by eye-movement patterns. In each experiment subjects were 
shown 180 pictures, and this was followed by a yes-no recognition 
test. It was found that "when pictures are viewed for a limited 
amount of time, memory performance is a positive function of the 
number of fixations on the picture", and that "with number of 
fixations held constant, performance is independent of exposure 
time" (Loftus, 1972, p.525).
Eye movements in Loftus* experiments were recorded using 
a modified Mackworth stand camera (Mackworth, 1967), a device 
utilising a corneal reflection technique and videotape recording 
facilities. Full descriptions of the apparatus and the 
techniques of data analysis employed are provided by Loftus (1972). 
Loftus* experiments are the first to systematically relate eye 
movement patterns to subsequent memory for the viewed material.
Earlier, experiments by Freund (1971) and Szewczuk (1970) 
compared recognition memory for pictures viewed normally and 
during simultaneous performance of a distracting cognitive task. 
Freund found that recognition performance was significantly 
worse for pictures viewed while performing a distracting mental 
task, viz. counting backward by threes, than for pictures viewed 
normally. The viewing time of 7 secs, per picture was the 
same in each condition.
Loftus investigated this situation, but in addition 
recorded eye movement activity. The important finding with 
regard to the present experiment was that in the viewing 
condition involving the concurrent task of counting backwards 
by threes, it was found that there was "about a 40% reduction" 
in the fixation rate compared to the normal viewing condition.
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In Loftus* experiments, subjects were required to learn 
visual material presented to them, and in certain instances 
received financial reward for correct responses. Consequently, 
they can be assumed to have devoted their entire processing 
capacities to the optimal input and storage of the visual 
material. In the counting backwards situation, it is important 
to note that subjects were still attempting to learn the visual 
material, but the utilisation of a substantial amount of 
processing capanity in the performance of the internalised task 
reduced the capacity available for the purposes of perception. 
This reduction in processing of the visual data was clearly 
reflected in the concurrent reduction in eye movements.
It is considered that these findings of Loftus confirm 
the present results, the validity of the gross data-analysis 
methods employed, and the theoretical assumptions from which 
the experiment was derived.
3.6 Conclusions.
1) When specifically instructed not to engage in
' internalised cognitive processing, the perceiver consciously 
elects to utilise his processing capacity by dedicating it 
entirely to the analysis of his visual sensory environment.
2) When engaged in the performance of an internalised 
cognitive task, the perceiver elects to make available the 
necessary processing capacity to perform this task by 
reducing the amount of information processing connected 
with the analysis of real visual sensory input.
It is emphasised that these conclusions are general 
rules with regard to the fundamental distribution of proportions 
of overall information processing capacity, and therefore are 
not affected either by individual differences in the limit of
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this capacity, or by inter- or intra-individual differences in 
specific information-processing strategies.
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NOTE During the development of the experimental procedure to be 
reported in the next two chapters, several extensive pilot studies 
were carried out. For example, a special computer program, 
written in FORTRAN IV using an IBM 360 computer, was evolved.
This highly flexible program generated dot patterns within a 
100 X 100 matrix according to pre-selected constraints imposed 
by the operator. Patterns composed of a particular number of 
dots, but of otherwise entirely random configuration could be 
generated. Also, prescribed geometric patterns, such as 
triangles, squares, trapeziums, etc., could be embedded in the 
matrix. These embedded figures could then be partially masked 
using a selected amount of random visual noise, or they could 
be randomly or selectively fragmented according to specific 
criteria. These patterns, which were printed out on paper, 
were then recorded onto video tape and presented to subjects on 
a television screen. In a dual-task situation, subjects had 
to perform a Posner (1962) information-réduction task (see p. 54), 
while simultaneously identifying the patterns, which were 
presented in complete, noisy or fragmented form. Because the 
Posner task required regular vocalisation of the classification 
responses, non-verbal pattern-recognition responses were made 
using a specially constructed item of apparatus incorporating 
a slowly moving paper tape. The subject’s writing hand was 
strapped in place, and his pattern-identification responses were 
in the form of drawings of the pattern on the paper tape.
Subjects could easily do this accurately, without averting 
their gaze from the screen. Although precise arbitary quanti­
fication could be achieved using these methods, tests showed 
that insufficient visual pattern complexity could be achieved 
on the screen to provide meaningfully structured visual stimuli 
which presented identification problems to subjects - even in
75
1
the dual-task situation* Further, considerable technical 
problems associated with stimulus synchrony were encountered. -1
It also became clear that the arbitary quantification of the 
highly artificial patterns v/as of limited real usefulness, and 
bore little meaningful relationship, to the problems of 
perception of real overlearned complex patterns in the 
situations to which the research was addressed. Similar 
problems resulted from other pilot investigations using 
continuous, moving, input, in which the camera travelled over 
a fixed path. However, although they were difficult and time- 
consuming, the experimental and technical data resulting from 
the carrying out of pilot studies of this nature we're of 
valuable assistance in the formulation of the definitive 
research concepts and procedures reported in the following 
chapters.
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CHAPTER IV
4*1 A primary concern of the present thesis is the recognition 
of overlearned, anticipated complex visual patterns in situations 
where the perceiver is able to devote only part of his conscious 
attention to the performance of this task.
Pictures of real perceptual environments typically 
encountered by subjects, in the form of still photographs, film, 
or video recordings represent extremely complex visual patterns. 
These patterns are far more complex than the simple letters, 
numbers, geometric patterns or line drawings which are generally 
employed in the vast majority of laboratory investigations of 
human perception, memory and pattern recognition. It is 
considered that the possibility must be acknowledged that 
subjects in experiments involving such artificial stimulus 
situations, which the subject might never have encountered prior 
to the particular experiment, may develop novel forms of 
information processing strategies which are specific and 
referent only to these experimental situations. These strategies 
may bear no meaningful relationship to the way in which subjects 
perceive and remember in their normal perceptual information 
environments.
The use of photographic pictorial stimuli involves visual 
material which is extremely complex and, while still retaining 
some degree of artificiality, is at least arguably closer to 
the nature of the subject’s perception of the real world than 
the visually simple stimulus material typically employed. 
Certainly, normal subjects have, without exception, experienced
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very frequent exposure to photographs from childhood. Thus, 
even if the cognitive processing strategies involved in complex 
picture perception are qualitatively different from those 
employed in perception of the real environment, as Gibson (1966, 
Ch. 11) has argued, the massive amount of exposure to pictures 
experienced by normal subjects ensures that well practised, 
developed and utilised picture processing strategies are in the 
subjects* repertoires. They are not, therefore, artifacts 
specific to the experimental situation; the "correspondences 
between surrogates and what they stand for" (ibid, p.235) have 
been well learned.
4.2 A further factor in favour of the utilisation of picture 
stimuli in the present context is the extreme, ease with which 
pictures can be learned, as evidenced by the high levels of 
recognition performance achieved by subjects in picture memory 
experiments, after only very brief, single exposures to the 
pictures to be memorised. This empirical evidence indicates 
that pictures can be readily and rapidly overlearned if the 
exposure times are increased. This increase allows a greater 
number of eye fixations upon, and consequently a greater amount 
of information to be extracted from a stimulus picture by the 
perceiver (Gibson, 1966; Loftus, 1972).
In a series of experiments seeking the limits of picture 
memory, Standing (1973) has extensively investigated the power 
of picture memory, following up earlier studies by Nickerson 
(1965, 1968), Shepard (1967), and Standing, Coneaio and Haber 
(1970). In one experimental condition, subjects were required 
to learn 10,000 ’normal* pictures. As Standing points out, no 
simple metric exists for the specification of such pictorial 
stimuli. However, he states that the pictures used "may be
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categorised as resembling a highly variegated collection of 
competent snapshots" (ibid, p,208).
The 10,000 pictures to be learned were presented to 
subjects once only at an exposure time of 5 seconds, with an 
interstimulus interval of 600 ms. With the necessary rest 
periods, only 2,000 slides per day could be shown to the 
subjects. An average retention interval of two days was obtained 
by administering the recognition test immediately after the fifth 
daily learning session. This test consisted of 160 trials, in
which two picture stimuli were presented side by side. One of 
these had been randomly selected from the learning set, and then 
randomly allocated to the left or right hand position. The 
other slide was selected from the total pool of * normal’ slides, 
but was one not previously presented to the subject. The subject 
wrote down an *L* or an *R* on each trial to indicate whether the 
left or right-hand picture looked the most familiar to him.
On the basis of these results, an estimate of the number 
of items retained in memory was calculated, making the usual 
guessing correction. It was estimated that 6,600 pictures were 
retained in memory. Standing concluded that, for pictures,
"there is no upper bound to memory capacity; per cent retention 
gradually declines, but the absolute number of items retained 
always increases as the learning set is made progressively 
larger" (ibid. p.210). At the other extreme, recognition 
performance with small sets of 20 and 40 pictures, with equal 
numbers of recognition test trials, was almost perfect after a 
retention interval of two days. Performance on a 100 trial 
recognition test administered immediately after viewing 1,000 
pictures was extremely good, subjects scoring a mean of 99,6 
correct (median 100). This corresponds to a retention of 992 
items.
79
4.3 In his paper, Standing notes that "apparently the only 
clear case of truly poor picture memory performance in the 
literature is that shown by Goldstein and Chance (1970) who 
carefully constructed extremely confusable items" (ibid* p.219). 
These investigators consider that previous studies (i.e. prior 
to 1970) of recognition memory for heterogeneous picture stimuli 
which suggest an unusually large storage and retrieval capacity 
have, in fact, overestimated this capacity, Goldstein and 
Chance argue that "in order to speak logically about * accuracy* 
or ’correctness* in the results of these investigations, in 
contrast to those of studies of verbal learning, it must be 
assumed that the correct recognition responses made by these S*s 
were to the particular, discrete picture, and not to the class 
membership of the stimulus. In other words, it must be assumed 
that S reacted to a previously seen stimulus as though it was in 
totality the identical stimulus shown to him earlier. Further­
more, it must be assumed that if the stimulus had been modified - 
even by a small change within the picture - between the first and 
second presentations, S could detect that stimulus and would 
react by reporting that the stimulus was not the one shown before" 
(ibid. p.327).
Goldstein and Chance put forward the proposition that, 
because the photographic samples typically employed in earlier 
studies are heterogeneous, the accuracy scores could be inflated 
estimates of picture recognition memory. An item could, they 
maintain, be recognised on the basis of its class membership 
rather than as a unique stimulus memorised on a previous 
occasion. Thus, what is stored in memory in such experiments 
is not detailed information about a particular stimulus, but a 
general concept, and with heterogeneous pictures this information
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may well be all that is required for recognition. Consequently, 
partially learned stimuli could be 'recognised' correctly, 
thereby increasing the 'accuracy' scores.
To test this notion, Goldstein and Chance investigated 
picture, or pattern, memory with sets of homogeneous stimuli.
All the homogeneous stimuli within a recognition series came 
from the same psychological class, with interstimulus differences 
kept as small as possible without making any two stimuli 
perceptually indiscriminable when viewed simultaneously. The 
three classes of homogeneous stimuli used were complex snow 
crystal patterns, ink blots, and photographs of faces. Separate 
groups of subjects were shown 14 stimuli from each class for 
2-3 sec, separated by a 5 to 8 sec. interstimulus interval. 
Recognition memory was measured either immediately, or 48 hours 
after presentation of the learning set, 84 randomly ordered 
stimuli were presented for 5 sec. each, this set containing the 
14 stimuli previously seen. All the pictures in the recognition 
test set were of the same psychological class.
It was found that, in the immediate recognition test 
condition, faces were best recognised (77% correct for female 
subjects; 66% correct for males), followed by ink blots and 
snow crystals. However, the overall decrement in the delayed 
condition was only 9%, which is extremely small considering the 
single short stimulus exposure duration, and the homogeneity of 
the stimuli. Further, this decrement was almost entirely 
accounted for by recognition errors in respect of ink blot and 
snow crystal stimuli. Memory for faces was hardly affected by 
the 48 hour delay. Goldstein and Chance attribute the 
significantly better performance of subjects with respect to the 
faces stimuli to the greater familiarity and meaningfulness of
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faces as stimulus patterns, and the resultant greater interest 
of subjects in such patterns.
Overall, the results of these experiments do show 
significantly poorer picture memory performance than previous 
studies using heterogeneous picture stimuli. However, in spite 
of this, Goldstein and Chance state that their findings are 
still impressive demonstrations of the effectiveness of picture 
memory, and that "recognition performance of such high levels in 
the presence of essentially meaningless stimuli following a 
single brief exposure is intuitively surprising" (ibid, p.241).
4.4 In an experiment designed to overcome such methodological 
objections as those raised by Goldstein and Chance, Standing 
(1973) devised a recognition test in which 2, 4, 8, 16 or 32 
alternatives were presented sequentially, rather than simul­
taneously, for 2 sec. each to the subject. The subject's task 
on each trial was to choose the picture he had previously seen 
for 2 sec. The larger number of sequentially presented 
alternatives "made the task more difficult and proportionately 
closer to the recall type of task" (ibid. p.213).
On the basis of the results of this experiment. Standing 
estimated that approximately 92% of items from a learning set 
of 100 stimulus pictures were retained in memory. This is a 
striking outcome, and together with the results from the 10,000 
picture experiment described earlier, these findings do strongly 
suggest that, whether or not the capacity for picture memory is 
somewhat overestimated in the literature, memory for complex 
pictures is extraordinarily good.
4.5 To summarise, from the preceding discussion, the following 
conclusions can be drawn:-
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1) Recognition memory for complex pictures is extremely 
good, even with very short single exposures to the set of 
pictures to be learned and long intervals between the 
presentation of the learning stimuli and the recognition 
test.
2) When the complex pictures used share a high degree 
of homogeneity, recognition memory performance is poorer 
than in the case of heterogeneous stimuli. It appears 
that this decrement is greater with meaningless, unfamiliar 
stimuli which are novel to the subject. In the case of 
homogeneous, familiar meaningful stimuli, such as faces, 
performance is not as poor as with homogeneous meaningless 
pictures. However, even when the sets of pictures are 
homogeneous, performance is still strikingly good.
These conclusions suggest that normal photographs provide 
complex visual information patterns which are likely to be 
readily, and rapidly overlearned by means of repeated, relatively 
long exposures to subjects. Subjects are able to achieve 
extremely high levels of performance with exposures of 1-2 sec. 
Thus, an exposure time of, say, 15 sec. should ensure maximum 
processing of the picture information. The evidence further 
indicates that subjects should readily be able to learn a series 
of small homogeneous sets of pictures, each of these sets 
representing a different stimulus category, and consisting of 
familiar, meaningful pictures.
4.6 On these premises a new form of picture recognition test 
is proposed, involving a two-stage identification process on 
each trial. The subject is required to identify a stimulus 
picture in two ways. He must <a) identify the stimulus category;
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and. (b-)-malte-an identification response with regard to the 
specific picture presented.
• The use of such a procedure has a number of advantages 
from the standpoint of the present theory, and provides a much 
more sensitive measure of recognition performance than the 
typical two-choice, or heterogeneous multiple alternative 
procedures usually employed in picture memory studies.
Differences in recognition performance may be measured in terms 
of both identification of the particular stimulus category, and 
identification of the specific picture within that category, 
thus providing' two indices of performance.
Consider the following experimental picture memory 
situations
Subjects are required to overlearn a number of pictures. 
These pictures consist of a relatively small set of different, 
or heterogeneous, stimulus categories, each category being 
represented by a small number of homogeneous pictures within 
that category. Recognition performance is then tested by 
sequentially showing the subject brief exposures of a numerically 
larger set of pictures containing ?11 the previously overlearned 
pictures, and consisting of the same heterogeneous set of 
stimulus categories. Hov/ever, the number of homogeneous 
pictures within each category is increased. The subjects* task 
on each trial is to name both the stimulus category and to state 
whether or not the specific picture was one of those previously- 
presented in the learning set. In this situation, it is 
hypothesised that subjects should make few, if any, errors in 
relation to identification of the stimulus category, but a 
small proportion of errors in relation to the identification of 
specific pictures v/ithin each homogeneous set.
_ ..
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Consider now the situation in which, during each trial in 
the 2-stage recognition test, the subject is simultaneously 
attempting to perform an internalised cognitive task involving t
no nominal visual distractions. According to the present theory, 
under these conditions only part of the subject’s available 
cognitive processing capacity will therefore be able to be 
dedicated to the processing of the visual sensory information 
input. Because the picture stimuli presented in the learning 
set are overlearned, i.e. able to be well specified from 
information held in memory, and because the heterogeneous set 
of possible stimulus categories is known and expected by the I
subject, he should be able, in the dual-task situation, to 
process at least sufficient real visual sensory information 
input to identify correctly the stimulus category. His 
conscious perceptual experience in relation to the picture 
presented is completed by the utilisation of memory information 
by means of the imagery system. In this way the subject should 
consciously experience perception of one of the relevant over- 
learned expected visual information patterns within that 
category.
It is hypothesised that the subject should, in all 
instances, be able to process sufficient real sensory information 
to identify unequivocally the stimulus category, but he should 
make a considerable number of errors in relation to the 
identification of specific pictures. Clearly, these latter 
types of errors should occur when the subject processes a portion 
of the real visual sensory information pattern which is not 
different from the corresponding information characteristics of 
the overlearned expected pattern. However, if the differences 
between pictures in the homogeneous set are small, the
I
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probability that the subject will process a portion of the 
visual information which is referent to differences between the 
actual and overlearned patterns, is low. If part of the real 
sensory information processed on a trial is different to the 
corresponding portion held in memory, then the subject will 
correctly classify the picture as one not presented in the 
learning set.
4.7 A series of studies have attempted to relate ’vividness' 
of visual imagery, as measured by a questionnaire technique, to 
performance on picture memory tasks. These experiments have 
been carried out by Sheehan (1966a, 1966b, 1967b, 1972; Sheehan 
and Neisser, 1969) and the questionnaire employed was a 
shortened form of the 150-item Betts Questionnaire Upon Mental 
Imagery (Betts, 1909). Sheehan’s briefer version of the Betts 
questionnaire requires vividness ratings along a 7-point scale 
for 35 items, consisting of 5 items for each of seven sensory 
modalities. (Sheehan, 1967a). The scores on the shortened 
form of the questionnaire correlated very highly (r = 0.92)
with total scores on the 150-item scale.
On the basis of this questionnaire, subjects were 
classified as high or low imagers. The results of the studies 
attempting to show that subjects rated as vivid or high imagers 
on the Betts questionnaire perform better on picture memory 
tasks than those subjects rated as low imagers, have, on the 
whole, proven either inconclusive or negative, leading Neisser 
(1970) to conclude that questionnaire imagery ratings have 
little predictive value in relation to picture memory 
performance.
j
4.8 Marks (1973) challenges this conclusion for two main ]
reasons. Firstly, using Sheehan and Neisser*s (1969) study 1
as a typical example, he notes that vividness ratings on each 
trial were obtained after recall. However, there is evidence
'5
(Marks, 1972 ) that this ’’rating-after-recall paradigm provides 
an artifactual basis for an‘accuracy-vividness relationship.
In this paradigm the subject can use his recall performance as 
a cue for the value of the vividness rating. If ratings are 
obtained prior to recall, the within-subjects relationship 
between accuracy and vividness disappears” (Marks, 1973, p.17).
Secondly, Marks points out that the shortened form of 
the Betts questionnaire is referent to seven sensory modalities.
Although Betts (1909) reported a moderately high correlation 
between ratings for different modalities, Sheehan and Neisser’s 
(1969) experimental task involved visual stimuli only.
Consequently, argues Marks, ratings of visual images alone 
would have been a more relevant basis on which to categorise 
and select subjects as ’high’ and ’low’ imagers. Further,
Marks claims that it is reasonable to suppose that vividness 
of imagery will be related to the subjective level of interest, 
meaningfulness, and affect evoked by the stimulus which is 
imaged. It is probable that geometric designs, as used by 
Sheehan and Neisser, have low values along these variables.
Thus, for these stimuli recall differences between high and 
low imagers would be less marked than differences in accuracy 
that might be obtained when other kinds of stimuli are used.
(It should be noted that this argument exactly parallels that 
employed by Goldstein and Chance (1970) to account for poor 
recall performance of geometric snow flake, and ink blot 
patterns (see p. 80 )),
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4.9 Marks (1973) describes a series of experiments using a 
new l6-item questionnaire referent to the visual modality only, 
the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ). This 
test has a test-retest reliability coefficient of 0.74 (n = 68),
and a split-half reliability coefficient of 0.85 (n = 150).
The image summoned for each item is rated on the 5 point vividness 
scale shown in table 2, once with the eyes open and once with the 
eyes closed.
TABLE II
The rating scale used in the Vividness 
of Visual Imagery Questionnaire.
Rating Description
• 1 ’Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision’
2 ’Clear and reasonably vivid’
3 ’Moderately clear and vivid’
4 ’Vague and dim’
5 ’No image at all, you only ’know” that you are
thinking of the object’
Subjects were selected as either ’good’ or ’poor’ visualisers, 
and on this basis divided into two experimental groups. In the 
experiments, stimuli consisting of coloured photographs of scenes, 
or groups of unrelated objects were presented to the subjects.
On each trial, after a 20 sec. delay, during which a subtraction 
task was performed to prevent verbal rehearsal, recall was tested 
using a multiple-choice questioning procedure, in which subjects 
were asked to describe particular details of the stimulus picture 
shown on that trial. (e.g. ’’What was directly below the suitcase; 
bicycle, candle, or books?”).
In all three experiments performed, Marks reports that
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’’verbal reports of visual image vividness were found to be ■;
reliable predictors of accuracy in the recall of information ■*
contained in pictures ••• Image vividness, these data suggest, 
facilitates accurate recall” (ibid. p.23). This conclusion 
contradicts the negative conclusion reached by Neisser (1970). S
4.10 In the present context, therefore, the VVIQ administered 
prior to testing picture memory performance, appears to be a 
suitable instrument by which to obtain an index of subjects’ 
vividness of visual imagery which can be related to picture 
memory performance.
Marks’ studies showed that ’high* imagers, as classified 
by the VVIQ, perform better on picture memory tasks than do 
’low’ imagers. However, in the dual-task condition, the 
situation is rather different. If it is assumed that subjects 
who are /high’ imagers possess an imagery system which is 
functionally more efficient than ’low’ imagers, it seems 
plausible to argue that an efficient imagery system would thus 
be likely to contribute more information to perceptual experience 
in the divided attention context, thereby freeing additional 
capacity for internalised cognitive processing. In other words, 
more efficient information processing in the dual-task situation 
is likely to be obtained by maximal utilisation of the capabilities 
of the highly effective imagery system. Thus, more of the total 
composite sensory-memory information content of perceptual 
experience of overlearned visual information patterns will be 
provided by the imagery system of a ’high’ imager than a ’low’ 
imager.
On the basis of this argument, it can be hypothesised 
that ’high’ imagers are likely to make a greater number of 
recognition errors in the dual-task condition, because less real J
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visual sensory information is being analysed and processed. 
Consequently, alterations in the real sensory information array 
should be less likely to be detected. Conversely, in the 
recognition testing situation not involving the simultaneous 
performance of an internalised cognitive task, the evidence 
suggests that 'high' imagers should perform better than 'low* 
imagers.
4.11 The use of large numbers of trials in testing recognition 
performance in the dual-task situation requires the selection of 
a suitable internalised cognitive task. It was necessary that 
the task chosen meet the following specifications;-
i) It should not involve any visual distractions, 
thus ruling out, for example, any kind of mental problem 
solving task requiring visual sensory input, or the use 
of pencil and paper. The subject should be able to 
solve the problem without averting his gaze from the 
screen onto which the stimulus slides are projected.
ii) There should be no temporal regularity in the 
pattern of response required from the subject. Such 
tasks, (e.g. the information-réduction numerical 
classification tasks developed by Posner (1962)), 
typically present the subject with a series of auditory 
inputs, e.g. numbers, at a regular pace, and the subject 
must respond during the fixed time interval prior to
the presentation of the next input. This fixed temporal ' 
regularity enables the subject to programme his attention 
switching, allowing optimal time sharing between the tasks, 
thereby minimising perceptual-cognitive interference 
i.e. the subject, knowing how much time he has on each 
trial, can proceed with one task, and then devote all his
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capacity to the other before the end of the time interval,
(A further problem with the Posner tasks is that some of 
the classifications are sufficiently difficult to require 
the constant provision of visual referents, contravening 
the requirement of (i), above). i
iii) The task should be sufficiently difficult to 
require maximum utilisation of the subject's processing 
capacities, but it should not be seen by the subject as 
impossible, thereby causing him to abandon it as hopeless, 
and devote all his attention to the performance of the 
picture memory task.
iv) The task should be sufficiently variable from 
trial to trial to eliminate repetition of closely similar 
problems, causing a practice effect which would make the 
task progressively easier for the subject over an 
extended number of trials. Such an effect would free 
additional capacity which could increasingly facilitate 
performance on the picture memory task.
v) The task should require as far as possible a 
reasonably continuous stream of information processing 
in order to proceed towards a solution, rather than a 
discrete series of specific stages. At the ends of 
such stages the subject could explicitly switch all 
attention to the memory task, then return to the problem 
and proceed easily from the memory marker provided by the 
previous discrete stage.
vi) The task requires auditory input to the subject, 
and verbal response.
vii) The time taken to solve the problem should be 
significantly greater than the exposure duration of the
    " ■ -■ ......   - .1,. J , V-
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stimulus picture, to enable temporal randomisation of the 
presentation of the stimulus picture. This prevents 
subjects anticipating the occurrence of the stimulus 
picture and programming their attention switching accord­
ingly, .
In view of the above considerations the task chosen was 
that of mental arithmetic as it appeared to meet all the 
necessary requirements. Specifically, the problems were two- 
figure by two-figure multiplications, excluding all numbers 
ending in zero. (i.e. 10, 20, 30, 40 etc.). Thus typical
problems were;- 64 x 67; 19 x 51; 27 x 38; 54 x 17 etc ...
Pilot studies showed that subjects found these problems 
difficult, but all possessed operational strategies which 
enabled the problems to be eventually solved.
4.12 It is emphasised that for the present purposes it is not 
necessary that the subject actually continues with each problem 
until a solution is achieved. It is necessary only that during 
the period in which the stimulus picture is presented, the subject 
is continuously processing information referent to the solution 
of the problem. The primary concern of the experiment is to 
ensure as far as possible that part of the subject's limited 
cognitive processing capacity is occupied during the time the 
stimulus picture is presented, so that only part of this capacity 
can be devoted to processing of the real visual sensory 
information input.
In order to investigate and test these theoretical notions 
the following experiment was carried out.
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4.13 Method
(i) Apparatus
Sets of five similar black and white photographs were taken
of 16 aspects of the local town and university environment
likely to be highly familiar to the experimental subjects
to be used in the experiment. The five homogeneous
photographs forming each of the sixteen sets were obtained %
either by photographing the same basic scene from five 
slightly different angles, or the same scene from the one 
camera position but with dynamic features such as crowd 
and traffic patterns differing between each photograph.
Prom the resulting pool of 80 transparencies, the best 10 
sets of five were selected on the basis of photographic 
quality (e.g. clarity, contrast, brightness) and adequate 
perceptual discriminability between the five individual 
members of each setf
To present the visual stimuli, a Kodak Carousel S 
slide projector, equipped with a solenoid operated shutter 
device manually operated by a micro switch was used. The 
duration of exposure of the slide was controlled by a 
variable timer wired into the circuit. The slides were 
projected onto a white screen in front of the seated subject, 
the centre of the projected picture being approximately at 
the subject's eye level. The screen was at a distance of 
approximately 2.6 metres from the subject's eyes,.
A Perrograph Vortexion tape recorder was used to 
record subject's verbal descriptions.
The experimental room was well sound-attenuated, 
but in order to mask any possible distracting extraneous 
noises a white noise generator emitted very low intensity 
* Prints of these photographs are shown in Appendix III.
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noise through a small loudspeaker for the duration of the 
testing session.
(ii) Subjects
14 undergraduate and postgraduate students of the 
University of St. Andrews (7 male, 7 female) were employed 
in the study. All had normal corrected vision and no 
optical defects. None of the subjects had any knowledge 
in relation to the purpose of the experiment.
(iii) Procedure
At the commencement of the session, subjects 
were comfortably seated in the experimental room and the 
VVIQ was administered. (The complete l6-item questionnaire 
is shown in AppendixII). Subjects completed the VVIQ at 
their own pace, alone in the experimental room. The 
experimenter left the room after explaining the VVIQ 
procedure to minimise any distraction, time-pressure or 
embarrassment of the subjects, none of whom had previously 
encountered a questionnaire of this type. In the instruct-
V-ions to the VVIQ subjects were directed to complete "che 
whole 16 items, imaging with their eyes open, and secondly 
the entire 16 items imaging with their eyes closed. This 
procedure was adopted to minimise visual adaptation after 
effects resulting from alternating eyes-open, eyes-closed 
imagery.
On completion of the VVIQ, the experimenter 
returned to the room. A series of 20 stimulus slides, 
consisting of two homogeneous slides from each of the 10 
heterogeneous stimulus categories was then shown to the 
subject. The two homogeneous slides from each category 
were presented consecutively so that subjects could be made
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aware of the sorts of differences they could expect between 
pictures within the homogeneous sets. The learning set of 
20 slides was presented once for five seconds exposure per 
slide, then a second time, in the reverse order, again for 
five seconds exposure per slide, and, finally, a third time 
in the original order at an item exposure time of five 
seconds. Thus, each picture was seen by the subject for a 
total of 15 seconds, and the subject had three occasions on 
which to compare the slides of each pair. For the reasons 
outlined earlier (p. 77 )» it was considered that, in view 
of the power of picture memory empirically demonstrated in 
experiments using large numbers of stimuli and very short 
exposure durations, 15 seconds presentation time would be 
more than sufficient to ensure over-learning of the stimulus 
pictures. Further, the consecutive display of the two 
homogeneous pictures within each category ensured that 
subjects were well aware of the extent to which these 
pictures varied. ^
As an additional control to show that all the 
pictures in the learning set had been memorised, subjects 
were asked in the absence of any visual stimuli to free- 
recall and describe to the experimenter in detail all the 
slides they had been asked to memorise. This verbal 
description was tape recorded for later analysis of recall 
order and amount and nature of detail.
The following instructions were read to all 
subjects prior to the presentation of the learning set of 
pictures:
"You will now be shown a series of 20 photographs of 
places and things that will be very familiar to you. I
i'
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want you to commit these pictures to memory, as you will be 
required to recognise them among sets of similar pictures 
later on. Although there are 20 pictures in all in this 
first series, there are only 10 basic scenes, so that you 
will see two similar pictures of the same scene for each of 
the 10 scenes. All the pictures are different - no two are f
the same. To enable you to make direct comparisons of the
differences between the similar photographs, the two members
of each pair will be presented one after the other. You 
will see the whole set through, with each picture exposed 
for 5 seconds. Then you will see the series again, in the #
reverse order, for 5 seconds per slide. Finally, you will 
see all the slides a third time for five seconds each in the 
original order. Remember to try as hard as you can to 
concentrate on memorising the pictures. Do you have any 
questions?"
For the recording of the verbal descriptions of 
the pictures, subjects were simply instructed to describeV-.
.in any order they wished,and in their own words,all the 
pictures they had been asked to memorise.
After completion of recording of the subject'6 
verbal description, and checking that the subject had 
verbally described all the sets of pictures presented, the 
recognition performance of the subject was tested in the 
following way:-
(A) Control group.
The entire set of 50 slides, which included the 
learning set, was then presented to the subject, with 
an exposure time of 1 second per picture, at an 
interstimulus interval of approximately 5 to 10 seconds.
:î■I
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This interval was dependent upon the response time of 
the subject. The task was hot forced paced. Within 
the overall set of 50 slides, the 5 homogeneous photo­
graphs of each stimulus category were presented con­
secutively, with the 2 learned stimulus slides randomly 
ordered within each of these sets.
After each exposure the task of the subject was to 
(a) identify the stimulus category which the particular 
photograph represented; and (b) state whether or not 
he had seen that specific picture before, i.e. whether 
or not it was one previously memorised in the learning 
situation. Performance on each trial on these two 
indices was recorded by the experimenter.
Instructions to subjects in the control group were 
as follows
"You will now be shown a large number of pictures. 
Each picture will be presented for 1 second. All the 
photographs you are about to see are of the same ten
basic scenes or objects shown to you earlier. However, 
this time there are more similar pictures of each scene 
in addition to the pair you have already memorised.
All of the pictures you have memorised will be presented 
again once only in this larger sequence, and no two 
pictures in this bigger set are the same. Every 
picture is different in some way from every other.
After each picture has been shown, I want you, in 
your own time, to tell me two things about it. First 
I want you to identify the particular scene or object, 
and, secondly, I want you to tell me whether or not 
you have seen that specific picture of the scene or
3
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object before - that is, whether or not it is the same as 
a picture you have memorised earlier. You must make a 
definite decision; you cannot answer 'I don't know'. 
After I have recorded the results, we will go on to the 
next trial, I will read these instructions again as it 
is important that you understand the procedure exactly, 
bo you have any questions? We will work at your own 
pace, and if you want a short break, please tell me".
The 50 slides were then presented to the subject and 
the results recorded.
(B) Experimental group.
For this group, the testing procedure was essentially 
the same as for the control subjects, with the following 
important differences:
Prior to the presentation of each slide, the subject 
was given a mental arithmetic problem to solve. (see 
p. 91 ). Before testing with the pictures, the subject 
was given several practice trials on this internalised 
cognitive task alone. This was done so as to ensure 
that the subject had no special mathematical ability 
enabling him to solve such problems extremely rapidly.
In the dual-task testing situation, at some random time 
during which the subject was concentrating upon attempt­
ing to solve the problem, while continuing to look at 
the screen, the picture was exposed for the one second 
interval. The timing of the presentation of the slide 
was randomised to reduce anticipation by the subject.
The subject was allowed to continue with the problem for 
a period of up to 20 seconds. If he had not solved it 
in this period, the experimenter interrupted* and asked
J
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for the information about the slide. This information 
was recorded as for the control group, together with the 
outcome of the subject's attempt to solve the mental 
arithmetic problem. The next problem was then given, 
and the next slide exposed, repeating the procedure for 
the 50 slides. At intermittent intervals, the experi­
menter verbally encouraged the subject to keep trying 
hard to solve the mental arithmetic problems, even though 
he might be having no success.
The instructions to subjects in the experimental group f
were as follows:-
"You will now be shown a large number of pictures.
Each picture will appear on the screen for 1 second.
All the photographs you are about to see are of the same 
ten basic scenes or objects shown to you earlier.
However, this time there are more similar pictures of 
each scene in addition to the pair you have already 
memorised. All of the pictures you have memorised will 
be presented again once only in this larger sequence, and 
no two pictures in this bigger set are the same. Every 
picture is different in some way from every other.
After each picture has been shown, I will want you to 
tell me two things about it. First, I want you to 
identify the particular scene or object, and secondly,
I want you to tell me whether or not you have seen that 
specific picture of the scene or object before - that is, 
whether or not it is the same as a picture you have 
memorised earlier. You must, make a definite decision; 
you cannot answer 'I don't know'.
Now, before each picture is presented I am going to
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give you a mental arithmetic problem like the ones you 
have just practised. It will be a difficult, but not 
impossible problem and I want you always to try as hard i
as you possibly can to attempt to solve it, even though 
you may not get any of the answers. This is extremely 
important. The experiment requires that you try as 
hard as you can. If you get the answer, tell me, and 
then tell me about the pictures. After I have recorded 
the results we will go on to the next trial. As soon as
I give you the problem, you must start looking at the 
screen where the slide will appear and continue to do 
this throughout the trial. The slide will be projected 
onto the screen at some random time after you have 
commenced solving the problem. If at any time you feel 
you want a rest break please tell me and we will stop for 
a short period.
I will read these instructions again as it is important 
that you understand the procedure exactly. Do you have 
any questions?"
In both experimental and control groups subjects were 
given a rest break after half the slides had been shovm.
Additional short breaks were given at the subject’s request.
Although for the experimental group particularly, the testing 
session was somewhat arduous, the experimenter attempted to 
maintain a relaxed minimum stress atmosphere in the testing 
room throughout the experiment.
At no point in the experiment were subjects given 
any feedback with respect to their picture memory performance.
The reason for this was that subjects’ responses to the 
identification of specific pictorial stimuli within a
100
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homogeneous set could be strongly influenced by a knowledge 
of results. For example, if a subject had responded in the 4
affirmative to the identification of two specific pictures 
within a set and had been told that he was correct, this 
knowledge would ensure that his responses would be negative 
to the remaining pictures’in the set, whether or not he was -J
certain on the basis of visual information alone.
On completion of the experiment subjects were 
interviewed by the experimenter and invited to comment on 
any aspect of the experiment. I
4.14 Results and Preliminary Discussion
(i) Picture Memory.
The recognition performance of subjects is shown 
in table III.
No subject in either group made any errors at all in 
the correct identification of the stimulus category. In the 
control condition performance across subjects was extremely 
consistent, although, as predicted, some errors were made with 
respect to the identification of specific pictures within each 
homogeneous set. (mean errors - 6.5; S.D. ~ 1.8).
However, subjects scored a mean of 87% correct, a strikingly 
good result considering the difficulty of discrimination 
within each homogeneous set of pictures. This performance i
is somewhat better than that achieved by subjects in the 
memory for faces condition of the experiment of Goldstein 
and Chance, described earlier (p. 80 ), and probably reflects 
the lesser homogeneity across the entire set of pictures in 
the present experiment.
Performance across subjects in the experimental 
group was also consistent. However, for these subjects the S
101
TABLE III
Group Subject %
MM 0 5
KB 0 7
LO 0 7
DL 0 6Control DR 0 . 4
DM 0 10
GP 0 8
BS 0 5
Mean/8.D. 0/0 6.5/1.8
PT 0 15
IG 0 18
JP 0 16Exptl.
BC 0 10
GB 0 15
m 0 17
Mean/S.D. 0/0 15.16/2.54
Key: E^ number of errors in recognition of thestimulus category
E2 number of errors in relation to identi-fication of specifici pictures.
“f
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mean number of errors in relation to the identification of 
specific pictures was over twice as great as for the control 
group. There was no significant difference at the 0.05 
level between the unbiased estimates of the population 
variances of the experimental and control groups (P = 0.478;
Vi =* 7, V2* 5). Thus, for this parameter, the variances of 
the two populations were homogeneous, and a normal ’t’ test 
could be used to test the significance of the difference 
between the sample means.
The difference between the mean number of specific 
picture errors (E2 in table 1X3) made by the experimental and
control groups was found to be significant at the 0.002%
level (t =  6.9, 12 degrees of freedom).
These results very strongly support the experimental
hypotheses derived from the theory, i.e. that subjects in the
dual-task condition would make more specific picture errors 
than those in the control condition who could dedicate all 
their cognitive processing capacities to performance of the 
.recognition task. The E2 error distributions of the two 
groups does not even overlap, just touching at one point.
It seems apparent that the effect observed in this experiment 
is a very powerful one, and that the imposition of the 
simultaneous internalised cognitive task upon the picture 
recognition task has the empirical effect on performance 
specifically predicted by the present theory.
An extremely important result of the experiment is 
that, on the basis of picture memory performance with respect 
to the correct identification of the 10 heterogeneous 
stimulus categories alone (E^), there was no difference what­
soever between the experimental and control groups, each group
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performing perfectly. It is only when the second index of 
performance (E2) is utilised that the very great differences 
between the groups in picture memory performance become 
clearly apparent. Thus, in a dual-task situation such as 
that used in the present experiment, it is highly probable 
that no differences between experimental and control groups 
would be found if only heterogeneous stimuli were used* On 
the basis of this argument it would appear that subjects in *1
the usual type of picture memory experiment need not devote 
their maximum cognitive processing capacity to the task in 
order to perform at the very high performance levels typically 
observed.
The lack of any errors by subjects of either group 
in identification of the heterogeneous categories is proof 
that subjects were always processing at least a sufficient 
proportion of the visual information array to correctly 
identify this aspect.
It is important to note that, even though subjects 
in the experimental group made a large number of errors in 
comparison to the control group, they still scored 69.68% 
correct responses.
(ii) Analysis of error patterns in picture memory 
performance
As stated earlier (p. 77), Standing (1973) has 
pointed out that there exists no straightforward objective 
method which may be employed to dimension the nature of a 
complex picture such as a normal photograph. Consequently, 
it is impossible, with the natural photographs used in the 
present experiment, to control precisely for equality of 
memory difficulty, either across the heterogeneous categories
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or within the homogeneous sets forming these categories. 
Therefore, it is to be expected that different categories 
will present varying degrees of difficulty to subjects.
Table IV shows, for experimental and control groups, 
the total percentage of errors made by all subjects with 
respect to the homogeneous pictures in each set, for each 
of the 10 stimulus categories.
TABLE IV
Stimulus category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
% errors. Control 
group 20 10 0 5 17.5 20 12.5 15.0 32.5 7.5
% errors. Experi­
mental group 33.3 16.6 6.6 13.3 50 53.3 20 36.6 40.0 23.3
Graphing the results shown in table IV shows very 
clearly that the error patterns for both groups across the 10
stimulus categories are extremely similar (Pig. 5 )• The error
patterns covary closely (r *s 0.77) illustrating that the
relative difficulty of the homogeneous sets for each stimulus
category remained virtually unaltered by the imposition of the
internalised cognitive task. This is an important finding,
as, if the effect of the simultaneous performance of the
cognitive task was merely one of a generalised confusability
across the heterogeneous categories, the particular error
pattern of the control group would not have been almost i
exactly replicated by the experimental group. The fact that 
the correlation between these group error patterns is so high 
shows that the effect is one of a pure negative shift in 
performance level in respect of the experimental group, which
105 II
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retains the selectivity of the control group with respect to 
the memory difficulty of the various categories.
It appears that the cognitive processing capabilities 
and strategies of the subjects referent to the picture memory 
task remain qualitatively the same for the two groups. The 
effect of the second task'appears to be essentially one of a 
reduction in the amount or power of this picture processing 
facility and not a fundamental change in its nature.
This empirical qualitative finding lends further 
strong support to the basic validity of the theoretical 
concepts and methodological strategies on which the experiment 
was based. The effect observed is congruent with a reduction 
in the amount of real visual sensory information which is 
being processed in the dual-task situation, the errors being 
a result of this. The nature of the processing is not 
changed, but the amount of real visual sensory information 
the system has to work with is reduced. Errors are a direct 
result of this reduced input of real sensory information 
.in accordance with the theoretical arguments outlined 
previously (p. 84 ).
(iii) Order of free recall of the 10 stimulus categories 
in relation to errors on those categories.
Reference to the graphs shown in Pig. 5 shows that 
for both experimental and control groups stimulus categories 
Sg, S^ , 8g, Sg and evoked the highest E2 error.rates.
The stimulus categories being presented in the numerical 
order to S]_q in both the learning and recognition test 
situations (except for one presentation in the learning 
situation of items in the order S^q to 8^).
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It might be that there were more errors associated 
with these categories because they were less well, or less 
vividly, remembered.' Prior to testing recognition performance, 
for both groups, subjects were asked to free-recall and describe 
verbally the pictures in the learning set. These descriptions 
were tape recorded. No subject failed to remember any of 
the stimulus categories, and virtually all accurately 
described the essential differences between the two homogeneous 
pictures shown in each stimulus category. This was clear 
evidence that all the pictures in the learning set had been 
well overlearned by all subjects. However, it is reasonable 
to argue that it is possible that those pictures and stimulus 
categories free-recalled first were the best remembered, and 
those recalled last were the least well remembered.
Because of the consistency of performance of subjects 
within each group, and the virtually identical error patterns 
of each group, (i.e. the rank order of stimulus categories in 
terms of the numbers of errors associated with them was the 
same for both groups), the total numbers of errors by all 
subjects on each category can be compared with a cumulative 
frequency index of free recall rank order for that category.
Thus, for each stimulus category we can determine the 
number of times it was free-recalled first by all subjects, 
the number of times it was recalled second, third, fourth and 
so on. Then, by multiplying the frequency by the rank in 
each cell, and summing across the ten ranks for each stimulus 
category a single weighted index of rank order for each 
category is obtained. Using this procedure, a category which 
was more often recalled earlier in the free recall sequence 
will have a numerically lower index than one generally recalled
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later# These indices can then be ranked and this rank order 
directly compared with rank order of total errors in each 
stimulus category. ’
Tables V and VI show this procedure#
TABLE V
Calculation of weighted rank index 
Rank Weighted rank1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 index (rank x frequency)
Si 6 1 0 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 45
S2 0 4 5 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 53
S3 3 2 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 58
S4 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 0 8,5
®5 0 0 0 2 2 0 3 0 5 2 105
StimulusCategory 1 2 0 1 0 1 2 1 3 . 4 104
87 2 1 0 3 1 0 0 1 1 5 97
Se 1 1 1 1 2 4 1 3 0 0 75
S9 0 2 1 1 3 2 0 4 1 1 89
^10 1 1 3 2 0 2 4 0 1 0 69
The numbers in each cell show the frequency with which all 
subjects free-recalled the particular category at that 
particular rank. e.g. 6 subjects free-recalled category
first.
i
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TABLE VI
Rank index and errors for all stimulus categories
Categories "1 ^2 "3 4^ "5 6^ S7 "a '9 ®10
Weighted rank index 45 53 58 85 105 104 97 75 89 69
Total errors on the category 18 9 2 6 22 24 11 17 25 10
Using Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient 
it is found that the correlation between these rankings is 
rg = 0.51. This correlation does not reach significance at 
the 0.05 level (t — 1.68, degrees of freedom = 8) (Hays, 1963» 
p.646). However, it does indicate that there was some 
positive tendency for fewer errors to be associated with 
categories described earlier in the free recall situation.
The rank-order correlation between order of 
presentation of the stimulus items and the rank order of 
recall over all subjects is rg = 0.46, again not reaching 
significance at the 0.05 level (t =■ 1.47, degrees of freedom 
~ 8). This indicates some slight tendency for items 
presented first to be free recalled earlier.
It is considered that, overall, the power of picture 
memory and the overlearning of the stimulus pictures, together 
with the fact that all were easily recalled verbally by the 
subjects is evidence that any potential order effects in 
recall were eliminated by the relative ease of the memory task. 
(iV) Errors of recognition of the overlearned pictures 
The number of errors made by subjects in relation 
to memory for the particular pictures in the learning set
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is shown in table VII.
Group
TABLE VII
Errors with respect to the
particular pictures memorised. 
errorsSubject Gross/w.r.t. pictures Total errors 
in the learning set (B)
(A)
A/B 96
MM 2 5 40
NB 3 .7 42.8
LO 1 11 9.0
DL 1 6 16.6Control DR 2 4 50.0
DM 7 10 70.0
GP 5 8 62.5
BS 4 5 80.0
Mean46.36%
GB 4 15 26.6
MW 6 17 35.2
BO 1 10 10Exptl. PT 3 15 20
JP 3 16 18.7
IG 8 18 44.4
Mean25.81%
For subjects in the control condition, errors of
identification of the pictures in the learning set formed a
mean of 46.36% of the total number of errors made by each
subject. Note that the control subjects made far fewer errors 
overall than the experimental subjects. However, keeping this 
point in mind, close to 50% of the errors made by the control
. îAî
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subjects were in relation to the identification of pictures 
memorised in the learning set. What errors that were made 
by the control group subjects seemingly occurred on a random 
basis in relation to whether the picture had been overlearned 
previously, although the total number of errors made on each 
category varied with the ’difficulty* of the category.
For the experimental group, the position is quite 
different. Although the mean number of E2 errors made by 
the experimental group was over twice as great as that made 
by the control group, the mean proportion of these errors 
made with respect to the pictures overlearned prior to 
testing in the dual-task situation, was virtually only half 
as great as for the control group ( « 25.8%). In other 
words, subjects in the experimental group made many more 
errors than those in the control group, but the proportion 
of these total errors which was due to incorrect identification 
of the pictures in the learning set was much smaller in the 
case of the experimental group. The difference between 
•these mean percentages was significant at the 0,1 level on a 
two-tailed test,and close to significance at the 0.05 level 
(t =1.85; 12 degrees of freedom).
This analysis shows clearly that, in general, subjects 
in the dual-task situation correctly identified the overlearned 
stimulus pictures on most occasions, but a mean of 74.19% of 
their errors in this situation consisted of responding that 
the stimulus picture shown was one they had previously over­
learned, when in fact it v/as not. The nature of this finding 
is precisely that predicted by the theoretical arguments 
outlined previously (p. 84 ). Because of the high degree of 
homogeneity of the picture sets within stimulus categories,
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the probability of the subject in the dual-task situation i
processing a proportion of the sensory picture information 
different to the corresponding portion of the information 
held in memory regarding the overlearned picture, was low.
Consequently, these subjects processed sufficient of the real 
visual sensory information to confirm an expected stimulus 
category, and consciously experienced perception of one of 
the relevant homogeneous pictures from the overlearned set, 
and identified it as such. Subjects in the dual task 
condition tended more often to ’see* the pictures presented 
as those they had overlearned and correspondingly made a 
greater proportion of inappropriate affirmative identi­
fications.
It should be noted, however, that the grouping of 
the 5 homogeneous pictures within each category in the 
testing situation may well have decreased the subject’s 
uncertainty with regard to the next picture to be presented.
Thus, he need process even less real sensory information to 
confirm the presence of an expected pattern than in an
experimental testing situation in which the presentation |
sequence of all pictures was randomised. Consequently, more 
processing capacity could be dedicated to performance of the 
internalised cognitive task, and a greater proportion of 
pictures would be perceived as those previously learned.
Therefore, the randomisation of picture presentation could 
well decrease the effect observed here.
(v) The imagery data.
The imagery data obtained in the experiment present 
a complex and intriguing picture. The W I Q scores for all 
subjects, together with errors in respect of identification 
of specific pictures (E^), are shown in Table VIII.
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TABLE VIII 
VVIQ Scores for ail subjects
Total VVIQ Scores _______ A ________
Group Subject E2 Eyes open Eyes closed Total MeanRating
MM 5 21 29 50 1.56
NB 7 27 37 64 2.0
LO 7 37 32 .69 2.15
Control DL 6 45 28 73 2.28N= 8 DR 4 39 51 90 2.81
DM 10 39 41 80 2.5
GP 8 59 52 111 3.46
BS 5 69 58 127 3.96
Mean/SD 6.5/1.'B 42/14.73 41/10.72 83/23.78 2.59/.74
PT 15 40 43 83 2.59
IG 18 55 34 89 2.78
Exptl. JP 16 36 23 59 1.84N == 6 BC 10 •“14 43 87 2.71
GB 15 48 47 95 2.96
MW 17 43 58 101 3.15
Mean/SD 15.16/ 2.54 44.33/6.01 41.33/10.84 85.66/14.51 2.67/.41
In the present experiment, subjects were not separated 
*a priori’ into ’good* and ’poor’ visualisers on the basis of 
the VVIQ, the VVIQ being administered at the experimental 
session to all subjects who volunteered for the experiment. 
However, conditions for administration of the VVIQ were 
extremely good, the subject being left alone in a sound- 
attentuated room to complete the questionnaire at his own pace,
Product-moment correlation between Eg errors and:-
i) Total VVIQ score - r = - 0.004
1 1 4
under no pressure from the experimenter. All the subjects 
were highly motivated, and it is considered that, if the VVIQ 
is a true index of imagery, then the circumstances of the 
experiment maximised the validity of the scores obtained.
On the average, subjects took 20 to 25 minutes to complete the 
VVIQ, If the VVIQ is a sensitive measure of vividness of |
visual imagery, it should be expected that, overall, imagery 
scores should covary reasonably consistently with picture 
memory performance.
Reference to table VIII ëiows that for both groups 
there is no significant difference between the mean imagery 
scores for eyes open and eyes closed conditions, and that 
there are no significant differences between the mean VVIQ 
scores obtained for the experimental and control groups. In 
all instances the between-subjects variance of the W IQ scores 
is considerable. For all subjects the correlation between H
total VVIQ scores for the eyes open and eyes closed imagery 
conditions was found to be only r == 0.56. It would therefore 
appear to be interesting to investigate the various relation­
ships between E2 errors and imagery scores obtained under the 
eyes open and eyes closed conditions, in addition to the total 
VVIQ score. (Marks (1973) provides no information on the 
above points, using only the mean item rating of the subject’s 
responses over all VVIQ items. Separate mean ratings for 
’eyes open’ and ’eyes closed’ conditions are not shown in 
his results).
Accordingly, the following results were obtained;-
(a) Control group.
:        ' - X - ' .... 'tî'vj
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ii) Eyes open VVIQ score - r =» 0.00 
ill) Eyes closed VVIQ score - r = - 0.1
These correlations are small and insignificant, 
indicating no apparent descriptive association between VVIQ *
scores and memory performance for the control group.
(b) Experimental group.
Product-moment correlation between E2 errors and:- 
i) Total VVIQ score - r » 0.04
ii) Eyes open VVIQ score - r »  0.24
iii) Eyes closed W I Q  score - r = - 0.09
These correlations are also small and insignificant.
On the basis of these results,scores on the VVIQ
appear to have no relation to picture memory performance in 
the present experiment. However, there is a plausible reason 
why this might not be so. The cognitive processing require­
ments of the picture learning and memory tasks employed may 
be sufficiently within the potential capabilities of all 
subjects so that they all perform well on these tasks. The 
.index of performance provided by the picture memory task is 
not sensitive enough to discriminate between ’good' and 'poor' 
visualisers at this level of performance. Certainly, this 
appears to be true of the control group, where the mean 
number of Eg errors is relatively small, all subjects performing 
very well.
In the dual-task situation, processing performance 
should be closer to the limits, and it is somewhat surprising, 
given the results achieved by Marks (1973), that no relation­
ships between vividness of visual imagery and memory 
performance were apparent here.
Referring to table IV , it is observed that, based
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on the total number of errors for the particular stimulus 
category, certain stimulus categories were considerably more 
difficult than others with respect to the memory task* 
Consequently, if the preceeding argument is correct,and 
performance superiority of good visualisers only becomes 
apparent at higher levels' of performance, let us consider 
relative performance on those categories only* The variance 
contributed by errors on the 'easier* categories could 
possibly be masking any covariance between high imagery and 
good picture memory performance*
Thus, referring to table IV, consider total errors 
on 8^ , S^ , Sg, Sg and 8g only. Total errors on these 
categories for each subject are shown in table IX , together 
with the associated imagery data.
Product-moment correlations between E2 error and 
imagery scores for these categories were as follows
(a) Control group
Correlation between Eg errors and;-
(i) Total W I Q  score r « - 0,14
(ii) Eyes open VVIQ score r = 0.00
(iii) Eyes closed WIQ score r = - 0.3
(b) Experimental group
Correlation between Eg errors and:-
(i) Total VVIQ score r = - 0.28
(ii) Eyes open VVIQ score r « - 0.45
(iii) Eyes closed W I Q  score r = - 0.09
In the case of the control group, the correlations 
remain generally small, supporting the argument that in the 
control condition the task is well within all subjects’ 
performance capabilities, whatever may be their individual
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TABLE IX
fdifficult * stimulus categories.
VVIQ scores i
Group 1Subject Eg errors Eyes open Eyes closed Total ■!
MM 3 21 29 50 -Ï•
NB 4 27 37 64
LO 9 37 32 69
DL 6 45 28 73Control DR 4 39 51 90 1
DM 7 39 41 80
:,!■
GP 6 ' 59 52 111 i
BS 3 69 58 127 3
PT 12 40 43 83
IG 10 55 ■ 34 89
JP 12 36 23 59Exptl. BC 9 44 43 87
GB 12 48 47 95
MW 11 43 58 101
differences in vividness of visual imagery. However, although 
small, two of the correlations are negative, indicating a 
very slight tendency for high imagers, or good visualisers, 
(i.e. with a low VVIQ score) to make errors in the control 
situation. This result suggests that the performance 
requirements of the task are so well within the capabilities 
of good visualisers that they perform it without devoting 
all their cognitive processing capacities to it, thereby 
making more errors for the reasons outlined earlier (p. 84 )«
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For the experimental group the correlations are all 
negative, and that between Eg errors and the eyes-closed S
VVIQ score is - 0,45, an absolute value considerably greater 
than for any correlation found in the case of the control 
group* These findings support the argument that the 
performance differences between 'high' and 'low* imagers 
become apparent only at the higher performance levels required 
by more difficult situations*
The most important aspect of these results is that 
the single relatively large correlation, and the negativity 
of all the correlations, for subjects in the dual-task 
situation offer firm empirical support for the hypothesis 
proposed in detail earlier (p. 88 ) that 'high* imagers will 
in fact perform worse in the picture memory condition involving 
simultaneous performance of the internalised cognitive task*
(vi) The internalised cognitive task.
Few subjects scored even a small number of correct 
solutions on this task over the 50 trials* The main obstacle 
was one of time, subjects taking excessive time to solve the 
mental arithmetic problem. However, when given the problem, 
subjects in all cases conscientiously initiated an attempt to 
.reach a solution. As emphasised earlier, for the purposes 
of the present experiment it v/as necessary only that subjects 
utilise their cognitive capacity to attempt a solution to the 
problem, i.e. that some proportion of their available 
.processing capacity was being utilised to prevent the entire 
capacity being dedicated to the picture memory task. It is 
clear from the significance of the results, and the qualitative 
nature of the error patterns found in the experiment that this 
aim was achieved, (see p.120-124 )
...f .. .. .
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4*15 Preliminary conclusions.
The theoretical concepts developed earlier in this thesis 
are strongly and significantly supported by the empirical evidence 
of the present experiment. Performance patterns of subjects 
obtained by quite different analyses of both the picture memory 
and the imagery data confirm a considerable spectrum of separate 
predictions,each independently derived from the theory.
In order to further confirm the present results, and to 
investigate whether the effects observed are resistant to 
changes in methodology, a second more powerful experiment using 
additional controls and larger numbers of subjects was carried 
out 0 This is reported in the next chapter, together with 
further discussion and conclusions in relation to both 
experimentSo
.1
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CHAPTER V
5*1 Some new, and apparently powerful, effects were demon­
strated in the experiment reported in the previous chapter.
The results of that experiment were significantly in accordance 
with the predictions derived from the present theoretical 
approach. In order to confirm further the validity of the 
theoretical conclusions drawn from this empirical evidence, and ^
to determine whether the effects observed are resistant to 
methodological changes, a second, fundamentally similar 
experiment was carried out,
5.2 Under the previous experimental testing procedure, the
experimenter had no overt feedback as to the continuing nature 
of the internalised cognitive processing employed by subjects 
in the dual-task condition. Further, while the subject was 
attempting to solve the mental arithmetic problem in silence, 
the experimenter had no way of knowing whether the subject's 
ongoing stream of information processing referent to the 
problem was interrupted when the picture was presented, the 
subject switching his attention to the processing of visual 
sensory information. The subject could have devoted a 
maximum amount of his cognitive processing capacity to the 
picture memory task for the duration of exposure of the picture, 
returning to the mental arithmetic problem only after the 
appropriate decisions had been made with regard to the 
identification of the picture.
Because of the practical necessity to limit the time 
period during which the subject could work on the internalised
■ ■■■ i ■ ■ ■  v . - . U A  i ~ ^  " r . . .  '4 .  ' » ■ .  J ' w  ■ . - f a '
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cognitive task on each trial, the correctness or accuracy of the 
subject's internalised processing associated with the solving of 
the mental arithmetic problem could not be evaluated. For 
example, if the exposure of the slide caused the subject to lose 
track of the problem, and prevented him ultimately reaching a 
correct solution, the experimenter had no means of ascertaining 
this. Also, even if the maximum time period allowed for solving 
the mental arithmetic problem were considerably increased, 
enabling the subject to reach a solution, and if the resultant 
answer were correct, it could still not be determined 
unequivocally whether or not the subject continued to work on 
the problem for the duration of exposure of the picture, or 
whether the occurrence of the picture caused the subject to lose 
track, and recommence solving the problem from scratch.
On the basis of the experience of the first experiment, 
the mental arithmetic task appeared to fulfil its intended 
purpose most successfully. However, to extend the time period 
to the.extent required for a solution to be reached on a 
majority of occasions would have made the dual-task situation 
even more arduous for subjects than it was. A pilot study 
showed that the extended and sustained period of intense 
concentration required in such a situation would undoubtedly 
introduce considerable extraneous effects, such as fatigue and 
reduction in task motivation, especially towards the end of 
the long testing session required. For these reasons, 
together with the problem of validity of interpretation of 1
successful results discussed above, it was considered undesirable 
to increase the time period allowed for the mental arithmetic 
problem.
It is emphasised that the results of the subjects in the
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experimental group in the previous experiment clearly confirm 
that the internalised cognitive task v/as having the predicted 
effect on subject's performances. This finding supported the 
post-experimental statements by the subjects that they were 
obeying the experimental instructions to the best of their 
abilities. The subjects were known to be highly motivated, 
and their statements to this effect were considered to be highly 
credible. However, it is conceivable that the lack of overt 
control over the above aspects could have facilitated better 
performance on the part of the experimental subjects. In any 
case, because the main experimental findings were to be 
replicated with larger numbers of subjects, whose high degree 
of motivation could not be guaranteed, and because the validity 
of the findings are increased by more powerful controls over 
possible extraneous variables, it was considered desirable to 
change the previous methodology with these aims in mind.
■>
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5.3 In order to overcome all the problems outlined above, the 
following change in experimental methodology was adopted:- 
Subjects in the dual-task condition were required to 
think aloud for the entii’e period during which they were 
attempting to reach a solution to the mental arithmetic problem. 
This thinking aloud procedure has been very extensively and 
effectively utilised by Newell, Shaw and Simon in their well- 
known research investigations of human problem solving. Much 
of this work has employed the subject's vocalisation of his 
thought processes as a primary data base from which to make 
inferences concerning the fundamental nature of cognitive 
processing in difficult problem solving situations. Prom this 
information, these investigators have developed computer programs 
incorporating the heuristics typically utlised by subjects to
. *i{
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simulate the essentials of human problem solving. All this 
extensive research, which now spans close to two decades, is 
reviewed, summarised, and extended, in the recent book by Newell 
and Simon (1972) entitled 'Human Problem Solving'• A trans­
cription of a typical subject's vocalisation in a cryptarithmetic 
problem solving situation is "pi'ovided in Appendix 6.1 of this 
book (p. 230)0
In the present context, the requirement that the subject 
think aloud has a number of advantages with respect to experi­
mental control
(1) It enables the experimenter to affirm on each trial 
that the subject is continuously and meaningfully attempting 
to solve the problem given.
(2) The methodology and content of the subject's attempt 
to solve the problem can be monitored by the experimenter, 
who can progressively check the accuracy of the subject's 
operations.
(3) Most importantly for the present experiment, the 
continuity of the subject's cognitive processing referent 
to the problem can be verified by the experimenter. The 
effect of a switching of attention to the processing of 
the picture information will be clearly reflected by a 
discontinuity in the ongoing vocalisation of the subject.
Thus, if the subject is proceeding smoothly with the 
problem, and this continuous flow of vocalisation.ceases 
momentarily when the experimenter chooses to present the 
picture, it can be assumed that the subject's attention 
has switched to processing the visual sensory information.
(4) By monitoring the subjects ongoing cognitive 
processing, the experimenter can choose to display the
  ..' A-'-. . , ... . .
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picture at an instant in which the operations being
■I
performed by the subject are most difficult* That is, 
in the sequence of arithmetical multiplications necessary 
to solve the two-figure multiplication problem given, the 
picture can be exposed by the experimenter when it is 
clear that the subject is embarking on the next of these 
stages, rather than at the end of one such stage, when 
there is typically a slight pause in processing.
In summary, the adoption of this change in methodology 
provides a powerful check that the subject is adhering to the 
experimental instructions throughout each trial in the dual­
task situation.
5*4 In the previous experiment, the homogeneous pictures in Î
each set were grouped together in the testing situation. This 
could clearly have had the effect of reducing the subjective 
uncertainty with respect to all pictures subsequent to the 
first one within each homogeneous set. According to the present 
theory, this would reduce the proportion of real sensory 
information that the subject needed to process in order to 
identify the expected stimulus category, with a corresponding 
increase in the number of Eg errors. This would have enhanced 
the difference on the E2 error index between the experimental 
and control groups. It is considered, however, that this was 
unlikely to be the case in the previous experiment for the 
following reasons
(1) Subjects were not provided with any feedback 
regarding the correctness of their responses on the picture .g
memory task. Therefore, even if, for a particular 
homogeneous set, a subject had responded in the affirmative 
to the identification of two pictures as those seen in the
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learning set, he had no way of knowing whether or not these 
two responses were correct. Consequently, if a picture was 
presented subsequently in the same set, and the subject 
thought it was one of the overlearned set, he would answer 
accordingly, regardless of the nature of his previous 
responses.
(2) At each trial, subjects were alv/ays attempting to 
process sufficient visual information to identify 
unambiguously specific pictures, in addition to the 
heterogeneous category. This requirement was referent to 
each picture as all pictures were different, and was therefore 
logically unaffected by sequential probability factors.
(3) The pattern of results for the experimental group 
in the previous experiment, in which 76% of Eg errors 
consisted of incorrect affirmative responses to the identi­
fication of specific pictures, is clear evidence that 
subjects were not making decisions on the basis of their 
earlier responses. That is, even though the homogeneous 
sets were grouped, subjects were not simply responding in 
the affirmative twice for each homogeneous set of pictures. 
Subjects were tending to make more than two affirmative 
identifications per set, even though they were aware that,
for each set only two of the pictures had been overlearned.
Although it appears unlikely, in view of the results of 
the previous experiment, that the grouping of the homogeneous 
slides had any significant qualitative or quantitative effects 
on subjects’ cognitive processing strategies, any such 
possibility can be effectively eliminated by completely
randomising the sequence of all pictures in the picture memory
testing situation. The subject then has no way of consistently
3
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predicting the occurrence of particular stimulus categories or 
particular pictures, the real probability of occurrence of any .4
stimulus category being 0.1 and that of the occurrence of a 
picture of the learning set being 0.4, on each trial.
The randomisation of all the pictures also prevents the -i
subject becoming aware of the number of pictures within each 
homogeneous set, so that he cannot utilise such information in 
any response strategy. Comparison of the results obtained by 
the■experimental groups in the randomised and non-randomised 
testing conditions will indicate whether the non-random picture 
grouping used in the previous experiment was having any 
significant effect on subject performance.
5c5. Although there were no apparent sex differences in any 
of the imagery or picture memory performance data obtained in 
the previous experiment, practical difficulties prevented an 
equal balancing of sexes within each group. If there was any 
statistical artifact associated with this aspect, which is most 
unlikely, it can be overcome in the present experiment by 
ensuring equal numbers of each sex within each group.
5.6 The main effects observed in the last experiment were 
sufficiently powerful to facilitate highly significant 
statistical differences in performance between experimental 
and control groups with the relatively small numbers of subjects 
used. However, the reliability and validity of these empirical 
findings will be substantially increased if the effects are 
replicated with larger numbers of subjects.
In view of all the foregoing considerations a second 
experiment was carried out incorporating the methodological 
changes described above. The theoretical basis of this second
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experiment, and the main experimental hypotheses to be tested, 
are precisely the same as for the first experiment, as reported 
in Chapter IV.
5.7 Method
(i) Apparatus 
The apparatus used in the experiment was identical
to that employed in the previous experiment.
(ii) Subjects 
21 undergraduate and postgraduate students of the
University of St. Andrews (10 male, 11 female) participated 
in the study. All had normal corrected vision and no optical 
defects. None of the subjects had served in the previous 
experiment, and none had any knowledge in relation to the 
purpose of the experiment.
(iii) Procedure 
The experimental procedure in relation to the
administration of the VVIQ, the presentation of the learning 
set of 20 pictures from the 10 stimulus categories, and the 
recording of subject’s verbal descriptions of these pictures 
was identical to that employed in the previous experiment.
After the recording of the subject's verbal 
descriptions of the overlearned pictures, and checking that 
the subject had described all the sets of pictures presented 
• in the learning set, recognition performance was tested.
For the reasons outlined earlier, the entire set of 
50 slides had been pseudo-randomised. This was done by 
numbering the slides 1 to 50 and, using sets of random numbers 
within this range generated by a Nova 1220 computer, each 
picture was allocated a random position in the testing 
sequence. The constraints imposed upon this randomisation
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were;- (a) that no two homogeneous pictures from the same 
stimulus category could be presented consecutively; and,
(b) that the 5 homogeneous slides from the 10 categories were 
relatively evenly distributed throughout the set of 50.
(a ) Control group
The recognition testing procedure for the control group 
was the same as for the previous experiment. The instructions %
read to the subjects were the same as used previously, except 
that the following statement was added at the end of the 
first paragraph of the experimental instructions (p.96 ):
"The order of presentation of the pictures in this larger set 
is completely random". The experimenter recorded the 
subjects* recognition performance on the two error indices, 
and E2 , as previously.
(B) Experimental group
The testing procedure for this group was essentially the 
same as that used in the previous experiment. However,
for the reasons outlined earlier, this time the subject was 
•required to think aloud during his attempt to solve the 
mental arithmetic problem. Accordingly, the additional 
instructions to subjects, referent to this aspect of the 
testing were as follows:-
"In the next part of the experiment, I am going to give 
you some mental arithmetic problems to solve. These 
problems will be relatively difficult, but certainly not 
impossible, and I want you to try as hard as you possibly 
can to attempt to solve them. This is extremely important.
The experiment requires that you try as hard as you can.
Now, while you are attempting to solve each problem, I 
want you at all times to think aloud. In other words, you
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must tell me exactly what you are thinking, and how you are .j
going about solving the problem. I want you to keep this 
stream of comments flowing smoothly, with no hesitations or 
periods of silence. This is very important. You must try 
and say aloud everything that you are thinking. Do you
understand? Do you have any questions?
We will now have a few practise problems to get you 
accustomed to this procedure".
Several such practice trials were given. The main part 
of the testing session was commenced when the experimenter 
was satisfied that the subject was conversant with the 
thinking aloud procedure, and could achieve a smooth flow of 
vocalisation coincident with his attempt to solve the mental 
arithmetic problem.
The recognition performance of the experimental group 
subjects was then tested as in the previous experiment.
However, in this case the experimenter listened carefully to
the subject’s vocalisation of his attempt to solve the problem, 
and by this means, a,s far as possible, kept track of what the 
subject was doing. Any interruption to the flow of the
subject’s vocalisation occurring on presentation of the 
picture was noted. Further, the picture was presented at a 
time v/hen the subject was carrying out multiplication 
operations (see p.123 ).
Instructions to subjects in the experimental group were 
those used in the previous experiment except that, as for the 
control group, the following statement was added. "The order 
of presentation of the pictures in this larger set is 
completely random." The Instructions with regard to the 
testing procedure were also changed slightly and this paragraph
130
g
now read as follows
"Now, before each picture is presented, I am going to 
give you a mental ar-ithmetic problem like the ones you have 
just practised. It will be a difficult but not impossible 
problem, and I want you always to try as hard as you possibly 
can to attempt to solve it. Remember, you must think aloud 
all the time, and you must keep your flow of words as 
continuous and as smooth as possible. You must not stop
speaking when the picture appears on the screen. I will be
listening carefully to you all the time, so that I will know 
whether or not you are concentrating on the problem.
If you get the answer to the problem, we will stop, and 
you will then tell me about the pictures. After I have 
recorded the results we will go on to the next trial. As 
soon as I give you the problem, you must commence to solve 4
it and all the time keep looking at the screen where the î
picture will be projected. The picture will be presented 
for one second at some random time after you have commenced 
to solve the mental arithmetic problem. If at any time you 
want a rest break, tell me and we will stop for a short 
period. Remember, you must think aloud all the time.
I will read these instructions again, as it is essential 
that you understand the procedure exactly. Do you have any 
questions?"
During testing of both experimental and control 
groups, subjects were given a short rest break after half the 
slides had been presented, with additional similar rest 
periods given at the subject’s request. The testing 
sessions were somewhat more arduous than the previous 
experiment; however, as before, the experimenter at all
%
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times attempted to maintain a relaxed minimum-stress atmosphere 
in the testing room.
At the end of the session, subjects were interviewed 
and invited to comment on any aspect of the experiment* %
5.8 Results and preliminary discussion
(i) Picture Memory
The recognition performance of subjects is shown in 
table Xo II
TABLE X
Group Subject Sex %
RMcC P 0 14
MP P 0 8
AC P 0 6
GB P 0 8
CO P 0 7Control(N -11) DM P G 6LJ M 0 7
KL M G 7
DKM M 0 10
CM M G 6
RM M 0 2
Mean/s.D. 0/0 7.36/2.80
ER P 0 13
GO F 0 13
PM F 0 15
VJ F 0 16
Exptl0 AP P 0 13(N =10) AH M 0 16
IW M G 14
TL M G 12
IM M 0 16
JL M 0 19
Mean/S.D* 0/0 14.7/2.00
Key; number of errors of recognition of the stimulus category.
E2»number of errors in relation to identification of specific pictures.
I
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As in the previous experiment, no subject in either group 
made any errors in the identification of the stimulus category 
(E^). Subjects in the. control group again, as predicted, made 
a small number of identification errors with respect to specific 
pictures within the homogeneous sets (Eg)* (mean Eg errors*
7,36; SD = 2.80)# Subjects scored a mean of 85.28% correct 
identifications of specific pictures, v/hich was only very 
slightly less than, and not significantly different from, the 
performance achieved by the control group in the previous 
experiment. A high level of recognition performance was 
achieved which was consistent across subjects, the randomisation 
of pictures in the recognition test having no apparent effect on 
performance in the control situation.
Performance of subjects in the experimental group was 
also consistent across subjects. However, once again, the mean 
number of E2 errors made by subjects in the experimental group 
was twice as great as the mean number of E2 errors made by the 
control group. (mean Eg errors = 14.7; SD = 2.00). The 
variances of both groups were homogeneous (F « 1.95; v^ = 10; 
vg = 9)* and a normal *t* test was appropriate to test the 
statistical significance of the difference between the sample 
means.
The difference between the mean number of E^ errors made 
by the experimental and control groups was found to be significant 
at the 0.002 level (t * 6.50; 19 degrees of freedom).
These highly significant results provide further strong 
support for the experimental hypotheses derived from the present 
theory, (i.e. that subjects in the dual task condition would make 
more specific picture errors (E2) than those in the control 
condition, who could dedicate all their cognitive processing
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capacities to performance of the recognition task). The 
additional controls incorporated in this experiment had no effect 
on the degree of significance of the difference in E2 errors 
between the experimental and control groups, nor on the real 
values of this index of memory performance. This almost exact 
replication of the results of the earlier experiment confirms 
that subjects in that experiment were obeying the experimental 
instructions, and not formulating their response strategies on 
artifacts referent to the adjacent grouping of all the pictures 
in each homogeneous set.
The results of this second experiment again show that the 
simultaneous performance of the internalised cognitive task with 
the picture memory task has the empirical effect on performance 
predicted by the present theory.
On the basis of the errors alone, there was no 
difference between the performances of the experimental and 
control groups, each achieving error-free performance. In the %
randomised picture situation, the complete lack of errors of 
category identification is proof that subjects were processing 
at least a sufficient proportion of the real visual sensory 
information to identify this aspect correctly. The randomisation 
of the pictures made it impossible for subjects to consistently 
guess the occurrence of specific categories. • The mean percentage 
of correct Eg responses for the experimental group v/as 70,6%.
(ii) Analysis of error patterns in picture memory 
performance
The total percentages of errors made by all subjects with 
respect to the homogeneous pictures in each stimulus category 
are shown in table XI.
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TABLE XI
Stimulus  ^category 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
% errors, 21,81controlgroup
0 12.7 0 29.0 18.1 5.4 23.63 32.72 3.63
% errors, 40exptl.group
12 20 12 44 48 28 32 36 22
Graphing the results given in table XI shows that. as in
%
the previous experiment, the error patterns for both experimental 
and control groups are very similar (Fig. $). Once again, these 
patterns covary closely (r = 0.8), and to virtually the same degree » •
as the equivalent error patterns of the earlier experiment. This 
shows that the relative difficulty of the homogeneous sets forming 
the different categories was not affected by the overall random­
isation of the pictures.
This finding further emphasises the point made earlier 
(p.104), that the effect of the simultaneous cognitive task is 
not simply to interfere with memory, i.e. in that on each trial 
the subject makes his decisions with regard to the picture, but 
the performance of the internalised cognitive task causes him 3
to forget all about them. If this were the case, there would 
be no reason for the experimental and control error patterns to 
covary; all categories should present equal difficulties in
the dual-task situation. The results show clearly that the
recognition performance decrement of the experimental group is 
not a result of such a failure of memory, rather it is consistent ^
with a reduction in the amount of real sensory information which «
is processed. There is no fundamental change in the qualitative
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nature of the individual processing strategies referent to 
performance of the picture memory task. Whatever may be the 
individual differences in these response strategies, the 
consistency of performance across subjects in both groups shows 
that the resultant global performance levels achieved by subjects 
on this task are extremely similar. |
(iii) Order of free recall of the 10 stimulus categories 
in relation to errors on these categories.
Reference to Pig 4. shows that, even though the pictures 
were randomised, categories Sg, S^ , Sg, 8g and S-j^ were again 
associated with the highest Eg error rates for both experimental 
and control groups. For the reasons outlined previously (p.l06), 
the relationship between the order in which the stimulus categories 
were recalled and the errors relating to those categories was 
investigated. No subject in the second experiment failed to 
describe correctly all the sets of pictures shown in the learning 
set, showing that the pictures had been well overlearned.
The high degree of similarity of the error patterns of 
both groups again enables the total numbers of errors by all 
subjects referent to each category to be compared with n weighted 
index of free recall rank order for that category
Using the procedure outlined previously (p.107), tables 
XII and XIII are obtained.
The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient between 
the rank order of the weighted rank index and the rankings of 
the total errors for each category is r^ * 0.18. This statistic 
indicates that there is no significant relationship between Eg 
errors and order of free recall for the 10 stimulus categories.
The Tg obtained here is lower than the equivalent obtained in 
the previous experiment, which,although not significant was
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TABLE XII
Calculation of weighted rank index 
Rank Weighted1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 rankindex
Si 13 0 0 2 2 ■ 1 1 0 0 2 64
^2 2 9 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 84
S3 1 2 1 4 1 2 3 4 2 1 122
^4 1 0 1 2 2 2 5 2 2 5 152
1 0 4 3 0 1 2 4 3 3 134
% 1 1 0 0 3 2 1 5 5 3 152
S7 0 1 2 7 1 2 0 2 2 4 127
Sq 1 2 2 1 4 6 2 3 0 0 107
0 2 4 0 5 0 2 1 4 2 119
^10 2 2 4 0 3 3 3 1 2 0 98
The numbers1 in each cell show the frequency with which all
subjects free-recalled the particular category at that particular 
rank order, e.g. 13 subjects free recalled category first;
3 subjects free recalled category seventh, etc.
TABLE XIII
Weighted rank index and errors for all stimulus categories
Category Si 82 S3 4^ 85 % 87 8^ 89 8^0
Rank index 64 84 122 152 134 152 127 109 119 98
Total errors on the 32 category 6 17 6 38 34 17 29 36 13
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somewhat greater (r^ « 0,51), indicating that for the randomised 
picture situation there was only the slightest tendency for 
fewer errors to he associated with stimulus categories described #
earlier in the free-recall situation.
The rank order correlation between order of presentation 
of the stimulus categories in the learning set and the order in 
which the categories were free recalled was r^ = 0,19, which was 
not significant, showing no important tendency for categories 
presented first to be free recalled earlier.
The above results illustrate even more strongly than the 
earlier experiment, that any possible order effects were 
eliminated by the overlearning of the stimulus pictures and the 
power of picture memory,
(iv) Errors of recognition of the overlearned pictures.
The number of identification errors made by subjects in 
relation to the particular pictures in the overlearned set, 
together with the total number of S2 errors made by each subject 
are shown in table XIV.
For the control subjects, errors in relation to the 
identification of pictures in the learning set formed a mean of 
36.65% of the total number of errors made by each subject. In 
some contrast to the previous experiment, errors in relation to 
pictures in the learning set formed a mean proportion of 45.1% 
of the total errors made by each subject in the experimental 
group. (vs 25.81% in the earlier experiment). In the present 
case, the difference between these mean percentages for the 
experimental and control groups was not significant at the 0,1 
level (t * 1.14; 19 degrees of freedom). There was no
statistically significant difference between the groups on 
this aspect, both groups making a similar proportion of errors 
of identification of the specific pictures in the learning set, X
'   - ' ' y/'- > ........... ...  . u i r k "
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TABLE XIV
Errors with respect to the particular
Group Subject Sex
Total errors w.r.t. pictures in the learning set (A)
Total Eg errors (B) A/B%
RMcC F 7 14 50.0
MP F 1 8 12.5
AC F 3 6 50.0
GB F 4 8 50.0
CO F 4 7 57.1Control
(N = 11) DM F 2 6 33.3
LJ M 3 7 42.8
KL M 1 7 14.2
DKM M 1 10 10.0
CM M 2 6 33.3
RM M - 1 2 50.0
Mean 36.65%
ER F 5 13 38.4
GO F 10 13 76.9
PM F 7 15 46.6
VJ F 11 16 68,7
Exptl. AP F 3 13 23.0(N =10) AH M 8 16 50.0
IW M 6 14 42.8
TL M 5 12 41.6
IM. M 6 16 37.5
JL M 5 19 26.3
Mean 45.1%
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Comparison of these findings with the equivalent results 
of the previous experiment suggests that the reason for the 
change in the proportion of errors made in relation to the 
overlearned pictures by the experimental group in the present 
experiment is that the randomisation of the pictures has had 
the effect predicted earlier (p.112). It appears that, although 
on the primary criteria, performance of the experimental groups 
in both experiments was virtually identical, on this particular 
parameter there was a significant and qualitative difference in 
the patterns of performance. The difference between these means 
for the experimental groups in the two experiments was signi­
ficant at the 0.05 level (t =s 2,433; 14 degrees of freedom).
In the non-random situation, the predictability of parts 
of the sequence within each homogeneous set of pictures meant 
that, on these occasions, subjects need process only a minimum 
amount of real sensory information to confirm the presence of 
the stimulus category which they knew would certainly occur. 
Consequently, under these conditions, more processing capacity 
could be utilised in performance of the mental arithmetic task, 
and a greater proportion of pictures on which Eg errors were 
made would be perceived as those previously overlearned.
The results obtained in the randomised picture situation 
show no qualitative differences in performance patterns between 
the experimental and control groups. The randomisation of the 
pictures eliminates the only difference between the experimental 
and control group performance patterns observed in the earlier 
experiment. This further emphasises the notion outlined 
previously (p.104) that the effect of the simultaneous perform­
ance of the internalised cognitive task is one of a pure negative 
shift in the level of picture memory performance of the
I
’■J
I
141
experimental group. The performance patterns of the two groups 
in the present experiment were qualitatively exactly the same for 
both groups. The effect of the mental arithmetic task v/as to 
reduce the amount of real visual sensory information which was 
processed on many trials in the dual-task situation, the Eg 
errors being a result of this. There was no fundamental change 
in the nature of the cognitive processing referent to the picture 
memory task in the dual-task situation.
(v) Sex Differences
There were no significant differences in picture memory 
performance between male and female subjects in either the 
experimental or control groups.
(vi) The imagery data
As in the earlier experiment,the imagery data are 
extremely interesting. VVIQ scores for all subjects, together 
with Eg errors are shown in table XV.
As noted in the previous experiment, conditions for 
administration of the VVIQ were extremely good, subjects again 
taking 20 to 25 minutes to complete the VVIQ. Reference to 
table XV shows that, for both groups, there was no significant 
difference between the mean imagery scores for eyes open and 
eyes closed conditions. There were no significant differences 
between the mean VVIQ scores obtained for the experimental and 
control groups. Over all subjects, the correlation between 
total VVIQ scores for the eyes open and eyes closed conditions 
was found to be only r » 0.56, exactly the same as for the 
previous experiment. The various relationships between Eg 
errors and imagery scores obtained under the eyes open and eyes 
closed conditions, in addition to the total imagery score, were 
investigated as in the earlier experiment.
?
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TABLE
VVIQ Scores for
XV
all subjects
Total WIQ scores ________A ________
Group Subject Sex Eyesopen Eyesclosed Total MeanRating
RMcC P 14 33 45 78 2.43
MP P 8 48 44 92 2.87
AC P 6 36 42 78 2.43
GB P 8 32 27 59 1.84
CO P 7 46 49 95 2.96
Control DM P 6 53 52 105 3.28(N 11) LJ M 7 46 55 101 3.15
KL M 7 28 46 74 2.31
DKM M 10 47 42 89 2.78
CM M 6 32 30 62 1.93
RM M 2 51 -47 98 3.06
Mean/SD 7.36/ 41.09/ 43.54/ 84.63/ 2.64/2.80 8.522 8.06 14.80 . 46
ER P 13 40 52 92 2.87
GO P 13 44 65 109 3.40
PM P 15 50 36 86 2.68
VJ P 16 28 26 54 1.68
AP P 13 42 45 87 2.71Exptl.
(N 10) AH M 16 46 44 90 2.81
IW M 14 56 43 99 3.09
TL M 12 41 50 91 2.84
IM M 16 51 62 113 3.53
JL M 19 30 26 56 1.75
Mean/SD 14.7/ 42.8/ 44.9/ 87.7/ 2.73/2.00 8.36 12.53 18.43 .57
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The following results were obtained:-
(a) Control group
Product-moment correlation between Sg errors and:-
(i) Total VVIQ score - r s - 0,24
(ii) Eyes open VVIQ score - r = - 0,33
(iii) Eyes closed W IQ score - r = - 0.08
These correlations are small and not individually
significant, although they are all negative.
(b) Experimental group
Product-moraent correlation between E^ errors and:-
(i) Total VVIQ score - r = - 0,55
(ii) Eyes open VVIQ score - r ^ - 0.34
(iii) Eyes closed VVIQ score - r - 0.58
In this case the inverse correlations are comparatively 
high, two being greater than 0.5. The relatively large absolute 
values of these correlations, together with their negativity 
confirm again the prediction derived from the theory (p. 88 ) 
that *high* imagers will tend to perform worse in the picture 
memory condition involving simultaneous performance of the 
internalised cognitive task.
In the equivalent analysis in the earlier experiment 
(p. 114), it was suggested that the cognitive processing require­
ments of the picture learning and memory tasks used in the 
experiment were well within the capabilities of all subjects. 
Consequently, in the control situation all subjects performed 
extremely well, the index of performance provided by the memory 
task not being sensitive enough to discriminate effectively 
between 'good* and 'poor* visualisers at the level of performance 
required.
*
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In the dual-task condition performance is closer to the 
limits, and it was suggested that the hypothesised relationship 
between vividness of visual imagery and picture memory performance |
would be more likely to be apparent in this situation. In the 
previous experiment, this predicted relationship became apparent 
when the Eg errors on only the five most 'difficult' stimulus 
categories were considered, the variance contributed by errors on 
the 'easier* categories masking the covariance between vividness 
of visual imagery and picture memory performance.
However, in the present experiment because of the larger 
number of subjects, the predicted relationship is clearly 
apparent when all categories are included in the analysis.
However, to enable a direct comparison with the results 
of the earlier experiment, the above analysis was carried out 
with respect to total errors on the 'difficult' categories,
89, Sg, Sq and Sg only. The following results were obtained:
(a) Control group
Correlation betv/een Eg errors and:-
(i) Total W IQ score r = 0«38
(ii) Eyes open W IQ score r = 0.53
(iii) Eyes closed WIQ score r = 0.14
(b) Experimental group
Correlation between Eg errors and:-
(i) Total W I Q  score r = - 0.27
(ii) Eyes open W I Q  score r * - O.I4
(iii) Eyes closed W I Q  score r = - 0.3
These results are extremely interesting, as while the
absolute values of the experimental group correlations are 
reduced they all remain negative. However, on these 'difficult' 
categories, all the equivalent correlations for the control group
i i i i . . r a Y ' V n V-'- • -  --±.: - --Aly g.^
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become positive, with one value reaching 0.53, Thus, this 
analysis reveals a clear divergence of performance between the 
experimental and control subjects when the performance require­
ments of the task are greater. On these ’difficult* categories, 
good picture memory performance tends to be associated with a 
greater degree of vividness of visual imagery as determined by 
the VVIQ. This finding is in accordance with Mark’s (1973) 
results, i.e. that ’good* visualisers perform better on picture 
memory tasks than * poor’ visualisers. In contrast, as predicted 
by the present theory, in the dual-task situation a greater 
degree of vividness of visual imagery, as determined by the 
VVIQ, is associated with poorer performance on the picture 
memory task.
The above theoretical considerations, and the outcome of 
the associated analysis related to two separate performance 
situations provide considerable evidence in support of Mark’s 
claim for the validity of the VVIQ as a useful index of vividness 
of visual imagery. Quite different predictions derived from 
analysis of the tv/o separate experimental situations aooordnng 
to the present theory were confirmed. This analysis was 
concerned with the functional role of the imagery system, and 
the transference of these theoretical concepts into empirical 
predictions was dependent upon the validity of the VVIQ as a 
quantitative index of imagery. The confirmation of these 
predictions indicates that the VVIQ is both a valid and useful
’measure’ of individual differences in vividness of visual
imagery.
(vii) Sex differences
There were no significant differences between mean WIQ 
scores for male and female subjects in either the experimental
or control groups. ^
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(viii) The internalised cognitive task
As in the previous experiment, few subjects scored even 
a small number of correct solutions on this task over the 50 
trials, because of the limited time allowed for each problem.
However, all subjects performed extremely well and conscientiously 
in the experiment. The requirement of thinking aloud presented 
few difficulties to subjects. Monitoring of the subjects’ 
vocalisations by the experimenter showed that, on the whole, the 
subjects were obeying the experimental instructions to the best 
of their abilities. The subjects maintained a smooth flow of a
vocalisation when the slide was presented. Occasional prompting 
from the experimenter between trials ensured that this require­
ment was kept in mind at all times by the subjects. The 
sustained concentration and very long testing sessions required 
for this experiment were mentally fatiguing for both subject and 
experimenter, but no subject abandoned meaningful attempts to 
solve the mental arithmetic problems, even towards the end of 
the testing session, and there was no tendency for errors to 
increase over the testing time period. The ’thinking aloud’ 
requirement fulfilled its intended purpose most successfully.
5.9 Conclusions
The experiment reported in this chapter replicated almost 
exactly the findings of the similar experiment reported in 
chapter IV, The effects observed proved resistant to changes 
in methodology, and the adoption of more powerful and extensive ÿ
controls, together with the larger numbers of subjects in the 
present experiment, confirmed and increased the validity of the 
previous findings over a wide range of different analyses.
The main results of the two experiments are highly 
significant, and strongly support the theoretical concepts
..'.'...-.y,; ... : -......, .. . .........
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developed earlier in this thesis, together with the experimental 
strategies and methodologies derived from these concepts. Some a
new effects have been demonstrated which, in addition to their 
bearing on the present theoretical approach, are relevant to 
other areas of investigation.
Concerning picture memory, for example, the results of 
the experiments using the two-stage recognition procedure in 
relation to a series of heterogeneous stimulus categories, each 
represented by sets of homogeneous pictures, indicate that, 
although picture memory is undoubtedly extremely powerful, the 
argument of Goldstein and Chance (1970), that the power of picture 
memory has been somewhat overestimated in the literature,is 
correct. (see p.79). The present experiments have demonstrated 
that two picture memory performances based only on recognition of 
heterogeneous pictures may appear to be identical, when the use 
of a second error index in relation to the identification of a 
previously learned picture in its totality may show that the two 
performances are, in fact,significantly different.
Secondly, the successful utilisation of the VVIQ indicates 
the worth of its use as a research tool in experiments concerned 
in any way with visual imagery. The present experiments go 
considerably further than typical studies which attempt only to 
relate good visual memory, or visual learning performance, to 
high levels of vividness of visual imagery. It appears that 
the index of imagery provided by the VVIQ is sufficiently robust 
to be usefully applicable to a wide range of experimental 
situations.
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The present results are also relevant to the ’'disproof" of the 
single channel hypothesis clairaed by Allport, Antonis and Reynolds 
(1972). In a dual task condition involving the simul.t8uieous 
shadowing of speech presented through headphones and the learning 
of pictures, it was found that subjects could apparently "attend 
to and repeat back continuous speech at the same time as taking 
in complex, unrelated visual scenes." (ibid. p.225). However, in 
this experiment sets of only 15 unrelated, heterogeneous pictures 
were shown to the subjects, and the experimenters "tested how much 
(the) subjects had taken in" by a forced-choice recognition 
procedure. Subjects had only to respond either "yes" or "no" to 
a given picture, according to whether or not they believed it to be 
one of the items originally learned. The investigators state: 
"Recognition of the pictures was much less affected by simultan­
eous auditory shadowing; one subject showed nn loss of accuracy, 
and three made only one or at most two more errors under divided 
than under undivided attention." (ibid, p.229).
The results of the present experiments showed that on the 
basis of recognition of heterogeneous picture categories alone, 
there was no difference in recognition performance between 
subjects tested under undivided and divided attention conditions. 
However, when the second index of recognition performance, (E^), 
relating to specific picture errors, was taken into account, the 
highly significant performance differences between the divided 
and undivided attention conditions became apparent. The clear 
implication is, therefore, that the measure of picture recognition 
performance used by Allport et.al. was not s^ufficiently sensitive 
to pick up differences in performance between the divided and 
undivided attention conditions. The present experiments indicate 
that subjects may achieve what appear to be very high levels of 
performance on heterogeneous picture memory tasks without devoting 
all their processing capacities to these tasks. In view of the 
experimental evidence provided by the work of Loftus (1972), 
discussed earlier,' and the results of the present experiments, it 
appears that the information content of the picture input may be 
very drastically reduced in the dual task situation. Allport et.al. 
mention this possibility as being a "way out" for the single channel 
hypothesis in explaining their results. They consider, though, that 
it is not very promising. However, as the preceeding discussion has 
indicated, this "possibility" should not be so readily dismissed.
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CHAPTER VI t|
Vigilance - a cognitive approach.
6.1 The three experiments reported in the preceeding chapters 
have provided significant empirical evidence in support of the 'i*■H
basic concepts of the- present theory. This theory suggests 1
a new approach to problems investigated over the last twenty 
five years or so, under the general category of ’’vigilance”.
Further, analysis of experimental work in this area carried out 
to date appears to provide strong support for the present theory. 
Comprehensive reviews of all recent work and the history of the 
extensive experimental research into vigilance phenomena are 
provided by Welford (1968) and Broadbent (1971).
In typical laboratory vigilance experiments, (v/hich were 
originally derived directly from applied situations), subjects 
are required to detect and act upon the presence of faint and/or 
infrequent signals of low probabilities of occurrence over 
extended time periods. Welford (1968, p.19) states that the 
laboratory studies of the past two decades ’’have built up a 
complex, but reasonably coherent, picture of the association 
between, on the one hand, sensitivity and responsiveness as 
measured by behaviour, and on the other, physiological variables 
such as level of autonomic activity, and of the relationships of 
both to environmental conditions.” He notes that these 
investigations have emphasised the importance of studying 
’’continued performance as a function of time. ” (ibid)
Under certain conditions subjects often fail to detect 
the presence of target signals, even though the experimental
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situation requires that their primary attention he continuously 
focused on the potential signal source, (e.g. a. radar screen).
Recordings of eye movement patterns show clearly that many 5
signals may be missed by subjects in spite of the fact that 
these signals occur well within the subject’s visual field, the 
sensory information indicating the presence of a signal therefore 
reaching at least the retinal receptors. (Mackworth, Kaplan 
and Metlay, 1964). In a one-dial display task situation in the 
Mackworth et al experiment it was found that ’’every missed 
signal was fixated without being recognised” (ibid., p.397).
Broadbent (1971) has termed this phenomenon "looking without 
seeing” (p. 42).
Prom the premises of the present theory, this finding is 
particularly significant. It shows that subjects fixating a 
specific visual target display pattern may not be consciously 
aware of portions of sensory information emanating from this 
pattern. In many instances, sensory information concerning the ÿ
presence of a signal is physically received by, and available to
the subject, but it is not utilised. In terms of the present 
approach it is considered that, in general, this sensory 
information does not become consciously available without an 
internalised reorganisation of the information flow dynamics 
of the cognitive system.
Investigators in this area do not appear to have overtly 
considered the vigilance problem from the particular cognitive 
viewpoint of the present approach. It is considered that the 
fundamental phenomena of vigilance-type situations are amenable 
to an analysis in terms of the present model. This analysis 
suggests new explanations and theoretical propositions which may 
be experimentally investigated. These explanations complement 
existing theoretical work, and deal with aspects of vigilance which
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existing theories do not attempt to explain. In very general terms, 
most existing theories are concerned with the "crucial question"
(Welford, 1968, p. 277) of v/hy lapses of attention occur in 
vigilance tasks. In some contrast, the present theory is concerned 
with the explanation of what happens when these lapses occur - i.e. 
the manner in which the altered dynamics of the information flow |
within the organism may cause environmental sensory input to be 
disregarded.
The conscious and continued attention of subjects to the 
primary task in vigilance situations lapses because the tasks 
typically employed in such experiments are unstimulating, cog­
nitively undemanding, and repetitive or monotonous. Post- 
experimental evidence from subjects indicates that during such 
tasks they start thinking as the task becomes increasingly boring.
Thought processes involving daydreaming, imagining and fantasising 
are often concomitant with the monotony of the task situation
(Antrobus, Singer, and Greenberg (1966)).
A reasonable explanation for subjects’ failure to maintain
high signal detection performance in vigilance tasks is that such 
tasks are essentially "laboratory artifacts", quite unlike, and 
with sustained performance requirements different from any task 
commonly encountered or likely to be undertaken in a subject’s 
normal environment - i.e. in the evolutionary sense, man is not 
biologically adapted to the performance requirements of vigilance 
tasks. Therefore, when it does become necessary for human 
operators to perform vigilance-type tasks in real situations - 
such as manufacturing industry, defence, flying and driving, for 
example - applied psychological problems arise because of man’s 
apparent inability to fulfil consistently the performance re­
quirements of these tasks.
In terms of the present model, high levels of signal
detection in vigilance task situations effectively require that 
a subject’s cognitive processing system be maximally dedicated
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to the continuous analysis of his entire visual sensory inform­
ation input. As discussed previously (p. 34 ), research 
evidence indicates that the conscious information processing 
capacity of this system is restricted. Thus, if part of this 
limited capacity system is utilised in thought, (even if the 
content of such thought is concerned with the task situation 
itself), the concomitant capacity available for analysis of visual 
sensory data is reduced. The two picture memory experiments 
reported in chapters IV and V have provided strikingly effective 
empirical demonstrations of this phenomenon.
In typical vigilance task environments, once the subject 
has become fully accustomed to the static visual sensory pattern 
of the task situation, especially those relating to the target 
display, and has stored this rapidly overlearned information in 
memory, such memory information can be utilised via the imagery 
system to meet the fundamental perceptual requirements of the 
task situation. At any given instant, the total amount of 
information concerned with conscious awareness of the basic task 
display may comprise phenomenally indistinguishable proportions 
of pattern information from memory and from the real sensory 
environment. The relative sizes-of these proportions are 
related to the degree to which the subject’s cognitive capacities 
are occupied by internalised thought processes, i.e. the degree 
to which his attention to the primary experimental task has 
lapsed.
The subjective probability of occurrence of the basic 
patterns concerning the target display (but obviously not the 
possible signal itself) very rapidly becomes, in effect, unity.
From the theory, this means that a minimum amount of the 
sensory information environment needs to be sampled to confirm
d
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the presence of the expected pattern, thus allowing the bulk 
of the appropriate pattern information passed to conscious 
awareness to emanate directly from memory by means of the 
imagery system. In this sense, subjects in vigilance tasks 
continuously "see" the task display environment, i.e. in that 
they consciously experience its presence perceptually. However, 
while the nature of this conscious perceptual awareness may 
remain constant, the composition of the information content 
forming this awareness may vary substantially over time. The 
conceptual notions under consideration may be represented 
graphically as in Fig. 7.
This diagram schematically represents the information 
content of conscious perceptions of the same basic complex 
visual pattern A (e.g. a radar set, a T.V. screen etc...) at 
several consecutive instances in time - T^, Tg, Tg, T^. The 
shaded areas of these graphs represent the proportions of the 
pattern information content derived directly from the analysis 
of retinal sensory input data. The remainder of the pattern 
information (the unshaded area) comes from memory=
At T-j^, the subject is utilising his maximum conscious 
capacity in the analysis of the sensory data input. At Tg, Tg, 
T^, because the subjective expected pattern probability is 
extremely high, and because the capacities of the cognitive 
system are to an extent focused elsewhere, the greater proportion 
of this pattern information is coming from memory, direct sensory 
analysis having ceased when the presence of the expected pattern 
is confirmed. Clearly, then, if the same signal should occur at 
the "position" X shown in the displays, it will be detected at 
T^ and Tg, but not at T2 or T^. Detection occurs at T^ because 
of the contextual juxtaposition of the portion of the sensory
-I
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information input being analysed and the signal occurring at 
that instant. Thus, at times when the subject’s conscious 
perceptual awareness is largely comprised of memory information, 
with minimal analysis of the concurrent sensory input, signals 
are less likely to be detected,
6,2 The foregoing analysis of vigilance-type situations leads 
to quite specific propositions amenable to experimental investi­
gations, vis:-
Condition 1; If over an extended time period a subject is 
repeatedly presented with the same complex visual pattern, which 
may or may not contain within it a given infrequent signal. Si, 
for the reasons outlined above, his detection performance should 
show the decrement over time normally observed in experiments in 
which the signal to be detected is a ’blip' on a blank cathode 
ray tube.
Condition II: However, if the task is restructured so that 
over the same extended time period the infrequent signals which 
must be detected may occur at random in any one of a given large 
set of complex visual patterns, each of equal but low subjective 
probability of occurrence, and if at every presentation the' 
subject’s task is both to identify the particular pattern and 
to detect the presence of a signal, detection performance in 
relation to the target signal should be significantly improved 
relative to condition I,
Where the time durations of the tasks are the same, and 
the task situations are in most respects identical, (i.e. 
subjects must register their identification of the display at 
each presentation in condition I, even though this pattern 
remains the same throughout), the theory predicts that the rate 
of detection of Si should be greatest in condition II, the
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performance level in this condition being directly dependent 
upon the size of the set of equally probable display patterns 
in which the target signal might occur. The greater the size 
of this set of possible patterns, the lower the probabilities 
of occurrence for each pattern. According to the present theory, 
because the accurate identification or recognition of patterns 
of low subjective probabilities of occurrence requires the 
processing of greater amounts of real sensory information in 
order to discriminate between the patterns, signals occurring 
in such patterns are therefore more likely to be detected. In 
other words, in this particular task situation, because at each 
presentation the subject must process more real visual sensory 
information in order to perform the pattern identification task 
accurately, as a spin-off from this task requirement he is more 
likely to detect the presence of a signal in the visual sensory 
information array if one happens to be present.
In contrast, in condition I, the same repeatedly occurring 
complex visual pattern becomes very rapidly overlearned (i.e. 
able to be completely specified from memory as an image). 
Consequently, even though the subject is required to identify 
the pattern at each presentation, because its probability of 
occurrence is unity, the amount of real sensory information 
that the subject must process which is necessary to confirm the 
presence of the expected pattern is greatly reduced. In this 
way, the processing capacity dedicated to this task .is lessened, 
and the remainder of the available processing capacity is freed 
for utilisation by internalised thinking. According to the 
present theoretical analysis, because of this reduction of 
processing of real visual sensory information, the probability 
of detection of a signal which may be present in the pattern is
-i
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lessened. The monotony of the sustained performance of such 
a single-pattern task over an extended time period should result 
in attention lapsing from the task, leading to a proportion of 
signals being missed, just as in the ’normal’ vigilance task 
situation. At all presentations of the single, overlearned 
expected pattern, the subject should consciously ’see’ the 
complete pattern, but this perceptual experience may consist of 
a high proportion of memory information combined with a relatively 
low proportion of real visual sensory information from the pattern.
In order to investigate the validity of the theoretical 
notions outlined above concerning vigilance-type task situations, 
the following experiment was carried out.
6.3 Method
(i) Apparatus
The construction and development of satisfactory apparatus 
to meet the particular requirements of the present experiment 
presented very considerable technical problems. These were 
finally resolved after an extended period of operational 
experimentation to evolve the most suitable equipment, recording 
methods and testing procedures.
The apparatus provided for the purposes of the experiment 
had to meet the following basic specifications:-
1) Complex visual patterns had to be repeatedly presented 
•at constant exposure times and at regular time intervals 
over an extended period. For the same reasons as those 
outlined earlier in relation to the picture memory experiments 
reported in chapters IV and V, (p. 76 ), these complex visual 
patterns were to be in the form of ’normal* photographs, 
rather than line drawings or dot patterns. In the proposed 
control condition, the same photograph had to be presented
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at each exposure for the duration of the experiment. In 
the experimental condition, a large number of photographs 
had to be presented in a random sequence for the entire 
period of the experiment. For both groups, the exposure 
time per picture was to be 1 second, with 5 seconds interval 
between each presentation.
2) An infrequent 'signal* had to occur intermittently at 
a random spatial position within any photograph used in the 
experiment. The signal had to be of sufficient clarity and 
contrast so as to enable it to be unambiguously discriminable, 
wherever it was located in the photograph. (i.e. it had to 
have a high visual signal to noise ratio). The occurrence 
of the signal had to be precisely synchronous with that of 
the picture, so as to prevent attention being drawn to its 
location by its sudden onset during the time interval that the 
photograph was exposed.
3) The presentation of the pictures had to be smooth and 
uniform throughout the experiment in order to facilitate 
the normal vigilance decrement. * Arousing* events such as 
overt irregularities of time periods of presentation of the 
pictures, or discontinuities in the expected visual patterns 
had to be avoided, as such events typically increase signal 
detection rates, at least for a short period of time after 
their occurrence (Broadbent, 1971). Such 'unexpected*, or 
non-uniform visual aberrations had to be eliminated.
4) It was also considered necessary to remove any possible 
auditory cue, such as a 'click', associated with the 
presentation of a photograph, as, in the control condition, 
at least, this cue alone would enable the subject to respond 
'correctly' to the presence of a picture v/ithout looking at it,
5) A method had to be devised for recording the subject's
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responses both to the picture itself, and to the presence or 
absence of a signal within the picture. The resultant 
subject performance record could not be in the form of simple 
counters showing total correct responses to pictures, and the total 
number of successful detections of signals, because it was 
necessary to evaluate the time pattern of the distribution of 
errors over the testing session. For later analysis, it was 
necessary to know when errors or misses occurred, and the 
particular pictures or signals associated with them.
6) The subject had to indicate his decisions manually via a 
keyboard rather than vocalise them. The purpose of this 
requirement was to simplify the technical and practical 
problems of recording and analysis associated with 5), above.
The subject had to make two *yes-no* type decisions in 
response to every presentation of a picture. One decision 
was in relation to the identification of the particular 
photograph, and the second was with regard to the presence
or absence of a signal within that picture. The requirement 
■for two decisions at every presentation of a photograph 
provided a check that the subject was at least partially 
attending to the picture. If, for example, the subject had 
only to record a response if he thought a signal were present, 
it could not be determined unequivocally whether some detection 
failures were a result of not looking at the picture at all.
7) The duration of the experimental testing session had to 
be comparable with that associated with typical vigilance 
experiments, i.e. of at least one hour's duration. This 
requirement, together with the proposed 1 second picture 
exposure time and 5 second inter-stimulus interval, meant 
that the number of presentations of photographs to the subject
-—7T^-
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had to be at least 600 in a single testing session. This 
task specification, together with that of 6) above, meant 
that the event rate throughout the experiment was relatively 
high. However, existing research evidence suggests that the 
rate proposed ( 1 per 6 seconds) is unlikely to improve signal 
detection performance to any significant extent. (This work *
is cited and discussed at length by Broadbent (1971) p.35 and 
following). Even if the event rate chosen were to have any 
effect on signal detection rates, this effect would be exactly 
the same for both experimental and control groups. Thus, 
the performances achieved by both groups would be directly 
comparable.
To meet all the specifications listed above, the following 
apparatus and procedures were devised:-
The sequences of photographs were presented to the subject 
in black-and-white on a 585 cm screen Shibaden television monitor, 
by means of an JVC Model 601 videotape recorder. The specifi­
cation of normal photographs as the complex visual patterns to 
be used in the experiment ruled out the use of any form of 
computer generated visual display*
The 'signal' was in the form of a small (0.8 cm dia), but 
clearly apparent 'blob' of white light, which could occur at any 
spatial position in any picture.
The photographs were recorded onto videotape by projecting 
them onto a white screen with a Kodak Carousel S slide projector,
A Phillips television camera, equipped with a Monital zoom lens, 
was positioned directly above the slide projector and focused 
on the screen, so that the projected photograph filled the 
entire television screen. The projector was equipped with a 
solenoid operated shutter and an automated timing device which
i
160
opened the shutter for 1 second at 5 second intervals. This 
5 second interval was greater than the time period required for 
the operation of the automatic slide changing mechanism of the 
Carousel projector. Thus, while the shutter was closed, this 
mechanism could be actuated, changing the slide so that a new 
picture would appear on the screen when the shutter opened again.
When necessary, the signal was placed in the picture by
means of a point source of light manually positioned against the
back of the screen onto which the slide was projected. The
presentation of the signal was exactly synchronised with that
of the picture by means of a microswitch actuated by the shutter
on the slide projector. The final form of the light signal
such that 'halo* effects were eliminated, and the signal v/as
always clearly visible, even in the 'white' parts of the
photograph, was evolved by experimentation with a number of
different bulb intensities, and the assistance of several 
observers.
By means of the above apparatus and methods, the necessary 
videotapes were recorded for both the experimental and control 
groups. The IVO videotape recorder had two auditory channels. 
Using an amplifier, a tone was recorded onto one of these 
channels each time a signal was embedded in a picture, this tone 
being initiated and synchronised with the signal by means of 
a microswitch attached to the shutter on the Kodak projector.
The subjects' responses to each picture were made using 
a keyboard consisting of 4 adjacent keys. One pair of keys 
was used by the subject for registering his decision with 
regard to the identification of the picture, and the other pair 
was used for registering his decision with regard to the presence 
or absence of a signal in the picture.
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Each subject's responses over the entire testing session 
were recorded using 6 channels of a BRD, model ER8, 8 channel 
event recorder. Each key on the response keyboard was connected 
to one channel of the event recorder. As the videotape 
presenting the pictures to the subject was played back, the 
tones which had been recorded onto one auditory channel of the 
videotape recorder in synchrony with the occurrence of the 
signals, actuated an event on one channel of the event recorder 
by means of an amplifier. As a fail-safe precaution to allow if
for possible breakdown of the event recorder and to prevent the 
resultant complete loss of all the data, whenever the subject 
responded in the affirmative to the presence of a signal, a 
further tone was recorded onto the second auditory channel of 
the videotape recorder. In this way, if the event recorder 
failed during testing of a subject, it could be repaired and 
the videotape from that session played through again, and the 
subject's positive responses with regard to the presence of 
signals would be shown.
The final record of each subject's performance was in 
the form of a 6.5 cm wide pressure-sensitive paper tape, of 11 
metres in length. The various responses of the subject, together 
with the record of the actual occurrence of the signals, were 
recorded in the appropriate channels as small step waves caused 
by deflection and return of each pressure stylus.
The duration of the main part of the testing session was 
determined by the length of the videotape, and was approxi­
mately 62 minutes for the experimental and control groups, being 
the maximum time that could be obtained with the IVO recorder 
used.
The pictures used in the experiment were in the 'normal' ê
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category described by Standing (1973). They were a varied ^
collection of competent, heterogeneous photographs. From a 
pool of over 400 transparencies, 75 were finally chosen to be 
used in the experiment. These were subjectively equated for 
photographic quality by the experimenter and a second observer.
A restriction on the use of certain photographs was imposed by Ù
the nature of the video-recording process. The necessary 
state of adjustment and lighting of the television recording <
equipment was highly sensitive to excessive changes in bright­
ness and contrast from one photograph to the next. (This state 
of affairs effectively provided a form of objective control in 
relation to the variation of the photographs used).
For the purposes of the recording of the videotape to be 
used in the experimental group, the order of the 75 pictures was 
randomised in the projector carousel, and this sequence was 
recorded onto videotape using the procedure described above.
After presentation of the 75 photographs the recording operation 
was stopped and the order of the 75 slides was again randomised.
The new sequence was then recorded onto the videotape. This 
procedure was continued until the videotape expired,the signals 
being inserted in the pictures where appropriate throughout this 
recording process. During the recording of the testing tapes 
for both groups, whenever a signal was placed in a picture, if 
it were not clearly visible on the television monitor to the 
observers present during recording, the recording operation was 
stopped and that presentation was replaced by a satisfactory one.
Finally, the completed tapes were checked in their entirety for 
picture and signal clarity, continuity, and electronic inter­
ference effects.
The distribution of signals over the time period of the
      ' T
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experiments was close to that used by Mackworth (1950), approxi­
mately 12 to 13 signals being randomly distributed v/ithin the 
picture sequences in each 20 minutes. There was a total of 
43 signals in the final tapes used for each group.
Because it was impossible to completely proof the testing 
room against the intrusion of some outside noise, a white noise 
generator emitted low intensity noise through headphones worn by 
the subject for the duration of the vigilance task.
During the vigilance task, each subject was alone in the 
experimental room. The presence of additional persons in the 
room in such task situations has been shown to increase signal 
detection rates (Broadbent, 1971). However, observational 
checks on both apparatus and subject could be made by the 
experimenter from an adjacent control room through a one-way 
mirror. At no time were subjects aware that they were under 
observation, the curtains over the mirror being drawn, leaving 
just sufficient visibility necessary for the experimenter's 
purpose. Prom the seated position of the subjects, the curtains 
appeared fully closed.
The experimental room was lit by soft, low intensity 
indirect light to prevent eyestrain.
(ii) Subjects
20 undergraduate and postgraduate students of the 
University of St. Andrews (10 male ; 10 female) participated in
the experiment. All had normal corrected vision and no optical 
defects. A further 10 such subjects had previously assisted in #
various pilot studies connected with the extensive operational 
development and reliability testing of the equipment and methods.
None of these earlier subjects were used in the main experiment.
All subjects were unpaid volunteers.
 .  - v -     ^^ tv.'f-I;
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(iii) Procedure
Subjects were seated at a tabl^ on which was situated 
the response keyboard.• Seating and keyboard positions were 
adjusted to suit the comfort of the individual subject. Where 
appropriate, the subject's watch was removed. The television 
screen on which the stimulus pictures v/ould appear was positioned
. fdirectly in front of the subject, at a distance of approximately
2.4 metres from his eyes, with the centre of the television 
screen approximately at the subject’s eye level.
The experimental procedure was then as follows 
I Control Group
Subjects v;ere first shovm on the television screen a 
series of five 5-second exposures of the single photograph to be 
used throughout the experiment. The subjects were instructed 
to memorise the photograph.
It was then explained to the subjects that, during the 
main part of the experiment, a signal would occasionally be 
present at some random position within the photograph. A 
number of further presentations of the photograph were then made, 
this time with each one containing a signal in a different spatial 
position. The purpose of this series of exposures was to 
thoroughly familiarise the subject with the nature of the signal, 
and to check that the signals w^ ere clearly visible to the subject.
The stop-m.otion facility on the I VO videotape recorder was of 
considerable assistance in this part of the procedure.
The method of response using the keyboard was then 
explained to the subject, a diagram of the keyboard layout is 
shown in Pig. 8 . The two left-hand keys were concerned with 
response to the identification of the picture. Each time a 
picture was presented in the experiment, if the subject identified
1 65
it as one which he had been Instructed to memorise earlier, he
\pressed the 'picture-same’ key* If the picture was not one 
memorised earlier, the subject pressed the ’picture-different* 
key. In the case of the control group, the picture shown at 
each presentation was always the same as the one memorised 
earlier. If the subject perceived the presence of a signal in 
the picture, he pressed the ’signal present-yes’ key.. If he 
did not perceive a signal, he pressed the ’signal present-no* 
key. Thus, at every occurrence of a.picture, the subject always 
had to press two keys.
r" e ou{"f>uts
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Next, the subject was shown a series of exposures of the 
picture at the presentation rate and exposure time to be used in
the main part of thej experiment. Some of these pictures\ 'contained a signal, 'and some did not. For this practice series 
of presentations, the'subject was .asked to respond using the
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keyboard, according to the instructions given. After several 
such practice runs, when it was clear to the experimenter that 
the subject was fully conversant with the experimental procedure 
and responding satisfactorily, and that the apparatus was fully 
serviceable, the main part of the testing session commenced.
For the vigilance task, the instructions to the control 
group subjects were as follows
"In the next part of the experiment, the picture you have 
memorised will be presented to you on the screen a very large 
number of times. Each time the picture occurs, you must respond 
using the keys in the way you have been shown. Now, I can tell 
you that it will always be exactly the same picture at every 
presentation for the entire period of the experiment. There are 
no 'different’ pictures included to try to catch you out.
However, you must respond ’picture-same’ at every presentation.
Occasionally, a signal exactly like the ones you have been 
shown will be present in the picture. It will always be clearly 
visible. However, the occurrence of these signals will be, on 
the whole, fairly infrequent, and completely at random. A 
signal can occur at any presentation and it can be at any 
position in the picture. Remember that you must make a ’yes* 
or a ’no’ response about the presence of a signal every time the 
picture is presented.
So, in this experiment, your task is to identify the picture 
correctly each time it occurs and to detect as many signals as 
you possibly can. You may press the response keys in any order 
you wish on each presentation. Rapid reaction time is not 
important in this experiment; respond reasonably quickly, but 
be as accurate as you can. Remember you have five seconds 
between pictures. If you think you have pressed the wrong key,
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you may change your mind and quickly press the correct one. I
will consider your final decisions for each picture as your
responses to that picture.
Now, sometimes a signal may become present in the blank 
spaces between pictures. In this case, press the 'signal 
present-yes’ key only. You must try and keep your attention 
focused on the screen all the time,
I will ask you to put the headphones on in a moment. These !
have a low intensity ’hiss’ coming through them to mask any
possible distracting noises. I will leave this room once I 
have started the apparatus and return when the experiment is 
over. Do you have any questions? Remember, you must press 
two keys after every picture, one relevant to the picture and 
one relevant to the signal."
After placing and adjusting the headphones on the subject, 
the experimenter left the testing room. At subsequent frequent 
intervals during the testing period, the experimenter checked 
the progress of the subject and the performance of the apparatus 
through the one-way mirror.
Although no signals were ever present on the television 
screen in any interval between pictures, the instructions to 
subjects suggested that there might be in order to maintain, as 
far as possible, the attention of the subject focused on the 
potential signal source, and its immediate visual environment, 
throughout the experiment.
On completion of the session, the experimenter returned 
to the testing room. Subjects were then interviev/ed and 
invited to comment on any aspect of the experiment. The 
experimenter questioned subjects with regard to their ability 
to maintain concentration on the task, the monotony or boredom
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of the task situation, and what happened when their concentration 
lapsed, i.e. whether they started thinking about other things 
during task performance. Finally, a brief explanation of the 
experimental aims was given to the subject.
II Experimental group.
Subjects in this group were first shown on the television
screen a series of 15 heterogeneous ’normal’ photographs, each fiIbeing presented for a 5 second exposure time. This series was a
then shown again in the reverse order at the same 5 second item 
exposure time, and finally, the series was presented a third 
time, each picture being exposed for 5 seconds* Thus, each 
picture was seen by the subject for a total time of 15 seconds.
Prior to the showing of this set of pictures, the subject was 
instructed to commit them to memory. The extremely accurate 
remembering of such a relatively small set of heterogeneous 
pictures presents no problems to subjects (see Chapters IV and V).
It was then explained to the subjects that a signal might 
sometimes be present in the pictures, and a series made up of 
all the pictures the subject had memorised was shown, each one 
containing a signal embedded within it at some random position.
The purpose of this procedure was to familiarise the subject with 
the nature of the signal and to check that all the signals were 
clearly visible to the subject. As for the control group, the 
stop-motion facility of the videotape recorder was of considerable 
assistance in this respect.
The response procedure using the keyboard was then 
explained to the subject, as for the control group. Next, the 
subject was shown a series of pictures consisting of some from 
the set memorised earlier, and some not previously seen by the 
subject, A number of these pictures contained signals, and the
r-v   .. 'a,;.'
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series was presented at the same event rate and exposure times 
to be used in the main part of the experiment. For this 
practice series, the subject was instructed to respond to each 
picture presentation using the keys in the manner in which he 
had been instructed. After several practice runs through this 
series, when it was clearly apparent to the experimenter that the 
subject fully understood the experimental procedure and was 
responding satisfactorily, and that the apparatus was functioning 
correctly, the main part of the testing session was commenced.
For the vigilance task, the instructions to the experi­
mental group subjects were as follows:-
"In the next part of the experiment a very large number of 
pictures are going to be presented on the television screen, one 
after the other, in the same manner as those you have just seen 
in the practice run. Some of the pictures will be the same as 
the 15 you have memorised, and many will be different. Each 
time a picture is shown you must respond using the keys in the 
manner you have been shown and which you have just practised. 
Remember, if the picture is the same as one you have memorised, 
press the ’picture-same’ key, and if it is not one you have 
memorised, press the ’picture-different* key. You must make a 
decision like this for every picture presented. Now, because 
the experiment goes on for quite a long time, even though there 
is a large number of pictures, you will eventually see them all 
more than once. So, always remember that you press the ’picture- 
same* key only when the picture presented is one of the set of 15 
you have memorised already, even if the particular picture may 
have occurred before in the experiment. Is that clear? The 
same-different category refers only to the 15 pictures you have 
already memorised.
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Occasionally, a signal exactly like the ones you have been 
shown will be present in the picture. It will always be clearly 
visible. However, the occurrence of these signals will be, on 
the whole, fairly infrequent, and completely at random. A 
signal can occur at any presentation, and it can be at any 
position in the picture. Éeineraber that you must make a ’yes' 
or a ’no’ response about the presence of a signal every time a 
picture is presented.’’
The remaining instructions and testing procedure for the 
experimental group subjects were exactly the same as for the 
control group.
6.4 Results and discussion.
(i) Method of analysis of the raw data.
Each of the paper tapes forming the record of a subject’s 
performance was analysed and cross-checked in the following 
manner
(a) Each event on the tape was numbered and the total checked 
v/ith the actual number of picture presentations for the group
(» 618 for the control group, and 624 for the experimental group). 
During this exercise of numbering, it was clear from discrepancies 
in the size of the normally regular interval between responses 
when the subject had failed to respond to a picture presented»
(b) The occurrence of each signal presented to the subject 
was numbered, and this total checked against the correct total 
( » 43). As a further cross check, the number of each signal 
was compared with the corresponding picture presentation number»
(c) A subject’s affirmative response to the occurrence of a 
signal v/as shown in the two channels adjacent to that indicating 
the actual presence of a signal. (One of these two channels 
indicated that a tone had been recorded onto the second auditory
"    "" ' ' " -  .si.:.::. r . /lu:.,,
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channel of the videotape recorder, for the reasons outlined 
earlier (p.l6l)). Scores for the total number of signals 
detected and the total number of signals missed were thus 
ascertained, together with the actual signal and event numbers 
associated with each detection failure.
(d) False alarms were scored by careful and repeated visual 
inspection of the tape. In this way total numbers of false 
alarms were obtained as well as the actual picture presentation 
numbers associated with each false alarm,
(e) The picture identification responses were scored using 
a master reference table showing each event number and the 
correct picture response associated with it. This table also 
indicated the actual picture shown at every presentation.
(f) Where a subject changed his decision on any presentation, 
the two final responses for that event were taken to represent 
the subject’s definitive responses to that presentation.
Because of the considerable length of the paper tapes, 
each of which recorded over 1200 decisions for every subject, 
each complete tape was carefully checked for scoring accuracy 
a minimum of four separate times.
(ii) Signal detection results.
The total number of signals missed and the total number 
of false alarms for each subject in the control group are shown 
in table XVI. Table XVII shows these results for the experi­
mental group.
The difference between the mean number of signal 
detection failures for subjects in the experimental group and 
the mean number of signal detection failures for subjects in 
the control group was significant at the 0.002 level on a 
two-tailed ’t’ test. (t = 4.42; 18 degrees of freedom),
the variances of this parameter for the two groups being
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TABLE XVI
Signal detection performance: control group,
Subject Sex Total no.signaismissed
Total no.falsealarms
AC P 7 1
OG F 7 4
PR F 5 3
DC F 10 . 11
MP F 11 1
JM M 10 0
RH M 7 0
PB M 9 0
HE M 4 0
AM M 6 4
Mean/S.D. 7.6 / 2.20 2.4 / 3.26
Notes (i) No subject failed to respond at any presentation#
(ii) There were no significant sex differences in no. of signals missed (t = 0,52; 8 d.f.), or number of false alarms (t « 1.59; 8 d.f.)
Signal detection
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TABLE XVII 
performance: experimental group.
Subject Sex Total no.signaismissed
Total no.falsealarms
JGr F 2 3
AC F 2 7
AS F 3 18
K F 6 . 4
JW F 1 1
JWr M 7 32
lA M 5 11
BC M 2 2
JG M 0 3
BM M 3 18
Mean/S.D. 3.1 / 2.11 9.9 / 9.49
Notes (i) No subject failed to respond at any presentation,
(ii) There were no significant sex differences in no.of signals missed (t = 0,40; 8 d.f. ), or numberof false alarms (t = 1.04; 8 d.f.)
homogeneous. (F = 1.08; = 9, 2^ ~ 9) The mean number of
signals missed by the control group ( = 7.6) was over twice as 
great as the mean number of signals missed by the experimental 
group (= 3.1). This empirical result very strongly supports
the two main predictions derived from the present theory.
Firstly, the prediction that there would be a decrement 
in signal detection performance in the single complex pattern 
condition was confirmed, subjects in the control group failing 
to detect 17.67/^  of the signals. Secondly, the theoretical 
prediction that subjects in the multiple complex pattern
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condition would detect more signals than those in the single 
pattern condition was confirmed, the empirical differences in 
signal detection performance between the two groups being in 
the direction predicted, and highly significant statistically. 
Subjects in the experimental group failed to detect only a mean 
of 7.2% of the signals.
The false alarm rates of subjects show that there were 
more false alarms associated with the experimental group.
However, the variance in the experimental group was substantially 
increased by the relatively high false alarm rates of three 
subjects, one of whom scored 32 false alarms. If the results 
of these three subjects are disregarded, the difference between 
the false alarm rates of the two groups is not significant 
(t = 1,19; 15 degrees of freedom), although the mean number of
false alarms for the experimental group is still higher than 
that for the control group. The higher false alarm rate of the 
experimental group supports the notion that the visual signal to 
noise ratios associated with the larger number of pictures were 
effectively lower than those associated with, the single picture 
condition of the control group.
The experimental group subjects, in addition to over­
learning the 15 stimulus pictures, also saw the signal at least 
20 times prior to commencement of the main vigilance task. 
Consequently, the overlearning of the visual appearance of the 
signal, combined with the ’noisier* pictures and the varying 
degrees of subjective probability of occurrence of a signal at 
each event may well have facilitated the subject’s perceptual 
experience of a signal which was not in fact present. This 
explanation is in accordance with the present theory in that 
information held in memory concerning the physical appearance
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of a signal may be incorporated into perception of a picture.
There is an alternative explanation of the higher false 
alarm rates of the experimental group, based on signal detection 
theory. According to this argument, subjects in the experimental 
group were altering their criteria of sensitivity in order to be 
more certain of not missing a signal if one were actually present. 
This response strategy would result in an increase in the false 
alarm rate. However, such an explanation is not consistent with 
a more detailed analysis of the data. If this explanation were 
correct, high false alarm rates should be associated with high 
rates of signal detection - i.e. there should be some degree of 
positive correlation between the number of false alarms and the 
number of signals detected by each subject. This should be the 
case for both experimental and control groups. However, it was 
not, the product-moment correlation coefficient betv/een number of 
signals missed and number of false alarms being r = - 0.1 for 
the control group, and r = - 0.6 for the experimental group. 
Although the absolute value of this correlation for the experi­
mental group is rather high, it is in precisely the opposite 
direction to that predicted by the sensitivity explanation. If 
the results of the single subject who scored 32 false alarms are 
disregarded, the correlation drops to r = - 0,3.
The above analysis shows clearly that the experimental 
group subjects were not detecting more signals simply because 
their false alarm rate was higher. Even the maximum number of 
false alarms achieved by any subject represented only one false 
alarm per 20 presentations. The equivalent mean figures were 
a false alarm rate of 1 every 257 events for the control group, 
and 1 every 62.4 events for the experimental group (= 1 every 
141 events if the three anomalous results are disregarded).
hr ..-
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In the case of the experimental group, detailed analysis 
of the patterns of each subject's false alarms in terras of the 
actual picture presentations and specific pictures with which 
they were associated reveals the primary reason for the greater 
number of false alarms in the experimental group.
The set of pictures used in the experimental group 
consisted of 75 photographs. This meant that, because of the '^
extended time duration of the experiment, which allowed 624 
presentations, each of the photographs in the set was seen by 
the subject at least 8 times during the experiment. Consequently, 
if at the beginning of the testing session, a subject positively 
interpreted some thing in a particular picture as a signal, even 
though there was no actual signal present, he was likely to tend 
to make the same error on each subsequent occurrence of that 
picture for the remainder of the experiment. Thus, for example, 
subject JWr scored 32 false alarms, but these were accounted for 
by only 14 different pictures. Table XVIII shows, for the 
experimental group, the total number of false alarms made by 
each subject, together with the total number of different pictures 
associated with those false alarms.
From this analysis, it is clear that the increased false 
alarm rate of the experimental group was primarily an artifact 
of the large number of pictures used compared to the single 
picture of the control group. The distribution of a considerable 
proportion of the false alarms was non-random and generally 
associated with the repeated occurrence of specific pictures.
The very low overall false alarm rates and the consistent 
distribution patterns of occurrence of many false alarms indicate 
that subjects in both groups were performing according to their 
perceptual experience of the photographs at each presentation 
rather than guessing the occurrence of signals.
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TABLE XVIII 
alarm analysis: exoerimental. group.
Subject Total no. of false alarms Total no, of different pictures associated with these false alarms
JGr 3 3
AC 7 6
AS 18 15
K 4 4
JW 1 1
JY/r 32 14
lA 11 9
BC 2 2
JG 3 2
BM 18 8
(iii) Picture identification results
(a) Control group
All the subjects in the control group correctly responded 
’picture-same’ to all 618 presentations of the single picture 
used in the control situation* This result, together with the 
low false alarm rate and the fact that no control subject failed 
to make either a ’yes' or a ’no’ response regarding the presence 
of a signal on any presentation, is strong evidence that, at 
each presentation all subjects were at least partially attending |
to the television screen.
(b) Experimental group
Picture identification errors for the experimental group 
are shovm in table XIX.
  -  ■ ' ' '   —    .
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TABLE XIX
Picture identification errors: experimental group 
Subject Errors
JGr 0
AC 0
AS 0
K 13
JW 0
JWr 0
lA 18
BC 0 *
JG 0 *
BM 3
* Complete record not available because of mechanical 
failure of event recorder.
Picture identification performance of all subjects in 
this group v/as extremely good, 5 subjects making no errors at 
all over the 624 randomly ordered presentations. In the cases 
of those subjects who did make some errors, detailed analysis 
of the records showed that for each of these subjects, most 
of their errors were associated with particular pictures.
That is, if, at the beginning of the experiment,a subject 
incorrectly classified a picture as either being or not being 
one of the 15 memorised prior to the experiment, this incorrect 
decision was repeated on the majority of times that picture 
occurred during the experiment. In the case of subject I.A,, 
tv/o particular photographs accounted for 11 of his 18 errors, , 
and for subject K., two specific photographs accounted for 10
- - -A'.'.• ■ - . - ' - - ■ - ■ ■ »-• ' " - - - ■- -■ . - --- -
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of her 13 errors. Failure of the event recorder during testing 
of subjects BC and JG meant that completed records of picture 
identification performance were not obtained for these subjects. 
However, neither of these subjects had made any errors up to the 
time at which the event recorder failed, this failure occurring 
after approximately & to § of the total testing session time had 
elapsed.
The nearly error-free performance on the part of the 
experimental group subjects is empirical evidence that an 
important aim of the experimental design strategy was achieved. 
Because of the complete unpredictability of the random sequence 
of pictures throughout the experiment, the very high proportion 
of .correct responses shows that, at each presentation subjects 
were attending to and processing at least sufficient proportions 
of visual sensory information referent to the picture to enable 
them to accurately discriminate between the 75 pictures.
(iv) Further analysis of signal detection failures.
Fig. 9 graphs the total numbers of detection failures 
made by all subjects on each individual signal foi- the control 
group. Fig. 10 illustrates the actual distribution of signal 
detection failures for each of the control group subjects. Figs, 
11 and 12 show the equivalent results for the experimental group.
This analysis shows that most control subjects missed 
signals IS, 19 and 26, For some reason these signals were not 
detected by the majority of subjects, although signal no. 18 
was the only signal missed by all subjects.
Prior to commencement of discussion of this point, it 
should be emphasised that if signal 18 is entirely eliminated 
from the scoring of signal detection failures of all control 
subjects, the difference between the new mean number of signals 
missed by the control group subjects (mean = 6.6; SD = 2,2)
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and the mean number of signals missed by the experimental group 
subjects (mean = 3.1; SD = 2,11) remains significant at the
0.01 level on a two-tailed test (t = 3,43; 18 degrees of freedom).
In order to determine whether the failures to detect these 
particular signals were simply a result of the signals being 
difficult to see, which was highly unlikely in view of the way 
in which the tapes were checked during recording, a small 
experiment was carried out, For each of the three contentious "'I
signals, separate sets of 5 subjects who had not participated in 
the main experiment were obtained. Each of these subjects was 
individually taken into the experimental room and seated in the 
position occupied by subjects in the vigilance experiment. The 
nature of the signal was described verbally to the subject, and 
the videotape used for the control group was started several 
events prior to the occurrence of the particular signal under 
consideration (i,e, 18, 19, or 26), the subject was instructed to 
say *yes* when he saw a signal somewhere in the picture on any 
occurrence, • None of the subjects employed in this small 
experiment had actually seen a signal prior to its occurrence 
in the picture, and could therefore not be entirely certain of 
what to look for. However, all responded correctly to the 
presence of the three signals (i,e, 5 subjects for each signal).
Clearly then, detection failures in relation to these signals 
could not be attributed to a straightforward problem of visual 
discrimination associated with these signals. On this point 
it should again be noted that the occurrence of a signal was 
exactly synchronous with that of the picture, i,e, it was 
present on the screen for a full second.
Prior to the occurrence of signal 18 there were 32 
presentations which did not contain a signal, and signal 19
* A photograph of signal 18, showing that it was clearly 
visible is included in Appendix IV,
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followed only 18 events later. Signal 20 followed 11 events 
after signal 19; signal 21, 16 events after signal 20; and 
signal 22, 7 events after signal 21. No subjects missed 
signals 20, 21 and 22. For signal 26, 15 presentations which 
did not contain signals occurred before it. Overall, for the 
control group there was only the slightest tendency for a 
greater number of signal detection failures to be associated 
with longer time intervals prior to their occurrence (r - 0.24)
Although 17 signals of the 43 shown accounted for all the 
signal detection failures in the control group, the mean number 
of misses for the group was less than half this figure. ( = 7.6). 
This shows that detection failures were distributed across all 
these signals, some subjects detecting particular signals which 
other subjects missed. However, these other subjects may have 
detected some signals which the first group missed, and so on.
The varied patterns of detection failures, although restricted 
to 17 signals, shows clearly that misses were not due to the 
signals being difficult to discriminate visually.
If the total numbers of signal detection failures for 
each one third of the time duration of the experiment is plotted 
for both experimental and control groups, it can be seen that 
many more detection failures occurred in the middle.20 minutes 
of the experiment than in either the first or last 20 minute 
periods, there being little difference between the number of 
detection failures for these two periods. (Fig. 13).
It seems clear from these results that the explanation 
of the pattern of missed signals, a pattern which was similar 
for both groups, is that, in general, subjects* attention to the 
task tended to lapse more in the middle of the experiment, 
leading to greater numbers of detection failures in this time 
period.
I
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When attention lapses, the present theory proposes that 
a lesser proportion of real visual sensory information is 
processed, resulting in a reduction in the probability that 
a signal will be detected (see p. 152), The results for the 
control group showed that all subjects responded to every 
presentation of a picture throughout the experiment. These 
presentations were not accompanied by any auditory cues. 
Consequently, it can be presumed that all the control subjects 
were processing at least some proportion of visual sensory 
information referent to the pattern at each presentation. On 
many presentations this proportion of sensory information was 
the minimum necessary to confirm the presence of the pattern 
expected. It is proposed that the reason that certain signals 
tended to be associated with a greater number of detection 
failures than others, particularly when attention had lapsed,
-i
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was not that these signals v/ere difficult to discriminate 
visually, but rather that they were positioned in what may be 
termed low-priority information areas.
Under conditions where only partial attention is devoted i
to pattern recognition, the proportion of real visual sensory 
information, referent to an overlearned pattern, which is 
processed is reduced. It is proposed that this reduction is 
selective in the sense that the reduced proportion of sensory 
information is referent to the minimum number of fundamental 
semantic characteristics subjectively considered necessary to 
identify the particular expected overlearned pattern. Thus, 
real visual sensory information which is redundant with reference 
to this purpose will be less likely to be processed when minimum 
capacity is dedicated to the identification of the pattern. In 
general terms, the notion is that, when the available pattern 
processing capacity is reduced, redundant visual sensory inform- i
ation is less likely to be processed. The processing of this 
redundant information is of low priority in the identification 
of the expected complex pattern. The subject consciously 
experiences perception of the complete pattern, the necessary 
redundant proportions of information come from the memory store.
On the basis of this argument, the reason that certain 
signals were detected less often than others was that ' they v/ere 
positioned in areas of redundant information. Thus, under 
conditions of partial attention the essential picture defining 
sensory information processed from the pattern did not contain 
these signals, and they were therefore not detected. Where the 
signals tended to be positioned within non-redundant information 
areas, they v/ould tend to be detected, even under conditions in 
which only part of the subject's capacity was dedicated to the
:'-4 . r, '
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the control group than in the experimental group. In the latter 
group, the missed signals were distributed across a wider range 
of signals. At every event in the experimental group, the 
requirements of the picture identification task caused moi'e real 
sensory information from each picture to be processed. When 
attention lapsed, the proportion of real sensory information 
necessary to accurately perform this identification task was 
reduced to a minimum. Consequently, signals in low priority 
information areas would tend to be missed. However, the wide 
range of photographs with their varying degrees of interest or 
familiarity between individual subjects can be assumed to have 
contributed to substantial individual diffei’ences in picture 
processing strategies with respect to many of the photographs 
used. This resulted in a greater variance with regard to what 
constituted low priority information areas within each picture. 
Thus, although more signals were missed by the experimented, 
group in the middle period of the experiment because attention 
had lapsed, just as for the control group, these detection 
failures tended to be distributed over a somewhat greater number 
of pictures. However, although the pattern of signal detection 
performance over the duration of the task was the same for both 
the experimental and control groups, the detection performance . 
of the experimental group was always superior, even when
1
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processing of sensory information from the pattern. When 
maximum capacity is dedicated to processing of the sensory 
information from the pattern, the redundant, or low priority 
information areas are included, and any signals are more likely 
to be detected.
Note that the term "redundant information" in the present 
context is quite specifically related to the extent to which 
that portion of information is subjectively considered 
necessary to the correct identification of a particular 
expected overlearned pattern. The specific proportions of 
pattern information which are considered "redundant" with 
respect to this purpose may vary within subjects over different 
presentations of the same pattern, and between subjects in 
relation to the same patterns. The concept of * redundancy * 
as used in the present context is not necessarily linked 
directly and unambiguously to specific physical properties of 
a stimulus pattern (e,g. homogeneity); rather, it refers to 
the semantic characteristics of the various areas of information 
in the pattern. Thus, for example, a particular visual feature 
of some kind in a pattern may be ’redundant’ (i.e. of low 
priority in identifying that picture) to one subject who may 
not be interested in that specific feature of the pattern, 
but the same feature may not represent redundant information 
to another subject, whose interests in the same pattern may 
be quite different to those of the first subject.
The proceeding argument also explains why larger numbers 
of detection failures were associated with particular signals in
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attention had lapsed. This was because performance of the 
associated picture identification task caused a greater 
proportion of visual sensory information to be processed at 
each picture presentation.
The proceeding discussion and the experimental techniques 
developed in the present study suggest a method by which probe 
signals may be used, in situations where subjects are required 
to recognise overlearned complex visual patterns under conditions 
of partial attention, to define the low priority information 
areas of these patterns. Such a technique may well be useful 
in the research area of feature analysis.
(v) Evaluation of interview data.
When interviewed after the completion of the vigilance 
testing session, all subjects in the control group stated that 
they found the task monotonous, and that, as a result they found 
it difficult to sustain full and continuous concentration on the 
task. All reported that, as a result, for periods during the 
experiment they started 'thinking about other things'. This 
introspective information was extremely important as it showed 
that a fundamental aim of the experimental design strategy was 
achieved. (No control subjects expressed any desire to repeat 
their experience).
In contrast, subjects in the experimental group found the 
task somewhat more interesting, although, many reported that, 
at times they felt that they v/ere not concentrating .as much as 
they could have done. During these periods they, too, found 
themselves 'thinking about something else'.
The subjects in the experiment all performed extremely 
conscientiously, and were obviously well motivated to perform 
to the best of their abilities. Clear evidence of this is
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that the proportion of responses on which subjects changed their 
initial decision with regard to either signal detection and/or 
picture identification was negligible for all subjects in both 
groups.
(vi) Consideration of an alternative interpretation of 
the experiment.
Before concluding the report of this experiment, an 
alternative interpretation based on signal detection theory will 
be briefly considered. It was suggested earlier that the 
'visual signal-to-noise ratio' for the single picture situation 
of the control group would be greater than that for the experi­
mental group where a large number of pictures were used. In 
the case of the experimental group, the large number of photo­
graphs would have the effect of decreasing the visual signal to 
noise ratio. With the constant repeated exposure of the 
identical picture in the control group situation, and the 
associated gross overlearning of that picture, fine differences 
in the picture, and certainly differences as obvious as the 
presence of a signal, should therefore be more easily detected. 
On the basis of this analysis of the experiment, subjects in the 
control group should have performed better than, or at least as 
v/ell as, subjects in the experimental group. However, this was 
not the case.
(vii) A note on 'arousal'.
Despite a great deal of research effort, precise 
definition of the concept of arousal, and the nature of its 
role in relation to performance in vigilance task situations, 
remains undetermined, with much relevant research evidence in 
conflict over apparently fundamental issues. Broadbent (1971, 
p.45-51) discusses at length the history and present state of
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the arousal approach to vigilance, and concludes as follows;
"In summary of the arousal approach we must accept that some Îgeneral state of the man, raised by stimulation having nothing to j
■'.rdo with the task can affect efficiency ,•.. Low arousal certainly %Î■tCmeans poor performance, but high arousal does not necessarily |
mean either good or bad performance" (ibid., p.51)*
In the present context, it is considered that the concept 
of arousal is not sufficiently clear to facilitate its meaningful 
application to the experiment reported in this chapter. However, 
some comments on this point will be made.
It might be argued that the experimental group in the 
present study detected more signals because their level of 
arousal was generally greater than that of the subjects in the |
control group. However, in both groups subjects were making 
two responses every 6 seconds to events occurring on the 
television screen. No subject in either group failed to make s
the two required responses at any presentation. Thus, subjects ^
in both groups were maintaining the same level of ’arousing' 
activity throughout the experiment.
Even if we therefore assume that both groups were, in |
general, equally aroused, then the observed performance Jdifferences may be readily explained in terms of the different ]Iproportions of cognitive processing capacity dedicated to the i
task by subjects in the two groups. It is proposed that j
subjects in this, and many other vigilance experiments, failed !
to detect signals, not through any reduction in the level of j
arousal, whatever that may be, but because of an internalised J
redistribution of the relative proportions of their cognitive |
processing capacities dedicated to performance of the vigilance
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task and to the performance of internalised thinking. Thus, 
if we consider the problem in terms of a concept of 'cognitive 
arousal', a subject in a vigilance task who misses signals 
because his attention to the monotonous task lapses and he 
starts daydreaming, for example, is just as cognitively aroused 
as a subject who is dedicating all of his cognitive processing 
capacity to the performance of the vigilance task. Hov/ever, 
the second subject is likely to detect more signals than the 
first because a greater proportion of his available processing 
capacity is dedicated to the analysis of real visual sensory 
information referent to the vigilance task.
6.5 Conclusions
The experiment reported in this chapter was quite 
different in nature to those described in proceeding chapters 
of this thesis. However, once again, the fundamental concepts 
of the theoretical approach developed earlier were strongly 
supported by the empirical results obtained. The experiment 
was devised on the basis of the application of the present 
theory to a consideration of vigilance phenomena. Quite 
specific results were predicted by this theory, which were in 
contrast to the different predictions derived from some other, 
more traditional, theories associated v/ith vigilance. The 
results of the experiment were most parsimoniously interpreted 
in terms of the theoretical approach of the present thesis.
To the writer's knowledge, no previous experiment has 
considered the concept of vigilance in this particular way, nor 
has any previous experiment investigated sustained picture 
identification performance in a similar manner. In the present 
experiment a total of almost 25000 subjects’ decisions were 
analysed.
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New experimental techniques were devised which may well 
be relevant to the investigation of other areas (e.g. feature 
analysis). It is hoped that the difficult and time consuming 
technical problems associated with the new experimental 
procedures devised can be substantially reduced, and that 
various refinements of control can be incorporated into future 
experiments, such as the use of over 600 different pictures, 
rather than 75,to prevent recurrence of pictures throughout 
the experiment. Also, it would be useful to devise a relatively 
inexpensive practical way of continuously presenting pictures 
for up to 2 to 3 hours, rather than the 1 hour of the present 
study. The application of the theoretical concepts and 
empirical findings of this experiment to the cognitive processing 
problems of the human operator in complex man-machine systems 
will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter VII
7.1 This chapter discusses and describes the development of 
a computer simulation technique which incorporates fundamental 
concepts of the theoretical a,pproach of the thesis.
7.2 Prior to the description of these computer simulation 
procedures, it is necessary to specify the purpose of using such 
methods in the present context, and the validity of their 
application to actual experimental situations. Firstly, it 
should be made clear that the simulation to be described is not 
concerned with the controversial area of 'artificial intelligence' 
(e.g. Turing, 1950; Newell and Simon, 1972). The computer in 
the present case is not being utilised to find detailed algorithms 
for human behaviour in a particular situation. The intention was 
not to evolve a program of the sort which purports to 'think like 
a man'. The purpose of the simulation to be reported in this 
chapter was of a primarily descriptive and illustrative nature.
The aim was to apply qualitative theoretical concepts to a 
particular situation, and to determine what kind of performance 
might be achieved in this situation by a hypothetical system 
incorporating these basic concepts. The simulation model of 
behaviour was intentionally not of the over-ambitious and elaborate 
type criticised by Broadbent (1971), and its interpretation is not 
ambiguous.
Although intended to embody and illustrate quite general 
principles, the scope of the program was deliberately restricted 
to the broad problem of what sort of global performance a given 
system might achieve, rather than the specific problem of the 
detailed elaboration of the nature of the information processing
195
methods by means of which it achieves this performance. In 
computing terms, the simulation is concerned more with the 
concepts, or general principles, on the basis of which a program 
(or several programs) may be written, than with the details of 
the program itself. There are often considerable differences 
between a number of computer programs written to fulfil basically 
the same purpose.
If the resulting simulation program can readily be made 
to achieve performances closely analogous to those actually 
achieved by human subjects, without the excessive employment of 
arbitrary artifact, and if some degree of quantification is 
embodied in the program regarding a parameter which may not be 
directly observable in the real situation (e.g. 'per cent of total 
attention'), then there may be some justifiable basis for making 
general inferences with reference to the quantification of that 
parameter in the real subject. This is especially so if the 
fundamental basis of the simulation is purely theoretical and is 
not derived 'ad hoc', or 'post hoc', from the particular situation 
which it is intended to simulate.
7o3 It is intended that the simulation techniques developed 
and demonstrated in this chapter should be considered as a 
potentially useful aid to the understanding of the areas of 
behaviour with which the present theoretical and experimental 
research is concerned.
It is strongtly emphasised that the simulation technique 
to be described is intended only as a heuristic device which may 
provide a useful practical aid to the understanding and investi­
gation of human cognitive processing performance. The simulation 
program should be regarded as a research tool to be used by the 
investigator in conjunction v/ith both the theoretical concepts
I
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and the empirical data related to a particular experimental 
situation. The application of the computer technique, and the 
evaluation of its usefulness are to be guided by the experimenter, 
and the benefits obtained from the simulation model depend upon 
the manner of its application.
The simulation is not the sort of deterministic system |
into which the experimenter simply feeds all his data, with his 
responsibility for the outcome ceasing at this point, and then 
waits for the computer to provide all the answers. In the 
present system, the experimenter's responsibility is to apply 
conceptual input into the system, according to the particular 
theoretical analysis of the experimental situation. That is, 
to some extent, the experimenter can influence, or bias, various 
aspects of the program's performance. In doing so he must 
justify the basis upon which he chooses to set the program 
parameters, and he must also justify his interpretation of the 
results provided by the program.
For reasons which v/ill be made clear during this chapter, 
the. function of the simulation program is not to apply a standard 
form of arbitary mathematical analysis to a plot of the empirical 
data points (e.g. the method of least squares) to obtain a 
function which best fits the data. Several quite different sets -4
of data may give rise to exactly the same best-fitting mathematical 1
function (e.g. if the data sets differ in amount of variance).
Clearly, such methods are most useful in indicating overall trends 
in data patterns, but they cannot be used in the present kind of 
simulation, which has a qualitatively different conceptual basis, 
and a completely different purpose.
The simulation uses the computer to perform a sequence of 
operations, v/hich are considered to be analogous to those performed
— -=3
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by real subjects, in accordance with fundamental theoretical 
concepts incorporated in the computer program. The theory 
proposes an analytical description of what may be happening at 
the performance of each event in a given real task situation, 
and these concepts form the basis on which the program is written. 
Unlike the process of finding a function to fit the data, the 
simulation uses a quantifiable parameter to determine whether the 
program v/ill perform in such a way as to produce results, over a 
given series of trials, which closely approximate real human 
performance in similar situations in as many aspects as possible.
Human cognitive processing performance is characterised 
by considerable variance both within and between subjects, and 
any useful simulation model must simulate such individual 
differences. A model which simply simulates trends in a set of 
empirical data is inadequate; it must provide results which 
closely match, in all important respects, a set of real results 
obtained from samples of different subjects. The program to be 
described does not simply obtain, or derive, a static mathematical 
function, rather it is a dynamic system which carries out a 
particular task.
7.4 The discussion which follows is in terms of the various 
theoretical concepts developed and explained in detail in earlier 
chapters. '
The present simulation program incorporates several 
fundamental notions of the theory. Firstly the concept of a 
pattern as a quantity of information is used (p. 43). Because 
the computer employed was a digital computer, the concept of an 
effectively continuous quantity of information was achieved by 
considering a pattern as a single row array divided into 100 
small segments. By separately labelling each of these 100
1
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elements, different patterns were defined. Patterns sharing 
similar characteristics could be defined by incorporating these 
similar characteristics in two or more patterns in terms of the 
identical labelling of the appropriate segments in each pattern. |
The proportion of shared pattern characteristics (i.e. the degree 
of similarity between patterns) could be simply increased or 
decreased by varying the number of identically labelled segments 
common to the separate patterns.
Although the proportion of this pattern information 
processed by two subjects may be similar, individual differences 
in the selection of ’significant' pattern information are 
accounted for by allowing for considerable variance with respect 
to which particular segments in the array are processed. Also, 
the same subject may constantly process approximately the same y
proportion of pattern information on repeated exposures of the 
same pattern, but this proportion may well be referent to 
different sets of pattern segments on each different presentation 
of the pattern, (see p.47)
The amount of attention, or processing capacity, dedicated 
to the recognition of a pattern on any presentation may be defined 
in terms of the proportion of the total number of pattern elements 
which is processed on that presentation. Thus, under conditions 
in which only partial attention is dedicated to the processing of 
a pattern, this proportion is correspondingly smaller. In terms 
of the present theory, the size of this proportion may be 
dependent upon the degree of overlearning and the subjective 
probability of occurrence of an expected pattern. Clearly, 
where sizeable proportions of the total information content of a 
pattern are involved, in most cases the sets of elements forming 
these proportions will overlap.
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Using this definition of a pattern, or more precisely, 
of the information content of a pattern, it becomes possible to 
specify redundant, or low priority, information areas (p.187) as 
those areas comprised of segments of the array which are least 4
likely to be processed.
7,5 The above quite general theoretical notions were 
incorporated into a computer program which was concerned with 
the simulation of subjects' performances in the vigilance 
experiment reported in chapter VI.
The computer used for the simulation was a Nova 1220 
mini-computer system, with 16K memory, teletype, dual-cassettes 
and a high-speed paper-tape reader. Some detail limitations 
were imposed on the scope of the simulation program by the 16k 
memory capacity of the Nova system (e.g. the use of 100 element 
single-row arrays rather than 100 x 100 matrix arrays). How­
ever, any limitations of this nature did not qualitatively 
affect the theoretical concepts underlying the simulation.
These concepts were not tailored to fit the computer system used.
Consider the control group task situation in the 
vigilance experiment, À single complex pattern was repeatedly 
presented to the subject throughout the experiment. The subject 
was required to identify this pattern at each presentation. That 
is, he had to process at least the minimum proportion of the 
available visual sensory information referent to this expected 
pattern that was subjectively considered necessary to confirm its 
presence. On any presentation it was possible for a randomly 
occurring, infrequent signal to be contained somewhere in the 
picture. The subject was required to detect as many of these 
signals as possible. At each presentation he had to respond 
'yes' or 'no* to the presence of a signal, in addition to the
f . -a'.- : :
200
concurrent task of correctly identifying the picture.
According to the theory, signals which occurred in the 
picture v/ere likely to be missed when they v/ere not contained in 
the particular proportion of sensory information which was being 
processed at that time. Conversely, if a signal was contained 
in this proportion of sensory information, it v/ould be detected.
For the purposes of the simulation, a signal was associ­
ated v/ith a single element in the 100 segment array. The signal 
could be 'positioned' at any chosen element, and this position 
could be varied between signal occurrences.
7.6 In accordance with the foregoing principles, v/hat the 
simulation program did was to execute a prescribed number of 
presentations of the pattern, or 'trials'. The number of these 
trials was chosen 'a priori'. On some of these presentations 
a signal was contained within the array. The occurrence of the 
signals with respect to particular trials and positions within 
the array could be randomised automatically by the computer 
according to a prescribed total number of signals. Alternatively, 
the signals could be included on particular trials, and at 
specific positions within the array, which were selected before­
hand by the experimenter.
The proportion of the pattern information which was 
processed on any individual trial was a criterion value, 'k'.
(see p.48). 'k' consisted of a set of k elements of the 100
element array. It was not restricted to any particular area 
of the array. In this way, on successive trials, k could be 
the same, but the actual elements forming the numerically 
identical sets processed on each trial could be different, 
although where k was relatively large ( > 50) they would always 
overlap to some extent. In the simulation, for each trial the
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actual set of ‘k* adjacent elements was always chosen at random 
from the array, so that its specific position could never he 
precisely predicted from trial to trial, even where k was the 
same.
At this point, the concept of 'k', and the way in which 
it is to be used in forthcoming discussion should be clarified, 
k has been defined as a set of elements of the 100 element array, 
the numerical value of k being the actual number of elements 
forming k, k is considered as tne proportion of the pattern «f
information processed on any given trial. Clearly, then, because 
the actual numerical value of k may vary from trial to trial, 
when using the term »k' as a quantifiable parameter of attention 
in a general sense, for example, in relation to overall attention 
during a particular experiment, *k* refers to the total range of 
values within which k may vary randomly. Because of the variance 
of attention across time, no meaningful single value of k may be 
taken as representative of *k* for the whole experiment, unless, 
of course, k constantly varies within the same narrow range on 
every trial, in which case, an overall mean k value, together 
with the statement that attention did not lapse, could be used.
Thus, to summarise this point, a single value of k is meaningful 
for a particular trial, but over a series of trials, k must be 
regarded as typifying a particular range of numerical values 
within which the actual value of k varies randomly. (A general 
expression showing how k is determined by the computer on each 
trial is given later in the chapter).
In the program k could be selected as a fixed constant, 
or It could be allowed to vary randomly from trial to trial 
within a prescribed range of maximum and minimum values, k max 
and k min. Also, the value of k could be varied randomly in
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such a way that the average value of k gradually decreased over 
a large number of trials to simulate a lapse of attention over 
a given time period. Similarly, the average value of k could be 
made to increase to simulate an increase in attention. The 
range within which k was allowed to vary could be altered across 
trials (i.e. in order to simulate the situation where attention 
is generally less, but is more variable from trial to trial). 
Alternatively, attention could be allowed to lapse with a constant 
range of k across trials.
Clearly, then, if k is small, the probability of detecting 
a signal is less than when it is large. The diagram shown in 
Pig. 14 illustrates this point in the case of the present program. 
The argument here is conceptually identical to that illustrated 
earlier using Venn diagrams.
S S
A ---- 1.. "   '/ml...........   °-------- '/)'
A '----------- -.^.7-14^ A'------------ ®^-i=========d A '
^ 4
Pig. 14
In this figure AA^  is the 100 element single-row array 
representing the total information content of a pattern, and k 
is the criterion of attention described above. T^, Tg, T^ , T^  
represent four consecutive presentations of the same pattern,
AA^ . In each case, the numerical value of k is the same.
However, the figure illustrates the way in which the actual set 
of k elements processed may vary from presentation to presentation.
205 iS represents a signal positioned at one element in the pattern ÂA . 
The diagram shows how S will be detected on trials T. and T.y, but1 Vnot on trials T^ and T^# Because the position of k is randon0.y 
chosen, it cannot be predicted with any certainty on which specific 
trials the signal will be detected. Similarly if the numerical 
value of k is allowed to vary randomly within a wide range, it 
cannot be predicted on which trials a signal will be detected. It 
should be noted at this point that, for the purposes of the program 
k consists of a set of adjacent elements. There is no theoretical 
reason why k, which is conceptualised purely as a proportion of 
information, could not be composed of a given number of non- 
ad jacent elements of the array.
In accordance with the concepts of the present theory, the 
greater the proportion of total processing capacity dedicated to 
the processing of real visual sensory information relevant to a 
particular pattern, the greater is the proportion of the total 
possible information content of the pattern that is processed - 
i.e. the greater will be the value of k. Thus, the value of k
at any instant refers to the percentage of the total information
from a given pattern which is being processed - i.e. the amount 
of total processing capacity (or amount of attention) which is 
dedicated to the processing of visual information from that 
pattern, (see also p.227).
In the present program no position of k could be selected such 
that it would fall outside either end of the array. Consequently, 
because of the nature of the randomising process, signals close to
either end of the 100 element array were somewhat less likely to be
detected. Thus, these end areas of the array could be usefully 
conceptualised as low-priority information areas (p.187) within 
the array. Detection of signals associated with elements in these 
areas was especially unlikely when 'k* was small - i.e. when 
attention had substantially lapsed. Note that these signals were 
no less ’discriminable* than identical signals associated with 
other parts of the array, but because of their location within 
these low priority information areas, they were likely to be 
detected less often.
A complete copy of the simulation program written in Extended 
BASIC is included in Appendix V. Using this program, any number 
of simulated experiments could be run, and the effects of altering 
the attention parameter k and the positions
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of signals could be investigated. By this means, the 
quantitative values and ranges of these parameters which most 
closely approximated the performance of the real subjects in 
the vigilance experiment could be obtained.
Thus, the range of k values which most closely simulated 
the empirical performance data obtained with real subjects could 
be determined by a method of successive approximations. On this 
point, it is important to emphasise that the performance data 
produced by the computer program had to simulate subjects* 
performances in relation to:- 1) the mean number of signal 
detection failures for the group; 2) the individual differences
in signal detection performance between subjects in the group; 
and, 3) the overall pattern of detection failures across trials.
To simulate correctly only one of these factors (e.g. mean signal 
detection performance), is inadequate.
The initial starting values of the ranges of k which 
were used in the method of successive approximations were chosen 
on the basis of a consideration of the theoretical conceptualisation 
of.the global experimental task situation, together with the 
empirical results actually obtained in the real vigilance 
experiment. Initial choice of the k values was not arbitrary.
If the theoretical basis and evaluation of the empirical data 
were soundly based, then, provided the qualitative concepts of 
the simulation program were also sound, the number of successive 
approximations necessary to produce results closely similar to 
the real ones obtained should be minimised. If, in fact, this 
number were excessive, it would indicate fundamental problems in 
either the computer program or the theoretical analysis. (In 
the present case this actually h-appened during development of 
the program, when repeated running of the simulation at
-<l
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unexpectedly low ranges of k produced the correct overall mean 
numbers of signal detection failures, and the correct variance, 
but not the correct distribution of misses if attention were 
lapsing. Further, the program was failing to detect signals 
in the low priority area at one end of the array, and detecting 
all signals in the corresponding area at the other end of the
array. This finding led to the discovery by the programmer of
several undetected errors in the program.)
The basis upon which the initial ranges of k were chosen
will be outlined in the description of the simulation.
7.7 Computer simulation of the vigilance experiment.
(i) Apparatus.
The apparatus used in the simulation experiments was the 
Nova computer system, in conjunction with the simulation program 
described earlier.
(ii) Subjects
For each experiment, the program parameters of the 
simulation were re-cycled 10 times to simulate 10 different 
subjects. Because of the degree of randomness written into the 
program, the chances of two subject performances being identical 
in all respects were low% This facility provided for individual 
differences between subjects with respect to processing strategies 
and selection of 'significant* pattern information, while 
simulating overall performances of the sample according to the 
same fundamental set of general theoretical concepts,
(iii) Procedure
For all the simulated experiments, signals were programmed 
to occur at selected positions within the array on 43 particular 
trials. The figure of 43 was chosen to match the number of 
signals used in the real vigilance experiment. There were 309 
trials, or pattern présentations, in each run.
J 
, ■
Trial
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TABLE XX 
numbers and signal positions
.gnal No. Trial No. Position
1 4 562 12 653 28 474 30 385 44 436 52 617 62 548 65 469 70 5410 73 4711 79 8112 89 4413 95 4214 106 5715 112 4916 117 5317 118 4618 134 8419 138 1920 144 4321 152 6122 156 3923 164 2924 169 4125 187 6026 195 18
27 207 3228 219 3829 224 5030 230 5731 236 4232 253 2133 257 4634 267 4035 270 6836 274 4937 276 5138 278 8039 284 2640 291 2841 295 9042 299 4743 309 53
Table XX shows the trial numbers on which signals occurred, 
together with the actual positions of the signals within these 
arrays, the elements of the array being numbered 1 to 100» A 
number of the signal positions were selected so as to be considerably
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distant from the mid point of the array to simulate the 
occurrence of signals in low priority information areas. The 
relative distribution of the 43 trials on which signals occurred 
across the 309 trials was the same as for the 43 trials con­
taining signals in the control group of the real experiment.
The actual number of 618 trials used in the real experiment 
could not be used, in the simulation as this exceeded the 16K 
memory capacity of the Nova system.'
An important factor involved in the formulation of the 
present concept of a 'pattern* was that of individual differences 
in relation to what aspects, or features, of a pattern were 
subjectively considered ’significant'. If every subject 
processed all the information in the patterns, defined in the 
program as 100 element arrays, then, clearly, there would be no 
provision for individual differences under conditions of 
maximum attention. Further, if we assume that a subject is 
processing all the information in the pattern, then, by 
definition, he will always detect a signal, no matter where it 
is situated in the pattern. Consequently, to determine the■ 
degree of flexibility in terms of individual differences to be 
allowed for in the simulation using the signals in table XX, 
the program was first set to run, with the range of k being kept 
constant across the experiment (i.e. no attention lapse), k was 
set at a maximum of 100 (i.e. in which case all the pattern 
information would be processed), and allowed to vary randomly 
through a 10 element range, i.e. so that the minimum k value was 
90. This range was to provide for some variance in attention 
from trial to trial. By repeatedly running the program, the 
maximum value of k was lowered by 5 segments at a time, keeping 
the range of random variance of k constant, until signals were
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just beginning to be missed. It was found that, when the range
of k was 100 - 90, no signals were missed. When the range was
95 - 85, no signals were missed, but when the range was 85 - 75,
single signals were occasionally missed by several of the 10
subjects over tv/o 'runs' at this k range. A mean of 4 signals
per run were missed over the two runs, no single subject missing*more than one signal. When k was lowered to the range 80 - 70, 
a mean of 12 signals were missed over two executions of the 
program.
On this basis, to enable the simulation to have some 
flexibility with regard to the selection of the position of k 
within the array, and thus simulate individual differences at 
maximum attention, and to include some redundancy in the 
perception of the pattern array, an upper limit of 85 was 
allocated to k for both experimental and control groups. In 
general terms, this meant that 85% of the total information 
content of the pattern needed to be processed for consistently 
accurate pattern recognition performance.
Also incorporated in the simulations for both 
experimental and control groups, was a general attention lapse 
towards the middle of the experiment, with an increase back to 
maximum attention towards the end of the experiment. This was 
done because results of the real experiment indicated a similar 
general lapse of attention over all subjects during the hour- 
long experiment, for both experimental and control groups. 
Reference to Fig, 13 shows that although the amount of lapse was 
less for the experimental group, its pattern was the same as for 
the controls.
For the simulated subjects, attention was made to lapse 
across trials in a non-linear manner, according to a square law.
.-V -nv. ,-■■■ -L.; L. •
-Tl
209
Attention v/as made to lapse in a non-linear manner, because 
existing evidence regarding the effects on attention, or 
capacity, of monotonous or boring tasks suggests that such 
effects are not linear with time, performance often tending to 
'fall off' exponentially (Welford, 1968). If such an assumption 
were unfounded, this should become apparent from an analysis of 
the distribution of signal detection results of the simulation 
compared to the real experiment.
Prior to any simulation run in which attention lapsed, 
the minimum value of the upper limit of k was selected (k max 
(min)), together v/ith the maximum, value of the lower limit of 
k (k min (max)). During the simulation, at each pattern 
presentation, the program first calculated the numerical value 
of the lapsed upper and lower limits of k according to the 
square law, and then randomly selected a value of k within these 
limits. This value of k v/as used for that trial. In this way, 
if the range of values through which k was allowed to vary was 
large, the random selection of the k value at each trial meant 
that there was not necessarily a constant sequential decrement, 
or increment, in the k value from trial to trial, but that the 
general trend of k was determined by whether attention was 
lapsing or increasing.
The diagram shown in Fig. 15 illustrates this notion, 
and shows diagrammatically the parameters which determined the 
range and distribution of k.
To outline the process in detail, for each separate 
trial, the value of k was determined by the computer in the 
following way:-
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Let I ss the actual trial number ( = from 1 to 309 in the
present experiment)
R « the total number of trials ( =& 309 in the present
experiment)
A constant V was chosen such that the values of V range 
from 1 0 1 ‘ as I ranges from 0 --**• N. That is, at the
mid point of the experiment, trial no. V has the value 0. 
Now, V ® j so that when:- I » 0, V = 1
I * N, V ;= 1
V is used to determine the overall non-linear variation 
of k across the experiment.
Referring to Pig. 15, a value, K8, is calculated such
that
K8 - K max (min) + V (K max - K max (min))
This gives the maximum value of k for trial I, being based on 
the maximum values of k selected. A value, K2, is calculated 
such that
K2 » K min 4- V (K min (max) - K min)
This gives the minimum value of k for trial I, being based on 
the minimum values of k selected.
Finally, a value of k to be used for trial I is selected 
randomly from within the range of maximum and minimum values of 
k determined for that trial, so that the computer equation, 
written in BASIC is
K = Int (0,25 + K2 + RND * (K8 - K2)).
The above is the procedure by means of which the value 
of k is determined anew on every trial. The derivation of k 
is independent for each trial, and is not contingent upon the 
specific value of k in previous trials. The general trend of
2 1 1
attention lapse, within the overall ranges chosen at the ' \
beginning of the run is determined by V, which is a function of 
the actual trial number,
For each trial, once the value of k has been calculated, 
it is then randomly allocated to a position in the 100-element 
array. If a signal is contained in that portion, it will be 
detected. Note that, even when k is relatively small, because 
of the random allocation of the position of k, it cannot be 
precisely predicted whether or not a signal will be detected on 
the trial if it is contained in the array. This means that, 
as in the real experiment, some signals can be detected even 
when attention has lapsed to its minimum.
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To summarise, referring to Pig. 15, at trial I, the 
program first calculates Kg and K2, and then randomly selects 
a value of k within this range. This k value is then used for 
trial I. The numerical values of k always fall within the 
shaded area on the diagram. For the simulation represented by
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Pig, 15, attention lapses (i.e. tends to become less) during 
the middle period of the simulated experiment.
For each 'subject*, the program printed out the follow^ 
ing information:-
1) Number of signals presented;
2) Number of signals detected;
3) Number of trials;
4) Number of correct trials;
5) The numbers of the incorrect trials,
5) showed the actual trials on which signals were not detected. 
The program always recognised the overlearned patterns correctly 
(as did the real subjects), and therefore the trials which were 
'wrong* represented only signal detection failures, and not 
recognition errors. Fig. l6 is an example of an actual print­
out for one simulated subject,
NO. OF SIGNALS PRESENTED= 43,
NO, OF SIGNALS DETECTED 37 
NO, OF TOTALS = 3C9
NO. OF CORRECT TRIALS= 353 
TRIAL NO'S '■■RONG ARE 
133 , 152 , 164 > 195 , 253 , 257 ,
A) Control group.
By the method of successive approximation outlined 
earlier, using the upper limit of k as 85, for the reasons 
explained, performance of the control group was simulated. 
Because the real control group situation involved only a single 
pattern, compared to the large number of patterns of the 
experimental group, the allowed variance of k at conditions of
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maximum attention was 7 elements (slightly less than the 10 used
in the determination of the overall k max of 85 for both groups).
Because all the control subjects always responded
correctly at every presentation of the single picture during the
experiment, attention to the task obviously never lapsed
completely* Subjects were processing at least a sufficient
proportion of the pattern information to carry out this task.
However, the results showed that the extent of the attention
lapse was clearly quite considerable, and all control subjects
stated that during the experiment they had started to think
about other things. On consideration of these factors it was
1 1decided to simulate an allowed lapse to a range of to ^ total 
attention in the middle of the experiment.
The range of attention variance was chosen to become 
greater towards the middle of the experiment, because analysis 
of the real empirical results had shown that although a greater 
number of misses were associated with this period, many signals 
were still detected during this period, thus indicating greater 
variance of attention.
These initial assumptions appeared to be well founded, 
and the control group subjects* performances were accurately 
simulated in all respects after only 6 runs, which included 
checks of k ranges slightly above and below those finally 
achieved. The following illustrates the optimal ranges of k
determined;-
Using the trial numbers and signal positions shown in
Table XZ, the ranges of k were set as follows (see Pig, 15):-
k max = 85 * note: examples of
k min 36 results using different
k max (min) = 5 0  k ranges are given
k min (max) = 78 later.
1
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That is, over the 309 trials the attention parameter v/as 
maximised at 85 at the start and finish of the experiment, with 
the minimum value of k at these points being 78 (a range of 7 
elements). At the mid-point of the experiment, the maximum 
value of the attention parameter k was 50, and the minimum 36, %
(a range of 14 elements). This meant that when attention had 
lapsed to its greatest extent, its variance was somewhat greater 
than when full attention was being dedicated to the processing of 
the pattern information. The experiment was run twice to 
simulate results for two 10 subject control groups using these i
parameters.
B) Experimental group.
In the case of the experimental group, the results ;
shov/ed clearly that attention had lapsed to a lesser extent 
than the control group. As noted earlier, the maximum k for 
both groups can be regarded as the same, as when subjects are 
'fresh* the maximum amount of attention dedicated to the task 
should be the same for both groups. However, because of the 
very large number of pictures, with their associated varying 
degrees of subjective interest, and resultant individual 
differences in information processing strategies, the range of 
k for the beginning and end of the experimental group was made 
greater than the controls (20 vs 7).
The simulated results for the control group provided a 
range of k which produced a sample performance closely similar 
to the real controls, and on this basis, the lapsed values 
k for the experimental group were chosen to be greater than for 
the controls. It v/as considered that the large number of 
pictures were unlikely to be accurately discriminated, as they 
consistently were by all subjects, if less than half processing
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capacity were devoted to the task. Similarly, because of the 
constantly high amount of attention required to perform the 
picture identification task accurately, the allowable range of 
k v/as kept the same throughout the experiment. ( = 20),
Once again, a small number of successive approximations 
( 5s 3) resulted in accurate simulation of the real experimental 
group results, indicating that the assumptions described above 
were sound.
The following shows the optimal ranges of k determined 
for the experimental group.
Using the same trial numbers and signal positions as 
for the control group (see Table XX), the values of k for the 
experimental group were set as follows (see Fig. 15):-
k max sa 85 note: examples of results
k min = 55 using different k ranges
k max (min) »» 75 are given later,
k min (max) = 65
Thus, for the experimental group, the maximum amount of 
information being processed from the pattern at each present­
ation towards the start and finish of the experiment v/as of 
the same order as for the simulated control group. Also, 
attention lapsed in the same qualitative manner as for the 
control group. Hov/ever, the extent of this attention lapse 
was less for the experimental group subjects than for the 
control group subjects. By definition, according to the 
concepts of the present theory, in order to consistently achieve 
correct performance on the multi-pattern identification task, 
subjects must process a greater amount of real sensory 
information from the pattern at each presentation. (i,e, k had 
to be greater). The results of the real experiment showed that
    ..
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all subjects did this accurately. Consequently, the amount by 
which k was allowed to lapse in the simulation of the experimental 
group was selected to be less than that for the control group. 
However, the range of k was kept slightly greater in the 
experimental group to simulate variance caused by the large 
number of patterns employed for that group. The simulated 
experiment was run twice to obtain results for two separate 
10-subject experimental groups,
7.8 Results and discussion.
(i) Signal detection performance
The computer took approximately 20 minutes of real time 
for each 10-subject simulation.
A) Control group
The optimised signal detection performance results 
obtained for two simulated control groups, together with the 
equivalent results for the real subjects are shown in Table ZXI, 
The optimised simulation results for both control groups 
(I and II) were extremely similar to the results obtained by 
the real subjects. Note that the randomness allowed for in 
the simulation program successfully provided for considerable 
individual differences between the performances of the simulated 
subjects.
The mean results for both control groups were not 
significantly different (t « 1,58; 18 d.f), and, most
importantly, the results of neither control group were signifi­
cantly different from those of the real control subjects.
(I; t = 0,74; 18 d.f; II: t = 0.56; 18 d.f). The results
of further repeated simulations using the same parameters do 
not deviate significantly from the examples shown.
—
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TABLE XXI
I II Real Experiment
Subject 
, No,
Total no. 
of signals 
missed.
Subject
No.
Total no, 
of signals 
missed.
Subject
No,
Total no. 
of signals 
missed.
1 7 1 6 1 11
2 6 2 5 2 7
3 7 3 7 3 10
4 8 4 7 4 7
5 10 5 8 5 5
6 7 6 3 6 7
7 8 7 8 7 9
8 9 8 9 8 4
9 8 9 7 9 6
10 11 10 9 - 10 10
Mean/SD 8,1/1.44 Mean/SD 6.9/1,75 Mean/SD 7.6/2.2
B) Expérimental group
The optimised signal detection performance obtained for 
two simulated experimental groups, together with the equivalent 
results of the real experimental subjects are shown in Table XXII.
For this group also, the optimised simulation results 
were extremely similar to the results obtained by the real 
subjects. The mean results of the two experimental groups were 
not significantly different from each other, and neither were 
significantly different from the results of the real subjects,
(I; t « 0.68, 18 d.f; II: t = 0,11, 18 d.f.)
As in the case of the control group, the pattern of 
results of the simulated subjects was virtually identical to 
that of the real subjects. Repeated simulations using the same
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TABLE XXII 
Simulated signal detection performance - 
experimental group 
I II Real subjects
SubjectNo. Total no. of signals missed.
SubjectNOo Total no. of signals missed.
SubjectNo. Total no. of signals missed.
1 3 1 2 1 2
2 3 2 2 2 ■ 1
3 5 3 4 3 2
4 3 4 5 4 3
5 4 5 3 5 5
6 1 6 2 6 7
7 2 7 1 7 3
8 6 8 2 8 2
9 4 9 5 ' 9 0
10 6 10 6 10 6
Mean/SD 3.7/1.55 Mean/SD 3.2/1.6 Mean/SD 3.1/2.11
k parameters do not yield results significantly different from 
the two examples shown.
The difference between the mean signal detection perform­
ances of the optimised simulated experimental and control groups 
was significant at the 0.002 level, just as in the case of the 
real experiment. (I; t = 6.22; 18 d.f; II: t = 4.66; 18 d.f).
Note that the only difference between the simulations 
for the experimental and control groups v/as the degree to which 
attention lapsed during the experiment; it started and finished 
at the same maximum level for subjects in both groups. Note 
that the manner in which the upper value of k was determined for
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both groups shows that when there is no attention lapse with  |
this maximum k, very few signals are missed. The important 
point here is that no signals are missed in either the real or 
the simulated experiments because of any problem of task 
difficulty. Detection of all signals is well within the 
capabilities of all subjects. Signal detection failures are i
entirely a function of attention lapse, i.e. a reduction in the 
amount of processing capacity dedicated to the analysis of real 
sensory information.
(ii) Analysis of patterns of detection failures for 
optimised simulation.
Each signal and the total number of misses made on that 
signal by all the simulated subjects in control group I is shown 
in Pig. 17* Note that, in a manner similar to the real 
experiment, 19 signals of the 43 presented accounted for all 
the misses in the control group (vs 17 in the real experiment). 
Equivalent results for the simulated experimental group I are 
graphed in Pig, 18. In the case of the simulated experimental 
group, 12 signals accounted for all the detection failures made 
by the group. (vs 19 in the real experiment). Reference to 
table XX shows that the signals missed most tended to be 
positioned toward the low priority information areas in the 
array, i.e. nearer to either end of the 100 element array.
Thus, in all essential respects, the overall performance 
of subjects in the optimised simulated experiments was very 
closely similar to that of the real subjects. The only 
important difference between the simulated and real situations 
was that the computer program made no provision for the 
simulation of false alarms. The reason for this omission was 
the limitation of the memory capacity of the Nova computer.
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However, the future provision of false alarms into an extended 
simulation program does not present special problems of 
programming.
The nature of the real false alarm data was discussed in 
Chapter VI (p.174). For the experimental group, the false 
alarm rate was very low, being only 1 in every 257 events.
These false alarms were generally distributed randomly across 
the period of the experiment, or they occurred at the very 
beginning of the experiment, when the subject may not have been 
entirely certain of the nature of the signal. This result may 
be simulated by associating the very low probability of a false 
alarm with the trial number, and biasing it to be greater 
towards the beginning of the experiment, using a randomising 
process to insert false alarms on occasional trials throughout 
the remainder of the experiment, For the experimental group, 
analysis of the false alarm data showed that, in many instances, 
false alarms were associated with repeated presentations of the 
same pictures. This type of artifactual result can be simulated 
by having a generally high, but randomised, probability associated 
with a false alarm on the repeated presentations of the same 
pattern. Had 624 different pictures been able to be used in 
the real experiment, the artificially high false alarm rates 
achieved by the three particular subjects would have been 
eliminated. If such an experiment can be carried out, it will 
provide a more meaningful basis on which to simulate false 
alarms.
(iii) Comparison tables showing examples of simulation 
results using values other than the optimal ■ 
values.
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TABLE XXIII
A) Simulated control groups
Range of k Signaldetectionfailures
K max K min K max(min) K min(max) Mean S.D.
1 100 51 65 93 1.6 1.11
2 90 41 55 83 5.2 1.4
3 85 36 50 78 6.9 1.75
4 85 45 50 78 5.1 1.44
5 85 36  ^ 50 65 9.2 3.06
6 80 31 45 73 9.3 1,67
Key: 1 : Values of k uniformly increased by 15 above optimal.
2 ; Values of k uniformly increased by 5 above optimal.
3 : * optimal values of k.
4 : Values of k allowing less attention lapse thanoptimal.
5 : Showing results for a control group with the samerange of k variance at start and finish of experiment as for optimal experimental group,
6 : Values of k uniformly decreased by 5 below optimal.
These tables show that substantial differences in 
performance of the simulated subjects result from small variations 
in k (e.j. 5 elements). These results also indicate the soundness 
of the assumptions upon which the initial ranges of k were 
chosen. For example, the variance of k at the start and finish 
of the experiment was made smaller for the control group than 
for the experimental group, because of the use of only a single 
picture in the control group task, compared with 75 pictures for 
the experimental group. If, for a simulation run, the starting
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TABLE XXIV
B) Simulated experimental groups
Range of k Signâtdetectionfailures
K max K min K max(min) K rain(max) Mean So Do
1 100 70 90 80 1 .0 0.89
2 90 60 80 70 1 .5 0,92
3 85 55 75 65 • 3 .2 1 .6
4 85 55 75 78 2.1 1 .04
5 80 50 70 60 3 .9 0 .9
Notes; 1 : Values of k uniformly increased by 15 above optimal,
2 ; Values of k uniformly increased by 5 aboveoptimal,
3 : Optimal values of k,
4 : Showing results for an experimental group withthe same degree of k variance at start and finish of the experiment as for optimal control group,
5- : Values of k uniformly decreased by 5 below optimal.
and finishing range of variation of k for the optimal control 
group is made the same as for the optimal experimental group, 
with no other factors changed, then the resultant signal 
detection performance by the simulated group is too poor in 
comparison to the real control group subjects. Conversely, if 
the starting and finishing range of variation of k for the 
optimal experimental group is made the same as the optimal 
control group, with no other factors being changed, then the 
resultant signal detection performance by the simulated 
experimental group is too good in comparison to the real
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experimental group.
These simulation results appear to justify the assumptions 
upon which the range within which k was allowed to vary in 
relation to the same maximum value at the start and finish of 
the experiment was chosen to be different for the control and 
experimental groups. (p.212).
If it is accepted that the experiments described in this 
chapter demonstrate that a simulation program based directly on 
the present theoretical concepts is able to produce results which 
do not differ significantly in any way from those of real subjects, 
then what can be usefully said about the possible benefits of 
such a program? It has been shown that a system operating 
according to fundamental concepts of the present theory can be 
readily made to achieve performances statistically indistinguish­
able from those of a sample of real subjects. There is, there­
fore, some strong justification, in addition to that provided by 
the empirical data obtained using real subjects, for regarding 
the theory as useful in the understanding of human cognitive 
processing performance in these complex situations. Secondly, 
the values of the k parameters of attention used in the 
simulation may provide a useful guide to the estimation of this &
general parameter in human subjects. These values cannot be 
measured directly in the case of real subjects; however, the 
simulation program may enable them to be reliably inferred.
That is, a meaningful quantitative index of the proportion of 
total cognitive capacity dedicated to the processing of sensory 
pattern information may be obtained by determining which values 
of k produce simulated performances similar to real performances 
in various situations. For example, if a separate second task 
of any kind were performed simultaneously with a vigilance task,
•' .Hi.
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the resultant increment or decrement in signal detection 
performance could be used in conjunction with the simulation 
program to ascertain the values of k appropriate to the single 
and dual-task situations. The difference between these values 
then provides an index of the proportion of processing capacity- 
utilised in performance of the additional task.
In the case of the present experiment, a quantitative 
index is provided with respect to the degree to which attention 
lapses during the monotonous single pattern vigilance task 
performed by the control group, in comparison to the task 
performed by the experimental group.
Fig. 19 illustrates the ranges of the attention parameter 
k for both simulated experimental and control groups.
3g
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By inference, it may be useful to assume that this is 
also the case for the real experimental and control subjects.
An important advantage of this procedure is that the concepts 
are quite general and are not linked to any specific physical 
details of patterns. Nor are they linked to specific measures 
of the absolute information content of different patterns, as 
k is always a proportion of the total information content of a 
pattern. Similar k’s for different subjects may well be 
referent to different physical aspects of the total pattern 
information content, but this does not affect the model, which 
is concerned only with proportions of total cognitive processing 
capacity. Prom these values of k determined by means of the 
simulation program, it becomes possible to make predictions with 
regard to the probability of a subject detecting alterations in 
overlearned visual patterns in situations where the proportion 
of real sensory pattern information being processed from the 
display is knovm. In other words, k may be useful in quantifying 
a human operator’s reserve, or ’spare’, processing capacity which 
he could employ to cope with increases in the cognitive load 
connected with the situation.
It is considered that the principles of the simulation 
procedures described in this chapter may well be extremely 
useful in the applied situations under consideration (p.7 ), 
and it is intended to further investigate this aspect in real 
complex man-machine environments.
Finally, it should be noted that because of the way in 
which ’k’ is defined, and the way in which a ’pattern* is 
defined in the present simulation, the values of k referent to 
the proportion of the total information content of a pattern, 
and the proportion of total capacity dedicated to the processing
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of pattern information, are interchangeable. That is, if all 
capacity is dedicated to the processing of a given pattern, then 
all the subjectively relevant information from that pattern is 
being processed by the perceiver, i.e. k ~ 100. Similarly, 
if only half total capacity is dedicated to the processing of a 
pattern, then, by definition, in this case, k = 50.
7.9 Conclusions.
It is concluded that the simulation technique described 
in this chapter provides further empirical support for the 
theoretical approach of the thesis from another different stand­
point. Further, the accuracy with which the.patterns of real 
subject performances were simulated suggests that the simulation 
principles may facilitate the determination of a meaningful 
quantitative index of the proportion of cognitive processing 
capacity dedicated to a particular task. On this basis, 
reliable predictions may be made with regard to the limits of 
cognitive processing performance in that situation. In addition 
to providing support for the present theory, the simulation 
principles developed may be evolved into a useful tool for 
applied research.
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Chapter VIII
8.1 This final chapter first sets out some general con­
clusions drawn on the basis of the research reported in the 
preceeding chapters, and then outlines the proposed future stages 
in the research program, which will be directly concerned with 
the application of the theoretical concepts and empirical results 
of the thesis to the investigation of human operator performance 
in real complex man-machine systems.
8.2 The most important conclusions relating to the outcomes 
of the particular individual experiments have been given in 
detail at the end of each relevant chapter. However, a number 
of broader concluding statements regarding the overall research 
program are put forward:-
It is concluded that the theoretical approach outlined 
and developed in Chapters I and II has been firmly supported by 
the empirical results of the experiments. A most important
aspect of this support was that it came from a range of several 
independent and qualitatively different kinds of experiment, and 
from different types of analyses of the empirical data within 
each of these experiments. Thus, the empirical support for the 
central concepts of the theory is v/ide-based, and is not linked 
to a particular kind of experiment or method of data analysis. 
Given the intended scope of the theory, it is considered that 
such independent wide-based support is. an essential adjunct to 
the validity of its fundamental ideas. The empirical evidence 
obtained in support of the theory indicates that its basic 
principles may be usefully applied with some degree of generality. 
Consideration of possible alternative theoretical explanations
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showed that the resultant predictions were in some respects 
contrary to the results observed.
A very important conclusion to be drawn from the thesis 
is that the new experimental paradigms and techniques which were 
developed as part of the research program are potentially useful 
in a number of existing areas of research, in addition to their 
primary purpose in relation to the investigation of the present 
theory. These methods were finally evolved only after extended 
periods of pilot experimentation with different apparatus con- 
figurations and stimulus materials. For example, as stated 
earlier, the solution of the various technical and methodological 
problems posed by the vigilance experiment were particularly 
difficult. However, these problems were finally effectively 
overcome to enable the setting up of the experiment as envisaged.
In future experiments, it is planned to at least partially automate 
the time-consuming processes of recording the experimental video­
tapes and of the accurate analysis and cross-checking of individual 
subject records.
8.3 The fundamental concepts of internal-external inter-task 
interference has demonstrated the potential value of investigating 
the nature of human pattern-recognition using partial attention 
techniques in conjunction with overlearned patterns. If the low- 
priority, or redundant, information areas of overlearned patterns 
are those which tend not to be processed under conditions of 
partial attention, then these lov/ priority areas may also 
represent the less subjectively ’significant* features of the 
array. During performance of divided-attention recognition tasks, 
probe signals or alterations embedded in these overlearned patterns 
should be less likely to be detected when they are located in 
redundant information areas of the pattern. By repeated testing
-
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using this procedure, it should be possible to map the 
’insignificant» or low priority areas for a particular complex 
pattern. The remaining areas will consist of the subjectively 
’significant* features of that pattern. Note that this procedure
does not involve any arbitrarily chosen form of visual decay or■r
fragmentation of the pattern. The definition of a pattern as 
a quantity of information, explained in detail on p . 43, enabled 
problems of feature analysis and individual.differences to be 
bypassed. Hov/ever, in achieving this purpose, the work has 
provided potentially useful new techniques which may assist in 
resolving these complex problems.
8.4 The results of the work suggest that the possible role of 
imagery in all aspects of human perceptual performance is worthy 
of further consideration and investigation. The experiments 
reported in chapters IV and V, together with the results of 
Marks (1973), indicate that the W I Q  may be a most useful research 
tool for this purpose. It is suggested that in future experi­
mental contexts where, in terms of the present theory, the imagery 
system might conceivably fulfil an important role in the conscious 
perceptual experience of the subject, the WIQ could be 
administered beforehand and the resultant imagery ratings be 
analysed in relation to individual task performance for each 
subject.
8.5 Partial attention situations are common in the normal 
human environment. The research work of the thesis illustrates 
the importance of using such techniques in the laboratory. 
Empirical results which might be somewhat less artifactual, and 
thus more applicable to human performance in real situations, may 
be obtained in this manner. Y/elford stated in 1968 that the
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dual, or multiple task technique was "as yet still in its 
infancy" (p.134). It is hoped that the concepts of this thesis, 
and in particular the types of ’internalised’ and ’externalised’ 
task interference predicted and subsequently observed have added 
a new dimension to the potential benefits of this kind of research.
For example, the following speculative suggestion is 
proposed:- If it is the case that, under conditions of partial 
attention, only non-redundant visual sensory information referent 
to an overlearned pattern tends to be processed,. then this 
selective factor indicates that, in certain situations, partial 
attention to a signal detection, or watchkeeping, task by a 
human operator may be of more benefit than full attention, 
provided that awareness of alterations to only the significant 
information areas of the display is all that is required of the 
operator. That is, it may well be that improved performance on 
particular types of task may result from only partial attention 
being dedicated to the performance of such tasks. The simul­
taneous performance of a secondary task may not be ’arousing’ in 
the usual sense, but the increase in performance on the primary 
task could be due to the fact that, although less processing 
capacity is being dedicated to the primary task, it is more 
selective. Clearly, in such a situation, performance related 
to the detection of changes in the redundant areas of the visual 
display will be worsened by the concurrent performance of the 
secondary task.
These concepts provide an alternative to the arousal 
explanation of the results obtained by McGrath (1965), who 
observed an improvement in signal detection performance on an 
auditory vigilance task when it was paired with perception of 
interesting visual material irrelevant to the signal detection
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task. If the effect of the interesting visual material v/as to 
cause only partial attention to be dedicated to performance of 
the auditory vigilance•task, provided that the subjects were 
aware in advance of the acoustic nature of the signal, then their 
attention to the auditory task could have been selective to only 
the non redundant areas of the sound spectrum, i.e. that of the 
sound of the signal. An obvious test of such an hypothesis 
would be to replicate McGrath’s experiment using as signals a 
set of individually different sounds of the same intensity and 
duration as the expected auditory signals. The prediction from 
the proceeding analysis would be that sounds acoustically similar 
to those expected would be more likely to be detected than 
dissimilar auditory signals of the same intensity and duration.
8.6 A primary motivation of the research of the thesis was
the investigation of the cognitive load problems associated with 
errors made by human operators in complex man-machine situations 
(p. 7 ) - in particular aircrew in advanced jet aircraft.
Despite much research, from the state of the existing literature 
it was clear that there remains a critical lack of knowledge 
regarding the fundamental nature of human information processing 
in such situations. It was considered that in order to study 
meaningfully the relevant aspects of the applied situation, 
further pure research, both theoretical and experimental, had to 
be undertaken to clarify particular issues. Much of the applied 
research in this area has been restricted to a particular kind of 
psychological approach, the main concern of which has been the 
optimisation of the ergonomics of the pilot’s work environment. 
With the primary applied psychological problems relating to 
aircrew performance now becoming increasingly associated with 
excessive cognitive, or mental, load, fundamental limitations of
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the ’traditional’ approach are clearly apparent. (Chapanis, 1965; 
Gerbert, 1971; Palckenberg, 1974).
Burrows (1973)-notes that "pilot error in the operation 
of equipment and controls of a type that did not exist 25 years 
ago is now becoming a critical element in accidents". Between 
55% and 85% of aircraft accidents are now attributed to ’human 
error’. Haward (1974) points out that, in cases of serious 
accidents involving misreading of the altimeter, the previous 
preferred action was to investigate redesign of the altitude 
display information, even though thousands of pilots were using 
the instrument satisfactorily. Little attention v/as given to 
the study and analysis of possible cognitive psychological factors 
involved in the accident relating to why that particular pilot 
misperceived his instruments in the particular circumstances 
pertaining at the time of the accident. With the almost uniform 
achievement of high ergonomic standards in modern aircraft, the 
real and continuing problem of apparently unexplained instances 
of failure of human control performance in ergonomically 
satisfactory cockpits by well trained aircrews, is not yet 
understood. (Burrows, 1973).
The traditional approach has ignored many other 
important areas of psychological research, yet the work 
described in this thesis indicates that the cognisance of 
research information from a number of traditionally separate 
areas of information processing psychology (e.g. cognition, 
imagery, perception, memory) may well offer a fresh approach to 
applied problems, and perhaps offer some new solutions, or, at 
least, allow the asking of new questions.
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8.7 The experiments reported in the thesis have demonstrated some 
particular effects of intertask interference. It has been shown 
that; while engaged in internalised thinking, a subject may 
simultaneously experience normal perception of an expected over­
learned complex pattern presented to him. However, the real complex 
pattern actually displayed to the subject may differ considerably 
from the expected overlearned pattern without the subject apparently ? 
being consciously aware of either the existence or the nature of 
this difference. A number of eminent investigators (e.g. Bartlett, 
Bruner, Welford, Piaget, Heisser) have expounded the notion that 
much of what is experienced perceptually is actually inferred, 
i.e. that conscious perceptual experience is often a composite 
of real and memory-derived information. This thesis has provided 
theoretical reasons why this may be so, and has proposed and 
investigated a system by means of which this might occur.
To relate these concepts to the applied situation of 
flying, consider, for example, the case of a pilot who misreads 
his altimeter, a continuing cause of many serious accidents.
This kind of failure on the part of the pilot to process correctly 
what the altimeter is showing is typically categorised as * pilot 
error* in post-accident investigation reports. However, in terms 
of the present theory, this pilot may hot, in fact, be making an 
* error* of perception in the accepted sense of the word. If, 
according to the expected configuration of the aircraft, the 
pilot expects to see a particular altitude value indicated by his 
instrument, a value which, through extensive previous training and 
experience of that particular aircraft configuration, is highly 
over-learned, then he may consciously experience real perception 
of the altimeter reading which he is expecting. In this case,  ^. 
a critical part of the pilot*s perception of his instrument is 
composed of over-learned information held in the pilot*s memory.
This effect will be enhanced if the pilot is either not «
concentrating fully on the flying task (e.g. if he has become
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complacent as a result of many incident-free operations), or if 
he is engaged in a difficult cognitive decision-making task at 
the time (e.g. if he has become confused regarding his present 
position relative to his intended destination). Note that the 
error of ’misreading* the altimeter is not caused by any reduction |
in visual acuity concurrent with either the excessive cognitive %
loading, or insufficient attention being dedicated to the flying 
task. The pilot may consciously perceive the expected, but 
incorrect, reading on the altimeter with ample clarity, but the 
information component of this perceptual experience is derived 
from memory.
This analysis is not concerned with any ergonomic 
deficiencies of the altimeter display. Viewed in this way, the 
performance failure may not represent an ’error’ on the part of 
the pilot, but rather a basic inability of the limited information 
processing capabilities- of the human cognitive system to cope with 
the demands of the situation.
8.8 A new conceptual approach to vigilance-type situations 
was suggested by the theory developed in the thesis. Vigilance 
tasks are common to a wide range of tasks in civil and military 
flying. They normally involve sustained concentration over long 
periods of time, during which a faint and/or infrequent signal 
such as a ’blip’ on a radar screen, may occur. The operator’s 
task is to detect these signals. Such radar watchkeeping tasks 
are typically found in, for example, maritime reconnaissance 
flying, where an operator must watch a radar screen, with the aim 
of detecting a signal indicating the presence of an enemy 
submarine. It is considered that the cognitive approach to 
vigilance, and the new experimental techniques concurrently
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developed, which have been shown to improve signal detection 
performance, offer possible practical application to some real 
vigilance task situations.
Some previous vigilance experiments have investigated 
the effect on signal detection performance of a concurrently 
performed ’arousing’ secondary task of some kind. However, the 
present approach is quite different in that the ’secondary’ task 
and the primary signal detection task are directly and inseparably 
inter-related at a visual sensory level. Existing computer­
generated display techniques may be utilised to explore the 
possibility of superimposing an artificial visual complex pattern 
identification task upon a real vigilance or radar watchkeeping 
task. Already such techniques have been used to present 
’artificial’ signals to operators.
8,9 Finally, the new simulation techniques developed in the 
thesis provide a means of quantification of a parameter of 
attention which is not directly observable during a real subject’s 
task performance. This computer-derived parameter is useful in 
that it is of a quite general, and not task specific nature 
(unlike a transfer function). It is hoped to apply this technique, 
using a larger computer, to the applied situations under consider­
ation. For example, the intention is to investigate, using a 
flight simulator, pilot performance in specific flight situations 
in which the requirement for making complex and difficult decisions 
is coincident with the requirement for accurate visual monitoring 
of the instrument and control displays. From the experimental 
evidence already accumulated, it is predicted that pilots who are 
confronted with the necessity to make a difficult decision, or set 
of decisions, about the state of the aircraft will be more likely 
to fail to detect deviations of instrument or control positions
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from the normal, expected, visual configuration. In more general 
terms, we expect to show that the pilot attempting to solve a 
difficult mental problem, i.e. to arrive at the correct decision 
regarding the most appropriate cockpit drill in a given situation, 
may simply fail to see, in a very real sense, unexpected deviations 
of his instruments or controls from the normal during this period. 
What the ’normal’ instrument and control configuration is depends, 
of course, on the particular global configuration of the aircraft 
(e.g. take off, climb, descent, final approach etc). However, 
the pilot expects to see that particular visual pattern appropriate 
to the mode of the aircraft, and these patterns are, of course, 
over-learned, i.e. able to be completely specified from memory 
information acquired during extensive training.
The simulation techniques can be used to quantify the 
proportion of total capacity a pilot is dedicating to the 
processing of real visual sensory information from his instrument 
and control displays. The procedure may then also be used to 
simulate the effect of varying degrees of cognitive load on 
perception of these displays. Those information areas in which 
changes are least likely to be detected under the conditions of 
partial attention associated with high cognitive loading may be 
determined in this manner.
8.10 Joynson stated in 1971 that, with regard to perceptual 
studies as a whole; "the re-examination of concepts is currently 
more important than the continued accumulation of experimental 
findings of the traditional kind", and that "the divorce between 
theoretical intention and experimental practice might be described 
as the contemporary problem in perception". (1971, p.415).
Such factors have been of prime importance to the motivation and
239
nature of the research reported in this thesis, and it is hoped 
that the work has provided a useful contribution to the 
resolution of these problems.
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APPENDIX I 
Schematic flow chart showing dynamic 
of pattern recognition component of
A c c e s s cognitive system in accordance with the
present model
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APPENDIX II : THE V.V.I.Q.
Rating Description
1 ^Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision*
2 * Clear and reasonably vivid’
3 ’Moderately clear and vivid’
4 ’Vague and dim’
5 'No image at all, you only "knov/" that you are
thinking of the object’
Questionnaire
*** For items 1-4, think of some relative or friend v/honi you 
frequently see, (but who is not with you at present), and 
•consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s eye. 
Item
1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body.
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body, etc.
3. The precise carriage, length of step, etc., in walking,
4. The different colours worn in some familiar clothes.
*** Visualise a rising sun. Consider carefully the picture that 
comes before your mind's eye.
Item
5* The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky.
6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness.
7. Clouds. A storm blov/s up, with flashes of lightning.
8. A rainbow appears,
*** Think of a shop which you often go to. Consider the picture 
that comes before your mind's eye.
Item
9. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side 
of the road.
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10. A window display including colours, shapes and details 
of individual items for sale.
11. You are near the entrance. The colour, shape and details 
of the door.
12. You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter 
assistant serves you. Money changes hands.
*** Finally, think of a country scene which involves trees,
mountains and a lake. Consider the picture that comes before
your mind’s eye.
Item
13o The contours of the landscape.
14o The colour and shape of the trees.
15. The colour and shape of the lake.
16. A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing 
waves.
J
■Hi- .1'..
'‘J -
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APPENDIX III
Photographs used in the picture memory experiments reported 
in Chanters IV and V.
Note. The category numbers adjacent to each homogeneous set 
of photographs (Sy_, S2» S3 etc.») correspond to those used 
in the tables and graphs in Chapters IV and V.
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APPENDIX IV
Examples of pictures and signals 
used in the vigilance experiment.
Notes
The following pages show examples of photographs used in 
the vigilance experiment. Position of the signal in the picture 
is indicated by marking its (x,y) co-ordinates in black on the 
border of the photograph.
The photographs were taken directly from the television 
screen to show as closely as possible the actual display seen by 
the subjects. However, it is extremely difficult to achieve 
satisfactory clarity and contrast by this method. (For example 
the variable diagonal 'shadowing* in the photographs is caused by 
the electron beam scanning the cathode ray tube. This 
'shadowing* is not apparent in normal viewing). Consequently, 
the pictures on the following pages should be regarded only as 
indicative of what was shown to the subject. For the actual 
experiment, the video pictures and signals were of far better 
quality.
•I

Photograph of signal 18 - showing that it is clearly visible, even 
when the picture quality is severely reduced by the process of 
photographing the pattern directly from the television screen.
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04 1 0 
0490 
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04.4 0 
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0460 
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1 / 0
LE^ 03=0
LET 09=0 
LET Ll=0T^EIMT :n^lNT > ;
PRINT "NO. OF CYCLES OF PPOG. PARAMS 
INPUT 0 1’^ PIMT • ■
IF G3=0 THEN GOT|o 0070 
LET G3=0 :
IF S3=l THEN GO^O 007# .
IF S9= 1 THEN GOTO 007 0 
LET G3= 1
PRINT "USE SANE TRIALS & POSN'S 
INPUT G9 :
LET 09=0 
FOR 0=1 TO 01 
PRINT 
PRINT 
PRINT 
PRINT
PRINT "-----
- PRINT
LET L=100 -
LET X=0 
DIN PCL],ECL]
IF 09=1 THEN GOTO 
IF 09=1 THEN GOTO.
PRINT
PRINT "NO. OF
INPUT N 
DIN SCN],u[N]
FOR 1=1 TO N 
LET scn = 0 
NEXT I 
GOSUD 1170 
IF 09=1 THEN 
PRINTI
PRINT "IS :(
INPUT A
IF A=<0 THEN GOTO 
PRINT
"XNA'{=
K9
0270
0230
TRIALS=
GOTO 0570 
A UARIABLE (1) OR CONST (0) 
0530
9^INT
INPUT
PRINT
PRINT
INPUT
UN:
I #320
THEN
IF K1>X9' THEN GOTO 
I F (H9-K1)> CL/2- 1 )
PRINT :
PRINT "ATTENTION LAPSE 
INPUT L 1
IF LI=0 THEN GOTO 0570 
PRINT
UR I NT "h ;'IAXc n i n ) = ";
INPUT K7
IF K7=<K1 THEM GOTO 044 0
GOTO 0320
1/ 0?
-Si
!
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 ^0430 UR I NT
0490 PR IN T "X IIN ( M AX ) = " ;
0500 rJuiIT K3
0510 IF X3=>X9 THEN GOTO 043 0 •
052% GO^O 0570
0530 PRINT
0540 PRINT "K=";
0550 INPUT X
05Ô0 GOTO 0570
_ 0570 PRINT
0530 LET T1=0
0 59 0 LET T=0
0600 LET 09=1
0610 FOR Us i TQ. N '
0620 LET u[Uj=0
0630 NEXT u
0640 FOR 1=1 TO L ,
0650 LET PC 13 = 1
3660 . LET ECI]=I
0670 •NEXT I
0633 LET 5 1 = 0
0693 FOR.1=1 TO N •
0703 IF A=<3 THEN GOTO 0720
07 13 G05UB 1100
3723 GOSUD 103 0
3730 LET 9=0
074 3 LET 51 = 0
3750 IF SC 13 = 0 THEN GOTO ■ 079 0
076% LET 51=1
3770 LET = ]
3 73 3 LE'f' PCP13=-PCP13
0793 FOR J=L9 TO CL9+K) -
0GO0 IF PCJ3XECJ3 THEN LET 5= 1
03 10 NEXT J
0320 IF 5=51 TH EN L ET T= T+ 1
3330 IF 5=51 THEN LET U[ I 3 = F
0343 IF S 1 X  1 TH EN GO TO 03 7 0
0353 IF S 1=5 THEN LET T1 = T1+1
3360 LET P[P13 = -P[P13
3370 NEXT I
0330 PRINT
0390 PRINT "NO. OF SIGNALS PRESENTED:
0903 PRINT
09 10 PRINT "NO. OF SIGNALS DETECTED '
0923 PRINT
0930 PRINT "NO. OF TRIALS = ";n
0943 PRINT
0950 PRINT "NO. OF CORRECT TRIAL 5=
0960 PRINT
0970 PRINT "TRIAL NO'S PRONG ARE
0930 PRINT099 0 ' FOR *•'= I TO N1 000 IF u[Tj]= 1 THEN GOTO 1020
1010 PRINT u; ", ";
1320 NEXT
1030 NEXT 6.
1 043 PRINT
1050 PRINT "-------
1 060 GOTO 0330
1 070 END
1333 LET L9=INT(.5+RND(K)*(L-X))
; 57
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"AU S3TH EN
0 SIGNE PSM 1/0
RETURN
L ET ; :<= I NT C . 2 5+X 1 + RNDC X ) >:< ( K9-X 1 ) ) 
IF L1=<0 THEN GOTO 1160
L ET ((2*1-N )'/M ) î 2
LET K3=K7+V*(X9-X7)
LET K2=:( 1+U*(%3-1{ 1 ) • .
LET X=INT(.2S+K2+RND(K)*(X8-%2))
RETURN
PRINT
IF 09=1 THEN GOTO 1240
PRINT "AUTO SIGML TRIALS 1/0
INPUT 59
PRINT
PRINT 
INPUT
IF 59=1  GOTO 1490
PRINT
IF 09=1 THEM GOTO 1320
PRINT "NO. OF TRIALS I TH SIGN 5=
INPUT 37
DIN YCS7],?CS7]
IF S7>N THEN GOTO 1250
FOR B=1 TO 57
IF 09=1 THEN GOTO 1370
PRINT
PRINT "TRIAL N0="; '
INPUT ?CB]
IF 53=1 THEN GOTO 1430
IF 09=1 THEN GOTO 1410
PRINT " POSN.= "j‘ ■
INPUT YCB3
LET G3=l
LET 5[2[B]]=YCB]
GOTO 1470
LET S5=RND(K)*(L-1)+1
LET 55=ÎMTCS5+.5>
■ PRINT " POSN SELECTED= "I 55
LET S[2CB]] = 55
NEXT B
RETURN •
PRINT
IF 09=1 THEN GOTO 154 0
PRINT "NO. OF TRIALS '-’ITH SIGNE5=
INPUT 57
DIM YCS7],%[S71
FOR T=1 TO 57
LET S6=RND(X)*(N-1)+1
LET 5 6=IMT(S6+.5)
IF SC 5 6 1 x 0  THEN GOTO .1550
PRINT
PRINT "TRIAL NO SELECTED= "J 56;
IF 53=1 THEN GOTO 1650
IF 09=1 THEN GOTO 1690
PRINT " POSN=
INTPIT YCT]
GOTO 1690
LET S5=RND(X)*(L-1)+1
LET S5=INTC55+.5)PRINT " POSN LET YCT] = S5.LET 5CS6]=YCT]NEXT TT7 'T* IJ pi 7»^ J
■ ELECTED=
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